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Abstract 
This study considers major challenges surrounding the governance of petroleum 
resources, and the implications for the economic growth and development of 
hydrocarbon-abundant countries as a result of ineffective economic, political, and 
social mechanisms. This study investigates the causal factors that may promote or 
hinder the effective management of oil and gas resources in the Kurdistan Region as 
a new oil and gas producing region. 
The large and growing body of resource curse literature has used either quantitative 
or qualitative cross-country approaches to investigate the determinant factors 
contributing to poor economic performance in natural resource-rich countries, 
especially petroleum-driven economies. Few research studies have used mixed 
methods to study the resource curse in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
challenges facing petroleum-exporting countries that have been unable to convert 
their petroleum wealth into long-term sustainable development. This research uses 
different methods to explore the economic, political, and social channels behind the 
resource curse theory. The study consists of three sequential phases: a quantitative 
cross-country (econometric) analysis, a qualitative cross-country (comparative) 
policy analysis, and a qualitative case study (semi-structured interviews). 
The findings reveal that well-designed governance of the oil and gas sector is a key 
determinant of the oil and gas producing countries’ success in the management of 
petroleum resources. The results and research methods contribute to the debate in the 
literature on the resource curse regarding major explanations for the poor economic 
performance of natural resource-rich countries by adopting a methodological 
triangulation approach. The results also contribute to the political economy literature 
!$""!
by showing that a well-designed institutional structure for the oil and gas sectors can 
contribute to greater accountability, transparency, and capacity building in the major 
petroleum-exporting countries. A petroleum governance model for the Kurdistan 
Region is proposed, which may be useful for other regions and states with similar 
circumstances or characteristics. 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
This work builds on earlier studies that have espoused the notion of the ‘resource 
curse’. The main idea behind the ‘resource curse’ theory is that natural resource-
abundant countries tend to have lower rates of economic growth than those with 
fewer natural resources (Mahdavy, 1970; Gelb, 1989; Auty, 1993; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, 1997, and 2001; Gylfason,1999). 
Various economic theories have sought to explain the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon, 
including the ‘Dutch disease model’, which refers to the potentially negative impacts 
on the rest of the economy of natural resource windfalls and accompanying rises in 
exchange rates. The economic transmission channels of the resource curse offered by 
economists in petroleum exporting countries range from oil price volatility on the 
international market making oil revenues variable and uncertain, to the existence of 
oil revenue-dependent economies and a lack of diversification in the wider economy 
(Cordon and Neary, 1982; Dées et al., 2008; Gelb, 2011). 
In contrast to economic explanations of the resource curse that have tended to 
overlook the role of institutional quality and effective management of natural 
resources, political economy approaches are now paying particular attention to the 
role of the quality of institutions and the potential interaction between natural 
resources and institutional quality. The political economy theory of the resource 
curse explains that the root of poor economic performance in resource-abundant 
countries lies in the fact that governments have failed to adopt the desired economic 
policies to ensure effective resource revenue management (Ross, 2012; Karl, 1999; 
!&!
Watts, 2004). In other words, policy makers play a major role in restricting growth 
through political interventions, rent seeking and corruption. 
This thesis takes a broader social perspective to shed light on the main challenges 
facing petroleum-producing countries in achieving desirable outcomes. More 
specifically, the purpose of this research is to develop new insights and to deploy 
them to produce policy guidelines for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 
as a new petroleum-producing region, to enable improvement of the management of 
petroleum revenue. 
1.2 Research Rationale 
The potential for natural resource-led development of economic growth has been 
questioned since the 1990s. Between 1970 and 1990, many developing countries, in 
East Asia reduced their economic dependence on primary commodity revenues 
through growth in manufactured exports (Jomo and Rock, 1998). In contrast, oil-
exporting countries in North Africa and the Middle East were unable to benefit from 
the potential for petroleum wealth to drive their economic development, and today 
their economies remain heavily dependent on petroleum revenues. In this regard, 
Auty (1993) first introduced the ‘resource curse’ thesis, which explains that natural 
resources provide a challenging and difficult basis for economic development. 
However, the emergence of new oil- and gas-producing states and regions, such as 
Uganda, Mozambique, Ghana, Papua New Guinea, Suriname, South Sudan and 
Iraqi-Kurdistan, is triggering renewed debate about the potential for petroleum 
wealth to drive economic development. This has driven the current research to 
question what are the specific challenges associated with petroleum-led economic 
development, and what are the potential constraints? More importantly, however, 
!'!
under what conditions can oil- and gas-rich countries channel more of their revenues 
into social capacity building, and how can they promote sustainable economic 
development? 
This project presents a ‘critical reappraisal’ of the resource curse thesis and extends 
the analysis to consider political and social dimensions, and thus the importance of 
the structure of the petroleum sector’s governance model. All research approaches 
that have been used to explain the reasons behind the resource curse suffer from 
certain limitations. Much of the resource curse literature consists only of cross-
country quantitative analysis, which is limited by the objectivity of results, data 
availability and quantification of variables, such as institutional quality and 
economic growth, and may not offer sufficiently robust explanations. Other research 
has used detailed case studies that suffer from limitations of the generalisability of 
their findings to the study population or community (Matveev, 2002; Goldstein and 
Spiegelhalter, 1996; Stiglitz et al., 2009). Therefore, this research adopts a 
triangulation approach, using a cross-country quantitative data (econometric 
analysis), a cross-country qualitative research (comparative case study analysis) and 
a single case study (inductive thematic analysis) to examine issues from different 
perspectives. In other words, ‘the weakness of each single method will be 
compensated by counter-balancing strengths of another’ (Jick, 1979). 
Methodologically, this research engages critically with the resource curse literature. 
It also contributes to knowledge by investigating causal factors that may promote or 
hinder the effective management of oil and gas resources in the Kurdistan Region, 
which also has implications for the security of the wider region and for global energy 
security. The project also seeks to generate lessons and policy guidelines to help 
!(!
inform other new petroleum exporting countries and regions about how best to 
manage their new-found wealth. 
1.3 The Kurdistan Region 
The autonomous Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, which emerged in 1991, 
developed its autonomous institutions, including a parliament and an oil and gas 
sector, following the fall of the Baath party in the wake of the US-led invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Kurdistan Region, Iraq (Source: Google map, 2015) 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the Kurdistan Region is bordered by Syria to the west, 
Iran to the east and Turkey to the north. Erbil is its capital city, and Kurdish and 
Arabic are the official languages of the Region. In addition to Kurds, a diverse 
collection of ethnic and religious minority groups live side by side in the Kurdistan 
Region, including Arabs, Turks, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians, Yizidis, Kakayi and 
Shabaks. Kurdistan is made up of the four governorates of Erbil, Slemani, Deuhok 
and Halabja. In addition to these governorates, the KRG governs parts of Nineveh 
and Diyalah governorates, and also claims jurisdiction over a wider set of ‘disputed 
territories’, including Kirkuk province. 
!)!
1.3.1 The Kurdistan Region’s political system 
In 2005, the Kurdistan Region was officially recognised in the Iraqi constitution as a 
federally semi-autonomous political region. Its three main institutions are the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Kurdistan Parliament, which was 
established in 1992, and the Kurdistan Region Presidency, established in 2005. The 
Kurdistan Region’s parliament has 111 seats and ratified the proposed constitution in 
June 2009. The last parliamentary elections were held on 21 September 2013. 
According to Iraq’s federal constitution, the Kurdistan parliament has considerable 
power to debate and legislate on policies in a wide range of areas, including health 
services, education and training, policing and security, the environment, natural 
resources, agriculture, housing, trade, industry and investment, social services and 
social affairs, transport and roads, culture and tourism, sport and leisure, and ancient 
monuments and historic buildings (KRG, 2015). When the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) seized control of vast areas of Iraq, several governorates and their 
respective authorities suffered total collapse. The central government’s loss of 
political, financial and military power and dysfunctional federal institutions have 
dramatically strengthened the KRG’s authority over foreign affairs and operational 
areas, since the military forces of the Kurdistan Region (Peshmerga) have been 
defending a largely flat and naturally defenceless frontier against terrorist attacks by 
forces loyal to ISIS. Furthermore, the Peshmarga has taken control of most disputed 
territories, such as the giant oil-rich fields in the city of Kirkuk (Financial Times, 
2014; The Guardian, 2014). 
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1.3.2 The Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector 
The peace and relatively high security of the Kurdistan Region compared with the 
rest of Iraq has enabled the KRG to develop its oil sector and lease much of its land, 
on the basis of production sharing agreements, to energy production companies for 
international resource exploration (see Figure 2). As an example of the sector’s 
attractiveness, Exxon Mobile signed a contract in 2011 for six exploration blocks, 
and in doing so relinquished access to blocks in southern Iraq. Other well-known 
international oil companies, such as Chevron, Total, Gazprom and Shell, have also 
pursued their own cooperative agreements in the form of product sharing contracts 
(PSC) with the KRG (The Oil and Gas Year, 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Discoveries and development of 'blocks' in the Kurdistan Region 
(Source: Ministry of Natural Resources, 2015) 
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The Kurdistan Region has resources estimated at 45 billion barrels of oil and 3-4 
trillion cubic metres of natural gas (Gulf Keystone, 2010; Ministry of Natural 
Resources, 2014). The first oil well (Chya Surkh) was drilled in the Middle East in 
1901, which was in Kurdish territory within Iraq (Mackertich and Samarrai, 2015). 
However, this is the first time in the 100-year history of Kurdish oil that Kurds have 
ruled their endowed wealth. 
As a result, the strategic importance of the oil and gas sector in Kurdistan has grown 
significantly over the last decade. There is now a potential to transform the region 
into an important actor in regional and international oil and gas markets. Today, 
Kurdistan has a golden opportunity to use this strength to create new revenue 
streams, to meet the Region’s employment creation needs, and to contribute to the 
social welfare of its people. Therefore, this thesis studies how the KRG can best 
manage the economic, political and social challenges that it faces, so that the 
abundance of natural resources can be a ‘blessing’ rather than a ‘curse’ for Iraqi-
Kurdistan. 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
Aims: 
The aims of this thesis are: 
1. To understand why some petroleum-rich countries succeed in developing their 
economies whilst others fail. 
2. To devise a regime for the effective governance of Iraqi-Kurdistan’s oil and gas 
wealth. 
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These aims are achieved by pursuing the following objectives: 
1.  To examine the causes and consequences of the ‘resource curse’ and identifying 
the major policy challenges associated with oil and gas wealth. 
2. To analyse the economic performance, practices and experiences of a number of 
oil and gas rich countries. 
3.  To explain the development pattern of the oil and gas sector in the KRG and in 
the wider economy. 
4. To evaluate current governance structures relating to the oil and gas sector in the 
KRG. 
5. To devise a management structure and policy framework for the efficient and 
transparent management of Iraqi-Kurdistan’s oil and gas wealth. 
1.5 Methods of study 
This section provides a summary of the approach taken to the current research. The 
present research is designed to offer an explanation for the success or failure of 
resource-abundant countries to derive benefits from the large revenues accruing from 
natural resources, using explanatory theories of the resource curse drawn from the 
extant literature. 
A key strength of the mixed methods approach is that it avoids the weakness of 
applying a single quantitative or qualitative approach alone, allowing the researcher 
to benefit from the strengths of each approach in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Creswell and 
Plano Clarke, 2007). The mixed methods approach used to collect and interpret data 
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on the resource curse phenomenon is designed to elicit an accurate representation of 
reality (Foss and Ellefsen, 2002). The combination of multiple methods in a single 
study adds depth and breadth to the investigation. That is, mixed methods provide in-
depth understanding of complex phenomena such as the resource curse. In addition, 
the current research has a unique rationale based on the research questions and the 
aims of the research. 
For the current research, a sequential mixed methods approach was adopted. A three-
phase, sequential mixed methods approach incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches was followed. Phase one was a quantitative cross-country 
analysis, using econometric methods to achieve Objective 2: to reappraise the 
importance of the key economic, political, and social challenges facing resource-rich 
countries. This was followed by a qualitative cross-country case study, using 
comparative analysis to analyse the economic performance, practices and 
experiences of a number of oil- and gas-rich countries to achieve Objective 3. 
Finally, a qualitative single case study approach was adopted to explore the 
economic, political, and social challenges facing the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas 
sector, thereby achieving Objectives 4 and 5. This combination helps to emphasise 
the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches across the whole research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Creswell and 
Plano Clarke, 2007). The findings of this research contribute to the body of 
theoretical, methodological and practical knowledge. 
The current research adopted a pragmatic paradigm, as most methodological 
researchers (e.g. Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) 
have proposed a pragmatic paradigm for a mixed methods approach. The pragmatic 
paradigm supports understanding of problems in the “real world”. In the case of the 
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current research, this paradigm was oriented towards understanding the reasons 
behind the effective governance of oil and gas wealth, and the researcher, as a 
pragmatist, decided to use a range of tools to investigate comprehensively and from 
multiple perspectives the challenges facing petroleum governance. As a result, the 
interpretation of data involves both deductive and inductive reasoning using a mixed 
methods design. Figure 3 provides an overview of the research and its three 
sequential phases. 
Rather than providing a separate methods chapter, each empirical chapter has its own 
detailed methods section explaining the rationale for the application of each 
approach. 
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1.6 Thesis outline 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction to 
the study. It presents the rational of this research, its aims and objective and the 
study methods. It ends with an outline of the thesis.  
In order to identify the major challenges facing resource-rich countries, a 
comprehensive literature review was conducted and is presented in Chapter 2. On the 
basis of this, the existing challenges were divided into three categories: economic, 
political and socio-economic. In addition, these different transmission channels of 
the resource curse were re-tested through econometric analysis. Chapter 3 re-
appraise the importance of economic, political and social transmission mechanisms 
of the resource curse employing both cross-sectional and panel data methods. 
Particular attention has been given to the role of institutions and the capacity of 
human resources within petroleum-based economies. Chapter 4 presents a cross-
country case analysis (Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria) to identify effective 
economic, political and socio-economic policies that address the various resource 
curse challenges. Chapter 5 presents an overview of Kurdistan’s petroleum 
development through publicly available documents. Chapter 6, which is based on the 
findings of a series of semi-structure interviews, identifies the challenges 
surrounding the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector. Chapter 7 presents a 
discussion of the specific implications of the research findings for both the KRG and 
other new oil- and gas-producing states. It concludes by placing the findings of the 
study in the wider academic context of research on the ‘resource curse’. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of the resource curse suggests that countries endowed with natural 
resources, such as minerals, oil and gas, have been less able to develop their 
economies than others with fewer natural resources (Auty, 1993). However, the 
success stories of some natural resource-abundant countries, such as Norway and 
Botswana, suggest that abundance of natural resources is not a curse per se, but 
rather that government mismanagement of natural wealth is to be blamed for the 
emergence of the resource curse in many resource-rich countries such as Nigeria. 
This investigation considers the findings of research in the field, which have 
identified a diverse set of challenges associated with the natural resource curse faced 
by hydrocarbon-producing states. Economists have sought to investigate the 
relationship between vast natural resource revenues and economic performance. 
Dutch disease, volatility of oil prices, resource revenue-based economies and a lack 
of diversification in the wider economy are significant economic challenges relating 
to the resource curse (Cordon and Neary, 1982; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Dées et al., 
2008; Gelb, 2011). 
Another focus of the literature is on political explanations for the resource curse. It is 
considered that weak governance and poor administrative quality may promote rent-
seeking activities rather than productivity in resource-rich countries: many ‘rentier 
states’ are overwhelmed by corruption and poor human capacity building, resulting 
in economic under-development. From a political point of view, it is concluded that 
the dilemma associated with abundant natural resources stems from the fact that 
decision makers in oil-rich countries have failed to take effective economic measures 
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to combat macro-economic instability caused by the frequent ‘boom and bust’ of oil 
cycles. In other words, government policies are key in generating benefits from 
petroleum resources (Mahdavy, 1970; Karl, 1999; Watts, 2004; Di John, 2011; Ross, 
2012). 
Against this background, this chapter is organised into three main sections 
addressing economic aspects of the ‘resource curse’, political aspects of the 
‘resource curse’, and the inadequacies of the literature. 
2.2 Economic aspects of the ‘resource curse’ 
2.2.1 Dutch disease 
The extraction of natural gas in the Netherlands in the 1960s resulted in a boom in 
the natural resources sector, and with it emerged a new phenomenon known as 
‘Dutch disease’. Economists see this as an economic dimension of the wider 
‘resource curse’ and link it to the influx of resource income into newly resource-rich 
countries. A surge of petro-dollars into a newly resource-rich country leads to 
appreciation of the national currency. This increases costs for the domestic 
manufacturing sector and finances the expansion of imports. Consequently, de-
industrialisation is a side-effect of Dutch disease (Cordon and Neary, 1982). 
Since the introduction of the concept, a substantial literature has developed. For 
example, Cordon and Neary (1982) developed an economic model to explain Dutch 
disease in terms of three economic sectors: the natural resources sector; the non-
resource traded goods sector, consisting of export industries with prices set by 
competition on world markets; and the non-traded goods sector, consisting of 
activities for which the domestic market determines prices. They argue that Dutch 
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disease appears in a resource-rich country when the non-traded goods sector is 
squeezed or ‘crowded out’ by growth in the other two sectors. They also argue 
(1982, p.983) that this may occur through two effects: the ‘spending effect’ and the 
‘resource movement effect.’ They highlight that, on the one hand, a boom in income 
from the natural resources sector increases demand for non-traded goods, resulting in 
higher prices for these goods. This may provoke an increase in the real exchange 
rate, which may result in a deterioration in the competitiveness of the non-resource 
traded sector. This is the ‘spending effect’. The ‘resource movement effect’, on the 
other hand, comes into play when the workforce shifts away from the traded goods 
sector into the non-traded goods sector owing to increases in wages. Both effects 
may lead to de-industrialisation in the non-resource traded goods sector. The 
relocation of labour away from the traded goods sector may also impact on the non-
traded goods sector (Cordon and Neary, 1982). In this respect, Kuralbayeva and 
Stefanski (2013) state that the non-traded sector may often be less productive than 
the manufacturing sector. This may result from the movement of less skilled labour 
into the non-traded sector and the fact that specialist labour tends to remain in the 
manufacturing sector. 
In addition to the spending and resource movement effects, Dutch disease is also 
linked to an inappropriate allocation of resources between the traded and non-traded 
goods sectors that may also result in lower economic growth. According to Sachs 
and Stiglitz (2007), in cases where the proceeds of an oil boom are invested in the 
non-traded goods sector, there may be evidence of Dutch disease. In other words, 
natural resource revenues tend to be consumed by public, non-tradable projects, such 
as roads, construction, power, telecommunications and other services. The 
manufacturing sector is squeezed, the exchange rate appreciates as a result of 
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increased prices owing to increased aggregate demand, the price of imports falls, and 
hence the manufacturing sector becomes uncompetitive in the face of cheaper 
imports. In a more recent study, Saad-Filho and Weeks (2013) state that the effects 
of Dutch disease may relate to the failure of economic policy in resource-rich 
countries, which results in a decline in productivity in the traded goods sector. 
In summary, a review of the literature shows that economic dependence on natural 
resource revenues may pose a major threat to the development of the manufacturing 
and agricultural sectors in a resource-rich economy. This threat is the result of a lack 
of adequate investment and financial support, weakening the competitiveness of 
these industries. Furthermore, Davis and Tilton (2005) state that resource-rich 
countries should take into account the negative growth effect of natural resource 
depletion when determining resource income investment policies, particularly in 
relation to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In other words, sustaining the 
development of the non-resource sector should be an important part of maintaining a 
diverse economic structure. 
Despite evidence that Dutch disease can be attributed to natural resources wealth, 
there is also evidence of significant heterogeneity in outcomes. For instance, Auty 
(2001) stresses that resource-rich countries have experienced different economic 
outcomes following the discovery of resources. While a number of countries, such as 
Nigeria, Ghana and Mexico, have suffered from challenges associated with their 
resource wealth, other countries, such as Malaysia, Botswana and Chile, have 
utilised their resource income to develop more diverse economic productivity. Dutch 
disease may therefore cause severe symptoms in some countries and less prominent 
ones or none in others. The key challenge for newly resource-rich countries and 
regions is to devise an economic strategy that mitigates the risk of Dutch disease. 
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The issue of heterogeneity of effects has been investigated in several other studies. 
Ismail (2010) conducted a survey revealing Dutch disease in a number of oil-
extracting countries between 1997 and 2004. The findings of this study, consistent 
with the theory’s predictions, confirm that an influx of oil rents results in a decline in 
the productivity of the manufacturing sector due to the inflow of revenue and the 
movement of labour and capital in the non-traded sector. The above finding was also 
found in a seminal study of an earlier period by Sachs and Warner (2001), 
demonstrating that resource-rich countries failed to grow their manufacturing sectors 
between 1970 and 1990. 
Contrary to the above studies, in a number of other countries, such as Russia, the 
abundance of resources has resulted in the development of their manufacturing 
sectors, contrary to the expectations of the Dutch disease hypothesis. Works by 
Tabata (2012) and Dobrynskaya and Turkisch (2010) are among two recent 
investigations that show that Russia managed to increase the productivity of its 
manufacturing sector from 1999 to 2007, despite observed symptoms of Dutch 
disease. Furthermore, they note that these symptoms may be linked to effects more 
diverse than those covered by the Dutch disease prediction; hence, Russia may be 
considered to be a specific case. These authors associate economic growth in Russia 
with the adoption of a flexible monetary policy and a rent-sharing policy. One 
example of the monetary policy is the stabilisation of the exchange rate of the 
Russian currency that resulted in maintaining the competitiveness of a number of 
domestic products in both domestic and world markets. In this regard, Ickes and 
Gaddy (2005) argue that ‘excess cost’ may be regarded as another supportive 
measure in the form of rent sharing, which may lead to higher productivity in the 
manufacturing sector. For instance, railway carriage production has increased since 
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oil has been shipped by rail rather than pipeline; however, the transportation of oil by 
rail is more expensive than by pipeline. This may be considered as an excess cost 
policy that encourages production in the manufacturing sector (Ickes and Gaddy, 
2005). As Lipscomb et al. (2010) demonstrate, Indonesia is another resource-
abundant country that considerably increased its manufacturing goods production 
between 2003 and 2008. 
In summary, the Dutch disease hypothesis suggests that resource-abundant countries 
tend to exhibit low economic growth rates because the influx of revenues leads to 
exchange rate appreciation. This may affect the manufacturing sector through 
spending effects and resource movement effects, resulting in a decline in the share of 
manufacturing due to a decrease in competitiveness in both domestic and world 
markets. However, empirical results suggest heterogeneity in terms of impact on the 
economic performance of resource-rich countries. In this regard, several other 
studies have shown that a number of resource-abundant countries have managed to 
develop their manufacturing sectors, leading to export competitiveness on the world 
market. In short, factors other than exchange rates may also play a major role in the 
efficient use of resource revenues (Tabata, 2012; Dobrynskaya and Turkisch, 2010). 
For instance, weak institutional capacity may be a negative determinant in managing 
Dutch disease (Bunte, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to learn from the experiences 
of countries that have been successful in managing the challenges of resource 
renting. 
2.2.2 Oil Price Volatility 
Since the 1970s, crude oil prices have been subject to high volatility. Political 
tension associated with oil-producing countries appears to be a major reason for 
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changes in oil prices. Uncertainty in oil-exporting countries may translate into a 
decline in oil supply on the international market, which may result in a rise in oil 
prices. The history of the oil market shows that several events have had a 
considerable influence on oil prices, including the Iranian revolution in 1980, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, and other political conflicts in African countries such as 
Nigeria and Venezuela (BP Statistical Review of World energy, 2015). Moreover, 
oil prices may be influenced by OPEC’s decisions with respect to oil supply (King et 
al., 2012). Researchers have also suggested fluctuating demand for crude oil as 
another factor affecting the oil market that may have an impact on oil prices. 
Increasing demand from emerging markets, such as China and India, have been a 
determinant factor in oil price rises since 2003 (King et al., 2012). Sornette (2009) 
believes that speculation plays a major role in oil price rises and explains that 
uncertain political situations in oil-producing countries may enhance the oil market, 
whereas King et al. (2012) state that there is insufficient evidence that speculative 
behaviour may influence oil prices. Considering the impact of the dollar exchange 
rate on oil price volatility, Zhang et al. (2008) argue that the changing value of the 
dollar also plays a significant role in the volatility of oil prices because oil markets 
trade in US dollars. For example, depreciation in oil prices may lead to oil price 
increases owing to increasing demand for crude oil. The literature also shows that 
the refinery sector, as a major oil consumer, may have an effect on oil prices (Dées 
et al., 2008). These exogenous factors shed light on the fact that oil price volatility 
may translate into volatile oil revenues, which makes oil revenue management a 
challenging task for oil-based economies. 
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• Mismanagement of fluctuating oil revenue 
Crude oil prices have recently been highly volatile, as shown in Figure 4. Oil prices 
remained high and relatively stable between 2012 and 2013, while increasing 
financial activities in oil markets may have been the cause of recent oil price 
fluctuations (Lombardi and Van Robays, 2011; Labban, 2010). Although oil prices 
fell unexpectedly by about 50 per cent in the second half of 2014, from US$108 
(bpd) in July 2014 to US$48 (bpd) in October 2015, the key points pressuring the oil 
market include sluggish demand, ample supply and a strong US dollar. The total oil 
supply has continued to grow as a result of a spike in US oil supply on the back of 
shale exploration and the expansion of OPEC exports (Baffes et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB May 1987–October 2015 (Source: US 
Energy Information Administration, 2015) 
Oil companies tend to be most interested in oil trade investment, which may produce 
greater profits than oil production investment when oil prices rise. In this context, oil 
price volatility may be transmitted to the level of public spending because of the 
instability of oil revenues available to oil-exporting countries. This volatile fiscal 
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expenditure may have a negative impact on public projects, and may lead to poor 
economic performance by oil-exporting countries (Lorde et al., 2009; Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995). Hence, the lack of an appropriate fiscal policy associated with the 
optimal use of oil revenues may have undesirable effects on economic growth, such 
as macro-economic volatility, low quality of public expenditures and budget deficits 
(Medas and Zakharova, 2009; Sturm et al., 2009; Bacon and Kojima, 2008). 
Macro-economic volatility may pose a major threat to economic growth. Macro-
economic stability may be affected by changes in public spending as a result of 
‘boom and bust’ oil prices. According to Al-Ezzee (2011) and Barrell and Kirby 
(2008), the expansion of public spending, particularly in infrastructure rather than 
investment, may make the tradable sector vulnerable to the floating real exchange 
rate. Moreover, both the lowered competiveness of the tradable sector (Van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2007) and a lack of adequate investment play major roles in 
the poor economic performance of oil-exporting states (Al-Marhubi, 1998). In 
addition, a decline in private investment due to oil price fluctuations may have 
negative effects on economic growth (Cologni and Manera, 2013). 
Low-quality public expenditure is one explanation for the negative impact of volatile 
oil revenues on the productivity of the tradable sector. Sturm et al. (2009) argue that 
rising oil revenues induce excessive social spending and infrastructural investment. 
In this regard, lack of appropriate investment guidelines often results in inaccurate 
evaluation and selection of public projects – so-called ‘white elephants’ or 
‘cathedrals in the desert’. This may cause low efficiency and productivity of fiscal 
policy in oil-producing countries. Medas and Zakharova (2009) also highlight that 
some oil-producing countries, such as Nigeria and Algeria, have allocated oil 
revenues to ambitious public projects without economic return, in pursuit of political 
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objectives. More generally, raising public expenditure may lead to imbalances in the 
state budget. 
Oil revenue volatility also makes balancing the budget a challenge for oil-producing 
countries. El Anshay and Bradley (2011) explain that budgets may be in deficit after 
a drop in oil revenues. Such budget deficits occur because of excessive public 
spending in periods of rising oil revenue, which may result in the state having to 
borrow in order to offset the deficit. This may hamper economic progress by leading 
to the discontinuation of projects associated with infrastructure development or 
economic diversification that aim to expand sources of revenue to counter 
dependence on oil revenues. Similarly, Van Wijnbergen and Budina (2011) stress 
that oil revenue volatility is likely to cause oil-exporting states to fall into debt. This 
may occur because of a lack of a sustainable fiscal policy to avoid budgetary deficit 
once oil prices fall. This would come into play as a result of the mismanagement of 
oil revenues in oil-producing countries. 
• Managing oil revenue volatility 
In dealing with all the above-mentioned challenges, oil-exporting countries may 
implement a number of fiscal measures in order to utilise their oil income 
effectively. Managing oil revenues by setting an annual budgetary resource on the 
basis of a conservative estimate of oil prices is a common fiscal policy among oil-
producing countries (Ossowski et al., 2008; Sturm et al., 2009). In addition, oil-
exporting states may attempt to smooth public expenditure and mitigate the risk of 
budget deficit by adopting conservative oil price assumptions in budgets. Sturm et al. 
(2009) argue that the use of conservative budget-based oil prices may pose a major 
threat to fiscal transparency because authorities may have more room to manoeuvre 
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in spending surplus revenues. For example, in Saudi Arabia, public expenditure has 
increased by 15 to 20 per cent in recent years, despite its budget being based on 
conservative estimations of oil prices. This is likely to be a result of increased 
distribution-related policies, such as subsidies and public sector jobs, to counteract 
increasing social pressures. Similarly, Ossowski et al. (2008) note that such fiscal 
policy may have drawbacks associated with the effective and transparent use of oil 
revenues. Dudley (2011) explains that high budget price estimates may make fiscal 
policy more vulnerable when real oil prices are lower than oil price estimates. For 
instance, the oil exporting countries since mid-2014 have experienced a sharp 
decline in oil revenues. In the current low level oil price environment it is clear that 
only countries with well-designed institutional fiscal polices, such as Norway, are 
able to cope with the significant fall in oil rents (Arezki and Blanchard, 2015). 
Another institutional mechanism is a ‘stabilisation fund’, which saves a proportion 
of oil revenues when oil prices increase in order to combat the consequences of oil 
revenue volatility (and Dutch disease). Reserving a proportion of oil revenues may 
serve to restrain excessive public spending, and thus real exchange rate rises and 
inflation, during periods of rising oil prices (Ossowski et al., 2008; Davis et al., 
2003; Sturm et al., 2009). Furthermore, a stabilisation fund may serve to adjust 
budget deficits on ‘rainy days’ when oil prices fall. Researchers also note that some 
oil-exporting countries may build up oil funds, such as savings funds, in order to set 
aside a part of their oil income for future generations because of the exhaustible 
nature of oil revenues. They argue that a number of factors may make the successful 
management of oil funds challenging for many oil-producing countries. These 
factors include low institutional capacity, and a lack of transparency, accountability 
and political commitment.  
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Explicit fiscal rules may enhance the quality of economic institutions. Transparent 
and accountable institutions lead to the restriction of political interventions in terms 
of managing natural resource revenues. Norway and Botswana have been able to 
manage their natural resource rents by introducing effective institutional policies 
(Sturm et al., 2009; Ossowski et al., 2008). 
• Heterogeneous experiences of institutional fiscal policy 
Research shows heterogeneous experiences in resource-rich countries where 
attempts have been made to establish resource funds to mitigate the negative effects 
of oil revenue volatility on economic performance. Therefore, reasons for the 
success or failure of a particular resource-rich country are debatable. Norway’s 
success in resource management, for instance, derives from a variety of factors. The 
imposition of explicit fiscal rules for oil funds may be the major reason for Norway’s 
success in its management of natural resources (Sturm et al., 2009). Moreover, 
monetary policy, with inflationary and exchange rate targets, transparency, high 
levels of human capacity and infrastructure, and good governance are also important 
in explaining the high performance of Norwegian resource funds. 
According to Benedictow et al. (2013), Russia offers another example of the 
successful implementation of institutional fiscal policies, addressing the negative 
effects of oil price volatility on macro-economic instability. In addition to saving a 
part of its oil revenues in a sovereign wealth fund, and preventing high inflation and 
real currency appreciation through the central bank, the Russian government has 
played a major role in smoothing public expenditure and productivity in the non-oil 
sector. However, Sturm et al. (2009) highlight that public expenditure increased in 
Russia in 2007-2008, and the expansion of public spending was a contributory factor 
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in the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007. This resulted in 
the use the savings fund to adjust the budgetary deficit. The fund was further 
depleted in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, but has since been 
replenished. However, the constant decline in oil prices since the second half of 2014 
has resulted in drawdown in the reserve fund to adjust the budget deficit (Fouche and 
Milhench, 2015). 
On a much smaller scale, Ossowski et al. (2008) note that Timor-Leste has been 
running its oil fund positively, as it has been well integrated into the budget system 
and managed within an overall fiscal framework. This study also finds that 
transparency and accountability are further reasons for the success of Timor-Leste’s 
oil fund management. Similarly, Davis et al. (2003) emphasise that oil funds may 
operate effectively if they are fully integrated into the central government’s 
budgetary process. This leads to enhancement of transparency and accountability 
relating to oil revenue management because all transfers into or out of the fund go 
through the central government budget and are reported by the government. For 
example, a study by Usui (2007) shows that Azerbaijan has failed to manage its oil 
fund effectively. This may be attributed to the design of and fiscal rules associated 
with its oil fund. Azerbaijan’s fund is separate from the public budget, so savings 
can be invested in public projects outside the budget plan. This may result in public 
expenditure increases and greater opportunities for political intervention. 
Conversely, Indonesia and Malaysia have been able to manage their oil revenues 
effectively through appropriate investment policies associated with diversification 
and industrialisation of the economic structure (Cotinho, 2011). In addition, efficient 
fiscal rules, which promote budget balance, investment in the non-tradable sector 
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and human resource development, and high institutional capacity play major roles in 
managing resource revenues efficiently in both countries (Cotinho, 2011). 
In summary, the empirical studies reviewed here show that oil revenue-based fiscal 
policies play a significant role in addressing the imbalances in public revenues faced 
by oil-exporting countries due to the highly volatile nature of oil prices. The major 
purpose of sound and effective fiscal policies is to enhance the economic 
performance of oil-producing countries in the face of oil price volatility, which poses 
a major threat to oil-exporting countries that are heavily dependent on oil revenues. 
2.2.3 Oil dependence versus diversification 
Natural resource revenues decrease the need for savings and investments in other 
non-resource-based sectors (Gylfason and Zoega, 2002). Countries with resource-
based economic development plans may, in the long term, be vulnerable to economic 
recession and low growth (Payton, 2010; Murshed and Serino, 2011). These 
economic dilemmas are due mainly to global economic conditions, price 
fluctuations, ambiguities in reserve estimations and geopolitical uncertainties. 
Stevens et al. (2015) highlight that high dependence on petroleum revenues 
jeopardises economic stability and real activity in oil- and gas-abundant countries. 
They argue that appropriate economic diversification policies have great potential to 
enable the building of strong, sustainable economies in petroleum-abundant 
countries. One measure that countries might take in order to combat these economic 
challenges is to endorse economic and export diversification strategies. In this 
section, the various factors that might hinder the economic performance of resource-
based countries are discussed, with an examination of the different forms of 
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diversification strategy adopted to promote more sustainable economic growth in 
developing countries with abundant natural resources. 
• Risks of economic dependence on oil exports 
One of the risks of economic dependence on oil exports is the enclave nature of the 
resources sector, which may hamper the development of the manufacturing sector. 
The extractive sector is an enclave because it is capital intensive and has limited 
links with other sectors of the domestic economy (Gelb, 2011; Esanov, 2012). In 
other words, the resources sector generates income independently, without engaging 
with other domestic economic sectors. It is only domestic labour intensive during the 
construction phase of the associated infrastructure, so may contribute to high 
unemployment rates in resource-rich countries (Gelb, 2011; Esanov, 2012). 
As noted above, besides the lack of links with other parts of the economy, resource-
dependent countries tend to suffer from poor economic performance because of the 
crowding out of the traded sector by the extractive sector. In fact, one of the main 
explanations for Dutch disease is that the traded sector may become less competitive 
in the international market when squeezed by the natural resources sector (Sachs and 
Warner, 1999). Uncompetitive production by domestic firms may lead to a decline in 
non-oil export revenues, which in turn increases dependence on the extractive sector 
in terms of the generation of budget revenue and influence on the exchange rate. 
A further factor that may undermine sustainable, long-term economic growth in 
resource-based economies is the unstable macro-economic situation in many petro-
states. Moreover, many oil-producing countries may suffer from macro-economic 
instability as a result of their economic dependence on oil revenues as the major 
income-generating channel (Alichi and Arezki, 2009). 
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• Implications of diversification 
Previous studies have developed a range of arguments associated with the benefits of 
diversification through the development of the manufacturing sector. In contrast to 
the extractive sector, manufacturing offers plenty of scope for new job creation, 
human capital development and innovation. The non-resources sector is also 
regarded as a catalyst for economic and technological progress, as well as for 
modernisation. Consequently, diversification is integral to macro-economic stability. 
Payton (2010) argues that investment in the diversification of economic structure in 
order to mitigate the negative impact of resource revenue dependence may result in 
sustainable economic progress. For example, Norway has succeeded in developing a 
wide range of manufacturing activities, and is therefore less economically dependent 
on resource revenues. Research suggests that oil-producing countries that suffer from 
low diversification should learn from the success of other countries in relation to 
diversification policies and processes. Likewise, Gelb (2011) explains that effective 
diversification can provide a buffer against oil price shocks, and thus promote 
macro-economic stability. Sachs and Warner (2001) also insist that development of 
the manufacturing sector may result in productivity growth and technical 
advancement. 
Another argument for diversification is that it may lead to expansion of employment 
opportunities in resource-dependent countries. Case studies (Berry, 2008) have 
shown that Indonesia’s effective economic policy has resulted in increased job 
opportunities in various sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing and construction. 
Similarly, Chile and Venezuela have focused development on their agricultural 
sector, which has to some extent helped to create jobs, whereas Nigeria has created 
more jobs in the construction industry. 
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• Diversification strategies 
In order to deal with the negative impacts of over-dependence on the resources 
sector, it appears imperative to adopt diversification strategies in order to pave the 
way for sustainable, long-term economic growth. These can be categorised as ‘real’ 
and ‘quasi-diversification’ (Gelb, 2011). Real diversification relates to non-resource-
based sectors and a move away from the resources sector to manufacturing, 
agricultural and service sectors, whereas engaging in a resource-based value chain 
and developing other resource sectors marks quasi-diversification, for example the 
development of a petrochemical industry based on domestic oil and gas production. 
- Manufacturing sector 
The diversification of non-resource-based manufacturing activities may lead to the 
provision of goods for the local market as import-substituting economic activities, 
and also for world markets through the promotion of internationally-competitive 
domestic production. An increase in non-natural resource-based exporting 
commodities provides resource-rich countries with another source of income that 
reduces their economic dependence on natural resource revenues (Gelb, 2011; 
Esanov, 2012). Many resource-rich countries have shown limited progress in terms 
of economic diversification; however, Indonesia and Malaysia have effectively 
diversified their manufacturing sectors. Studies conducted by Gelb (2011) and 
Esanov (2012) indicate that the measures applied by these two countries have 
focused on reducing the costs of production, implementing effective macro-
economic policy, and upgrading their technological and human capacity. 
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- Agricultural sector 
Development of the agricultural sector is another form of economic diversification 
adopted to overcome the resource curse in resource-abundant countries. Hailu et al. 
(2011) suggest that allocating resource rents to the development of rural areas may 
result in import substitution in relation to domestic food production and the 
improvement of food security. An effective agricultural diversification strategy 
requires public investment in the development of rural infrastructure, irrigation 
systems, improved seeds and appropriate fertilizers. Coxhead and Li (2008) also 
argue that effective management of oil rents has enabled Indonesia to diversify its 
economy into its agricultural sector, which may lead to import-substituting economic 
activities. 
- Service sector 
The development of the service sector, such as tourism and construction industries, 
may also contribute to the sustainable economic growth of resource-rich countries. 
For instance, development of the tourism sector is an income source that requires 
complementary services, such as logistical, technical and health services and well-
developed infrastructures, to enable the promotion of diversification, which may also 
play a major role in reducing the oil revenue dependence of crude oil-exporting 
countries (Shafaedin, 2001). 
- Value-added economic activities within resources sector 
Diversification may also occur within the extractive sector. Industrial sectors provide 
specialised equipment and services that can be regarded as a backward linkage, 
while forward linkages may create opportunities to develop resource-based domestic 
manufacturing activities to generate value-added products such as petrochemicals 
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and refined fuels (Hailu et al., 2011). In this regard, Botswana has succeeded in 
increasing its manufacturing activities to generate value-added resource-based 
products by cutting and refining diamonds domestically rather than exporting them 
uncut for other countries to manufacture the finished product. Therefore, moving the 
resources sector up the value chain may lead to increased domestic productivity by 
protecting against technology leakage, thus creating market power (Hailu et al., 
2011). 
- Development of other resource sectors 
It is widely accepted that the extractive sector may make a significant contribution to 
the creation of new resource sector activities to promote economic diversification. 
For example, effective fiscal links between the oil sector and other parts of the 
economy in Indonesia have enabled development of the gas sector (Gelb, 2011). 
• Impediments to diversification 
Diversification of an economy is an immense and challenging task for many 
resource-dependent countries. The availability of institutional and human capacity 
may have an impact on the outcome of any diversification strategy. Therefore, well-
functioning government institutions and highly skilled human capital may be 
decisive factors in successful diversification. 
Recent studies have shown that an absence of political will and low institutional 
quality may be major impediments to diversification strategies (Gelb, 2011; Esanov, 
2012; Arezki et al., 2011; Arezki and Nabil, 2012). The establishment of strong 
institutions may also reinforce the transparency and accountability associated with 
spending of resource revenue by resource-rich countries, as well as providing a more 
business-friendly climate to attract private domestic and foreign investment. 
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Consequently, leaders have limited room for manoeuvre, because rent seekers often 
form a major opposition to a diversification policy owing to their desire to maintain 
their monopoly over the extractive resources of many resource-rich countries (Auty, 
2001). In other words, economic and political efforts may be severely hampered by 
leaders whose rent seeking poses a threat to the diversification of manufacturing 
production and the development of other industrial activities. Other factors that may 
hinder the implementation of diversification are a lack of skilled human resources 
and a lack of a well-developed infrastructure. 
Lack of access to and the often poor quality of educational systems and the absence 
of high-impact research and development capacity in extractive countries are further 
factors that may contribute to low diversification in terms of economic structure and 
performance (Gylfason, 2001). The growth of enterprises and manufacturing 
requires educated human capital, and policy makers in resource-rich countries may 
fail to take this aspect into account in their economic policies, so the development of 
human capacity is likely to be neglected. A study conducted by Ding and Field 
(2005) shows that resource dependence and human capital development are 
negatively related. For example, human capacity building has played a major role in 
Malaysia’s successful economic diversification strategy (Gelb, 2011). 
In summary, natural resources may be a positive driver of economic growth if 
resource-dependent countries endorse economic diversification and use their 
revenues to promote sustainable and long-term economic growth. Diversification 
strategies may take the following forms: 
• The improvement of value added within the oil and gas industry by moving 
down the value chain through the petrochemical industry and the refining sector.  
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• The development of a domestic oil and gas service industry to capture some of 
the rent impacts. 
• Diversification into other resource sectors such as natural gas and non-fuel 
minerals. 
• Real diversification away from the resources sector into agriculture, 
manufacturing activities and services such as tourism and construction. 
• Export diversification for the purpose of expanding new products with high value 
added into new export markets. 
Skilled human resource capacity and a well-developed infrastructure are integral to 
success in diversifying economic structure. Review of the literature associated with 
diversification strategies in resource-dependent countries reveals that institutional 
quality and political commitment may also be essential factors determining the 
success of diversification programmes. In other words, diversification may be 
difficult to achieve when it threatens the monopoly power base of a ruling élite. 
Thus, successful implementation of the policy measures needed to mitigate 
economic risks associated with resource dependence rests on the political will to 
devise the right policies and the institutional capacity to implement them. 
2.3 Political Economic Aspects of ‘Resource Curse’ 
According to Ross (1999, p.307), ‘[t]he failure of states to take measures that could 
change resource abundance from a liability to an asset has become the most puzzling 
part of the resource curse’. Ross highlights that the root cause of poor economic 
performance in resource-abundant countries is that governments have failed to adopt 
desired economic policies associated with resource revenue management. 
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The core of such work is political explanations for ineffective states in terms of 
combating the ‘resource curse’. Theoretical explanations of policy failure have 
focused on how political incentives generated by large-scale natural resource 
development may promote rent seeking, corruption and patronage activities by 
politicians and powerful groups. From this perspective, it is suggested that 
ineffective governance in relation to the petroleum sector in oil- and natural gas-
exporting countries may be related to corruption, rent seeking, patronage, poor 
institutional quality, lack of skilled human capacity and social and political conflict. 
2.3.1 Governance and institutions 
The role of government institutions is particularly decisive in the optimal allocation 
of resource rents in petroleum-exporting countries to productive projects, rather than 
to ‘white elephant’ activities that may not be economically efficient but may be of 
great value to politicians and interest groups (Karl, 1999; Torvik, 2009; Bridge and 
Le Billon, 2013; Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007). In petro-states, government institutions 
may be either the main contributing factor to a ‘resource curse’, or a ‘blessing’. 
Therefore, it is essential to reform and develop political and administrative 
institutions in order to ensure the optimal use of oil and natural gas revenues by 
securing investment in the productivity of the resources sector and economic 
diversification. 
Similarly, Mehlum et al. (2006) emphasise that the quality of government 
institutions may determine the impact of resource revenues on the economic 
performance of resource-abundant countries. They suggest that a ‘grabber-friendly 
institution’ may lead to economic stagnation and, in turn, low growth. Similarly, 
Heredia (1998) highlights the significant role of well-functioning institutions in 
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terms of a sound path towards economic growth in resource-rich countries. However, 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) do not identify a strong correlation between the 
economic growth and poor levels of government institutional capacity, measured by 
rule of law; the reasons for this are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2 Institutions and natural resources 
Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2007 offers a three-fold explanation of the causes of the 
poor economic performance of some resource-rich countries based on 1) institutions, 
2) natural resources and 3) trade policies/openness. Figure 5 provides a visual 
representation of how these three determinants of growth interact with income and 
with each other. 
 
Figure 5: Direct and indirect effects of natural resources on income per capita 
(Arezki and Van der Ploeg 2007, P.12). 
As can be seen from the directions of relationships in the graph, Arrow 1 indicates 
that large resource revenues may induce rent-seeking activities, which may result in 
lower income per capita. Arrows 3 and 4 represent channels through which natural 
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resources may aggravate the negative impact of existing low institutional quality on 
income by increasing corrupt behaviour amongst officials and those in public 
positions. Arrows 5 and 7 represent the argument that Dutch disease (a decline in 
non-resource traded commodities due to rises in the real exchange rate) may result in 
a decline in income per capita. Under this condition, governments are forced by 
political pressure exerted by interest groups to adopt restrictive trade policies, such 
as import substitution and subsidies, which reduce income per capita. These 
inappropriate fiscal policies may accelerate corrupt behaviour, since transfers of oil 
revenues to protected industries may not be transparent because of low institutional 
quality. This means that institutional quality may also affect income per capita 
(Arrows 3 and 7) by diverting resource revenues from more productive use, such as 
diversification of the wider economy. Arrows 6 and 2 show that institutional quality 
and trade openness may be affected by income during an oil boom, as huge oil 
revenues in resource-dependent countries may induce more rent seeking, as well as 
corruption and patronage. 
It can be concluded that the quality of pre-existing institutions may affect the impact 
of natural resources on growth while, conversely, resource abundance may also have 
an effect on institutional quality, leading to ineffective governance through rent 
seeking, corruption and patronage. 
2.3.3 Rent seeking 
A major focus of research associated with the resource curse is the link between the 
resource curse and rent-seeking behaviour. Mehlum et al. (2006) explain that 
entrepreneurs tend to specialise in rent-seeking rather than productive activities due 
to high resource revenues and the poor quality of public institutions. Poor economic 
 37 
!
performance may be attributable to the escalation of unproductive activities through 
rent seeking in oil- and gas-rich countries. In other words, inefficient governing 
institutions may waste resources rather than translating them into assets for long-
term growth. 
Mehlum et al. (2006) also link high growth in resource-abundant states with the 
effective rule of law, which may enhance institutional quality. It is suggested that 
well-functioning institutions may account for economic progress in some resource-
rich countries, such as Norway, Botswana, Canada and Australia. Therefore, an 
increase in productivity, and thus economic growth, may be hampered by low-
quality institutions, creating the potential for increased rent seeking and corruption 
among the powerful. 
Kolstad (2009) argues that increased rent seeking and a tendency towards patronage 
are aggravated by inefficient governing institutions, and highlights that the 
development of institutional quality may contribute to the sound management of 
natural resources. This means that an effective state may turn its resource 
endowment into a blessing rather than a curse. The same author mentions that rent-
seeking incentives and patronage tend to emerge among powerful groups and 
politicians, which may cause a decline in the productivity of public sector activities 
and projects. Several other authors also argue that natural resources may impede 
democratisation by increasing rent-seeking and patronage incentives in countries 
excessively dependent on oil and gas revenues, namely rentier states (Ross, 2001; 
Busse and Gröning, 2013). 
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2.3.4 Corruption 
The literature dealing with the resource curse (e.g. Karl, 2004) explains corrupt 
behaviour as a tendency by politicians and officials to satisfy individual interests 
through the illegitimate use of authority, while sacrificing the public interest 
associated with the distribution of resource rents. Corruption is a consequence of 
poor institutions and may harm a resource-abundant state’s efforts to enhance its 
economic performance. For instance, Al-Kasim et al. (2013) argue that weak 
petroleum governance may have a negative impact on the provision of welfare in oil-
exporting countries. In this regard, corruption between those in authority and oil 
firms is considered to be a major obstacle to optimal oil and gas production. Under 
such circumstances, corruption may occur in the form of bribes, cash or payments in 
kind by oil firms to officials to secure access to the national reserve base. 
In this setting, another study also considers the state’s involvement in petroleum 
production in oil-producing countries through national oil companies to be a 
determining factor for increased corruption among officials related to the oil and gas 
sector. For instance, Arezki and Bruckner (2011) highlight that the ownership 
structure of oil and petroleum industries plays a major role in the existence of 
corruption in the resources sector. Furthermore, rentier states are granted greater 
authority over resource development, and thus oil rents directly accruing to the 
government budget may create more opportunities for corrupt state leaders in 
connection with oil production because of poor institutional practices and a lack of 
transparency. Consequently, rentier states’ attempts to reduce political rights in order 
to promote their own interests are the most likely reasons for conflict and civil war 
(Ross, 2001). 
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Similarly, Hammond’s (2011) case studies on Angola and Venezuela indicate that 
increased political control over oil companies and state participation in petroleum 
production have encouraged corruption. Nigeria is another frequently-cited example 
of a corrupt country associated with oil revenues (Osoba, 1996; Watts, 2004). 
Widespread corruption in Nigeria has resulted in inefficiency in terms of domestic 
investment and low-quality projects, both of which may impact negatively on 
economic development. 
2.3.5 Patronage 
In addition to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour, the existence of a patronage 
system among politicians and other powerful groups is another reason for poor 
institutional capacity in resource-dependent countries. It is widely accepted that in 
many resource-rich countries, where abuse and mismanagement of resource rents has 
resulted in low growth, governments may try to remain in power through the 
distribution of resource rents to those in official positions and other powerful groups 
(Kolstad and Soreide, 2009). 
To counter the problems discussed above, Collier and Hoffer (2005) propose a 
model of democratic politics that compromises between electoral competition and 
checks and balances to impede patronage behaviours. A lack of effective functioning 
institutions may result in poor accountability and transparency in resource revenue 
allocation and spending. Under such circumstances, governments tend to use 
resource rents for their own patronage purposes, which may bring a democratic 
regime into question. Similarly, Robinson et al. (2006) emphasise that resource rents 
tend to be used by politicians for patronage purposes in order to generate political 
support and achieve re-election. For example, the expansion of public spending was 
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a contributory factor in the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in 
Russia in 2007 (Sturm et al., 2009). Another way for political leaders to increase 
patronage is the allocation of lucrative and influential public sector posts to their 
supporters. 
2.3.6 Other political economic explanations 
Inequality and social conflict are other negative consequences of poor institutional 
quality in terms of the redistribution of resource rents in extractive countries. 
Ramsay (2011) argues that there may be a negative correlation between increasing 
petroleum revenue and institutional capacity in oil-producing countries. This 
negative relationship, which may result in inequality and authoritarianism, arises 
from such factors as the diverse economic and political histories of resource-rich 
countries. According to Johan (2007), political instability may result in poor 
economic performance in oil-producing countries. Social and political conflict may 
be caused by a lack of transparency and accountability in terms of revenue 
management in resource-rich countries. In this context, rent seekers attempt to 
increase their profits from oil revenues, which in turn generates inequality in the 
distribution of oil income, and is likely to cause social conflict and even civil war in 
resource-rich countries. 
Democracy in extractive countries is perhaps under most threat from strong 
competition between powerful groups to gain profit from resource revenues. The 
lack of effective systems of checks and balances in the resources sector, linked to 
weak fiscal institutions, may lead to the mismanagement of oil revenue collection 
and spending. Elbadawi and Soto (2012) and Collier (2010) argue that many 
resource-rich countries have been afflicted by the resource curse due to poor 
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monitoring mechanisms in relation to the flow of rents from the exploitation of 
natural resources. They argue that this weakness on the part of institutions is 
inconsistent with the practice of democracy in oil-exporting states. 
As discussed above, the development of human resource capacity is often ignored in 
petroleum-exporting countries in terms of failing to fund education adequately 
(Gylfson, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Humphreys et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, human resource development is delayed by a lack of resource revenue 
allocation to industries with intensive learning by doing (Van Wijnbergen, 1984). As 
a result, many such countries may suffer from poor institutional quality. Kronenberg 
(2004) explains that inefficient institutions may stem from unprepared and unskilled 
actors in relation to the resources sector. Under these conditions, a rise in corruption 
and an ineffective rule of law endanger the public interest. 
Political and economic instability, which may seriously damage a resource-rich 
country’s economy, may be due to the mismanagement of oil rents through poor 
institutional capacity. Guenther (2008) stresses that a resource curse may develop in 
resource-dependent countries as a result of a weak political economy and bad 
governance associated with the resources sector. Ruling élites tend to gain profits by 
increasing their control over the resources sector. In this context, rentier states levy 
low taxes because a large proportion of oil revenues accrue directly to these states. 
This leads to a decline in the need for an effective taxation system (Ross, 1999a; 
Karl, 1997; Mahdavy, 1970; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005), and consequently these 
governments do not meet their commitment to be held accountable for the spending 
of resource revenues in economies over-dependent on these revenues. 
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2.3.7 Accountability and transparency 
Many authors dealing with the resource curse attribute its root cause to a lack of 
institutional quality in resource-rich countries such as petroleum exporters. However, 
producer-friendly institutions may combat the emergence of the resource curse and 
promote the creation of wealth within resource-rich nations (Mehlum et al., 2006). 
These producer-friendly institutions seek transparency and accountability, which 
may provide substantial opportunities to increase productive activities and so 
encourage long-term economic growth. Kolstad and Wiig (2008) assert that 
transparency is a key factor in curbing the negative impacts of the resource curse. 
Improvement of institutional quality through transparency, making information with 
respect to resource revenue collection and spending available to public scrutiny, may 
reduce corruption and patronage. These authors point out that the emergence of 
various international initiatives may enforce extractive states to improve their 
institutional quality, thereby promoting transparency. High-quality institutions may 
encourage human resource development, which may be regarded as a pillar of 
economic growth. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2010) indicate that producer-friendly 
institutions may enhance human resource capacity in resource-rich countries. 
The implementation of transparency and accountability may result in an increase in 
public trust, which may resolve political and social tensions in oil- and natural gas-
exporting countries. In this regard, Herringshaw (2004) argues that the poor 
economic performance of resource-abundant countries may be attributed to a lack of 
transparency in resource revenue management. For instance, the governments of 
many African natural resource extractive countries are unable to handle resource 
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income effectively in order to improve the welfare of their nations, due mainly to 
poor institutional quality. In such contexts, social conflict is highly likely. 
2.4 Summary 
The body of work analysed here shows that poor institutional quality in terms of 
combating corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and patronage may result in poor 
economic performance. The literature suggests that high oil revenues may divert the 
attention of entrepreneurs from productive activities to rent seeking. A ‘grabber-
friendly institution’ may facilitate rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour, which reduces 
the productivity of projects. Ruling élites also spend resource revenues for the 
purpose of staying in power through the allocation of funds to political supporters 
and powerful groups, and also on expenditure that is popular with the electorate, 
such as subsidised fuel. Recent trends in oil contracts, based on profit sharing 
between rent-seeking governments and powerful international oil companies, have 
resulted in the semi-privatisation of natural resources, with a loss of control over the 
sector, loss of ownership of land and national resources, negative environmental 
externalities and foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of nations. Good 
institutional governance should provide accountability and transparency with respect 
to the collection and spending of resource revenues. Those institutions that maintain 
government accountability may reassure the public that their resource revenues are 
being well spent and their national resources are being maintained in order to ensure 
sustainable economic growth. 
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Table 1: Summary of literature review 
Explanation Key points Authors 
Dutch disease 
Natural resources 
Real exchange rate appreciation 
Decline in manufacturing sector 
Cordon and Neary (1982); Sachs 
and Warner (1999, 2001); Auty 
(2001); Bunte (2011); Tabata 
(2012) 
Volatility of oil 
prices 
Causes of volatile oil prices 
Mismanagement of fluctuating oil 
revenues 
Macro-economic instability 
Fiscal policy 
Budget price estimates 
Stabilisation fund 
Savings fund 
Dees et al. (2008);Ossowskie et 
al. (2008); Davis et al. (2008); 
Sturm, Gurtner, and Alerge 
(2009); Dudley (2011); Kinge et 
al. (2012). 
Oil dependence 
versus 
diversification 
Risk of economic dependence on oil 
exports 
Implications of diversification 
Diversification strategies 
Manufacturing sector 
Agricultural sector 
Service sector 
Value-added economic activities 
within resource sector 
Development of other resource 
sectors 
Obstacles to diversification 
Shafaedin (2001); Gylfaston 
(2001); Berry (2008); Alichi and 
Arezki (2009); Gelb (2011); 
Hail et al (2011); Arezki et al. 
(2011); Esanov (2012); Arezki 
and Nabil (2012). 
Governance and 
institutions 
Ineffective states 
Low quality of political, 
governmental and economic 
institutions 
Bridge and Le Billon (2013); 
Ross (1999, 2012); Karl (1999); 
Mehlum et al. (2006); Torvik 
(2009). 
Institutions and 
natural 
resources 
Rent seeking 
Corruption 
Patronage 
Accountability 
Transparency 
Shafaedin (2001); Gylfaston 
(2001); Berry (2008); Alichi and 
Arezki (2009); Gelb (2011); 
Hail et al (2011); Arezki et al. 
(2011); Esanov (2012); Arezki 
and Nabil (2012). 
 
In order to understand the roots of the ‘resource curse’ in resource-rich countries, 
particularly petroleum-exporting countries, it is crucial to consider institutional 
quality as a major factor behind slow growth. As a result, a lack of producer-friendly 
and nationally-conscious institutions may pose a major threat to policies designed to 
overcome the economic challenges facing petroleum-exporting states. The key 
points of economic and political explanations of the resource curse are summarised 
in Table 1. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
A key shortcoming of the resource curse literature is the lack of clear understanding 
of the effect of the managerial model of the oil sector, in particular its effects on the 
sector’s economic performance. Few case studies have focused on effective 
administrative design as a causal factor affecting the performance of the oil sector. 
The literature suggests that an effective model of governance for the national 
petroleum sector enables the effective management of petroleum resources and 
revenues (Heller and Marcel, 2012; Lahn et al., 2007, 2009; Thurber et al. 2010, 
2011; Luong and Weinthak, 2006). 
The main contribution of the current research will be to identify the main channels 
through, which oil and gas resources may promote or impede economic growth from 
a broader social perspective. This information will be used to outline the main policy 
implications for domestic policy makers in achieving desirable growth outcomes. In 
other words, this research will provide a social explanation for the resource curse in 
resource-rich countries. Therefore, high priority should be given to policies that 
address the enhancement of ‘social capital’. This means that policies in resource-
abundant countries should be less about macro-economic management and more 
about administrative and human capacity building to reduce or prevent the negative 
impacts of the resource curse, thus providing the right incentives to players in the 
resources sector. Moreover, all policies need to take into account existing 
bureaucratic capacity – the government’s capability to deliver effective policies and 
public services independently of political pressures and interventions – and human 
resource capacity as determining factors in success or failure. 
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Chapter 3: Transmission Channels of the ‘Resource Curse’ 
Reappraised (Cross-Country Quantitative Method) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this chapter are to investigate whether there is evidence of the 
resource curse – a significant negative relationship between natural resource 
dependence and economic growth – and, if so, to reappraise the importance of 
transmission channels with regard to the resource curse. 
The main research questions are: 
(i) is there a negative connection between resource dependence and economic 
growth? 
(ii) does human resource and institutional development positively affect growth 
performance, and do natural resources influence growth through institutional 
and human resource quality? 
This research reappraises the negative relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth by applying empirical cross-sectional and panel data analysis using 
a large dataset of 160 countries for the period 1970-2010. In these analyses, the 
emphasis is on (1) the applicability of economic variables to economic growth, and 
(2) the specific influence of institutional and human resource capacity on natural 
resources in natural resource-dependent economies. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the samples and a description 
of the data. Section 3.3 introduces the generic growth model and provides an 
overview of the most common methodological difficulties encountered in empirical 
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studies seeking to confirm resource curse effects. Section 3.4 applies a cross-
sectional model and Section 3.5 uses panel data with a five-year average to estimate 
a dynamic panel growth regression model. Section 3.6 presents a summary and 
conclusions. 
3.2 Econometric Model 
The basic econometric specification for testing whether natural resources induce 
certain distortions in the economy resulting in low economic growth is a growth 
regression model using elements from neoclassical and endogenous growth theories, 
as described by Durlauf et al. (2005). This model postulates a conditional 
convergence hypothesis, which states that economic growth is negatively related to 
initial income (Solow, 1994 and Lee et al. 1997). The growth equation has generally 
been presented as follows: 
! 
git = "0 +"igit#1 +"2Xit +"3NRit +"4 Instit +"5HRit +$it (3.3.1)  
where g is the growth rate in per worker GDP over the period, gt-1 is the log of per 
worker t,i at time t in country i, Xi is a vector of economic variables, and NR is an 
indicator of resource dependence. Inst and HR are measures of institutional and 
human resource quality, respectively. In estimating the equation, the most common 
methodological difficulties for empirical studies are: 1) the choice of control 
variables, 2) the choice of adequate estimators, 3) the measure of the natural 
resource, and 4) the effect of different types of natural resource dependence on GDP 
growth. The lagged value of GDP per worker accounts for the relative convergence 
hypothesis. 
 48 
!
3.3 Sample and Data Availability 
The sample and data used in this analysis consist of all countries and years for which 
relevant data are available, covering 160 countries from 1970 to 2010. The initial 
year of the dataset is 1970 because, on average, the major resource exporters had 
high incomes at the beginning of this period as oil prices began to increase in the 
early 1970s. Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that natural resource-rich countries with 
high incomes in 1970 tended to exhibit lower growth over the following forty years. 
The data used to construct the regressions were drawn from two databases frequently 
used in the literature: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and the 
Penn World Tables. GDP per worker, measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), is 
expressed in constant 2005 international dollars. Prior to taking the natural log, 
investment as a share of GDP was obtained from Penn World Table 7.1. Average 
years of secondary schooling for the entire population, terms of trade, and data on 
primary exports for the period 1970-2010, and institutional variables were drawn 
from the World Bank WDI Governance Database.  
Descriptive statistics tables provide relevant information, including the number of 
available observations and the general direction of responses. For example, Table 2 
indicates that the mean share of fuel exports as a proportion of GDP was higher than 
the mean share of mineral exports and agriculture exports for the entire sample in the 
cross-sectional data. It also indicates that between 1970 and 2010 there was greater 
variance in fuel exports than in other types of natural resource. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of sample data (n= 160 observations) for cross-
sectional model 
Variable Abbreviation Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Natural Resource Exports:        
Fuel Export/GDP % 
NrEXP 
FuelEXP_sgdp 156 6.44 13.47 0 73.68 
Mineral Export/GDP % MinExp_sgdp 156 2.67 6.22 0 46.92 
Agriculture Export/GDP % AgrExp_sgdp 156 1.33 2.16 0 14.12 
Human Resources HR 157 56.46 31.21 4.80 139.62.00 
Institution/Accountability EstVA 159 -0.06 0.96 -1.90 1.61 
Institution/Political Stability EstPS 159 -0.11 0.97 -2.81 1.51 
Institution/Government 
Effectiveness EstGEF 159 0.01 1.00 -2.18 2.15 
Institution/Regulatory Quality EstRQ 159 0 0.96 -2.44 1.92 
Institution/Rule of Law EstRL 159 -0.06 1.01 -2.35 1.94 
Institution/Control of 
Corruption EstCC 159 0 1.01 -1.74 2.45 
Investment/GDP % Inv 159 22.99 8.25 3.73 44.99 
Terms of Trade Growth Rate 
2000-2010 TOTG 157 1.24 3.30 -12.25 8.57 
Initial Income LogGDP70 156 9.15 1.31 6.59 12.28 
GDP Growth Rate 1970-2010 Growth7010 156 1.05 1.72 -4.01 7.20 
 
In order to shed light on time variations in the dataset, descriptive statistics for two 
sub-periods are presented: before 1995, and after 1995 when oil prices were rising 
steadily (See Tables 3 and 4). As can be seen, the fuel export variable shows less 
variability in the years after 1995. However, there is a minor difference between the 
two sub-periods in the standard deviation of the GDP growth rate, the maximum 
GDP growth being higher over the latter period. Furthermore, Table 3 has missing 
observations for institutional indices in the years before 1995. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for period before 1995 for panel data model 
Variable Abbreviation Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Natural Resource Exports:                     
Fuel Export/GDP % 
NrExp 
FuelExp_Sgdp 421 5.62 13.27 0.00 93.52 
Mineral Export/GDP % MinExp_Sgdp 436 2.28 6.28 0.00 57.08 
Agricultural Export/GDP % AgerExp_Sgdp 438 1.38 2.33 0.00 16.66 
Human Resource HR 552 50.70 31.47 1.90 132.86 
Institution/Accountability EstAV 0     
Institution/Political Stability EstPS 0     
Institution/ Government 
Effectiveness EstGEF 0     
Institution/Regulatory Quality EstRQ 0     
Institution/Rule of Law EstRL 0     
Institution/Control of Corruption EstCC 0     
Terms of Trade TOT 242 117.66 44.21 35.61 320.94 
Investment/GDP % Inv 615 22.97 11.02 1.46 63.02 
GDP Growth Rate GDP Growth 617 0.90 3.33 -19.84 12.02 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for period after 1995 for panel data model 
Variable Abbreviation Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Natural Resource Exports: 
Fuel Export/GDP % 
NrExp 
FuelExp_Sgdp 537 6.03 12.14 0.00 64.16 
Mineral Export/GDP % MinExp_Sgdp 548 2.23 4.72 0.00 38.23 
Agricultural Export/GDP % AgerExp_Sgdp 546 1.03 2.01 0.00 18.16 
Human Resource HR 522 71.87 32.04 5.38 154.05 
Institution/Accountability EstAV 624 -0.06 0.97 -2.07 1.66 
Institution/Political Stability EstPS 623 -0.12 1.00 -3.11 1.64 
Institution/Government 
Effectiveness EstGEF 624 0.00 1.01 -2.31 2.26 
Institution/Regulatory Quality EstRQ 624 0.00 0.98 -2.56 2.23 
Institution/Rule of Law EstRL 624 -0.06 1.02 -2.51 1.98 
Institution/Control of Corruption EstCC 624 0.00 1.03 -1.98 2.52 
Terms of Trade TOT 545 109.13 29.81 24.99 235.61 
Investment/GDP % Inv 625 23.32 9.57 2.59 76.51 
GDP Growth Rate GDP Growth 625 0.81 3.61 -22.74 36.52 
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Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables. Note that the correlation 
is negative between all types of natural resource and the economic growth rate, but 
the relationship is stronger with fuel exports than with mineral and agricultural 
exports. Interestingly, the share of fuel exports in GDP is more positively correlated 
with initial income than the negative and weaker relationship between mineral and 
agricultural exports and initial income. Furthermore, a positive link is found between 
investment, openness and terms of trade and both fuel and mineral exports’ share of 
GDP. 
 Table 5 also indicates that the fuel export share is positively associated with human 
resources but negatively correlated with quality of institution. Similarly, shares of 
agricultural and mineral exports are negatively correlated with institutional quality. 
However, quality of institution has quite a strong positive association with the 
human resource variable, exhibiting the strongest relationship between the different 
variables in the correlation matrix. Moreover, collinearity might be an issue when 
looking at high correlation among measures of institutional quality, however the 
results revealed that some of them are actually significant when they are included.  
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Table 5: Correlation matrix 
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TOTG -0.23 0.13 0.45 0.23 0.11 -0.08 -0.29 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 -0.2 -0.16 -0.05 1 
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Figures 6, 7 and 8 present scatter plots of the relationships between growth in real 
GDP per worker from 1970 to 2010, and primary exports (fuel, minerals and 
agriculture) as a share of GDP. These plots indicate that the natural resource 
intensity of exports is negatively related to economic growth, particularly in 
countries that have larger fuel and mineral exports. Furthermore, A regression 
specification that allows for different effects of fuel exports on growth depending on 
the size of the share of fuel exports to GDP is considered in section 3.4.2 by 
employing 1dummy variables.   
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Figure 6: Fuel exports and economic growth 
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Figure 8: Agricultural exports and economic growth 
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3.3.1 Control variables 
The first decision to be made in modelling research associated with the resource 
curse is the choice of potential growth determinants as control variables. As 
explained earlier, the resource curse literature has used a wide range of factors to 
account for the economic performance of resource-rich countries. The following 
control variables were selected on the basis of economic transmission channels of 
the resource curse described in the literature: 
• Xi is a vector of the economic channels of the effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. The resource curse literature suggests that: 
(a) To measure growth in capital stock, the investment share of GDP (Inv) is 
used. 
(b) To capture the effect of the price volatility of natural resources on economic 
growth, a terms of trade variable (TOT) is included in the regression 
equation: the external TOT is the ratio of an export price index to an import 
price index. 
The dependent variable and the main variables, selected on the basis of political and 
social transmission channels of the resource curse, are measured as follows: 
• The dependent variable is the average annual growth, g1, of adjusted per-person-
employed GDP in 2005 international dollars of country i over the period 1970-
2010. The analysis in this study uses GDP per worker, following Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1997). It is argued that GDP per worker is more appropriate for 
growth models than GDP per capita because it encapsulates the productive 
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population as a significant element of the production process, which is a key 
determinant in the growth model (Jones, 1997; Durlauf et al., 2005). 
• The political and social transmission channels of the resource curse are tested 
with institutional and human capacity measures. Institutional quality is measured 
by government effectiveness (GEF), accountability (VA), regulatory quality 
(RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS) and control of corruption (CC) 
rescaled to between 2.5 and -2.5. These are commonly used indicators of 
institutional quality in the resource curse literature. The variables are provided by 
the Work Bank (see the Appendix A for details). The percentage of the total 
population attaining secondary school education is a proxy for human capital 
(HR). 
3.3.2 Measure of resource dependence 
The second major decision relates to the measure of resource dependence. To 
measure the impact of natural resources on economic performance, it is important to 
distinguish between resource abundance and resource dependence (Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte, 2008). Resource abundance is measured by total resource stock 
availability, such as total land area per capita, cropland per capita or mineral 
resources per capita (Auty, 2001b), while the term ‘resource dependence’ is used to 
describe the degree to which a natural resource-rich country is dependent on its 
primary product exports. Economic dependence on natural resources is measured by 
natural resource exports as a percentage of GDP or of total exports (Auty, 2001; 
Ross, 1999, 2012). 
A resource-rich country’s dependence on fuel (FuelExp), mineral (MinExp), and 
agricultural exports (AgriExp) is measured in terms of their respective shares of 
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GDP. The ratio of primary exports to GDP used by Sachs and Warner (1997) and 
Ross (1999, 2012) is the most popular indicator for measuring an economy’s 
resource dependence. In fact, this indicator is important because it shows, on the one 
hand, the role of natural resources in the export sector and, on the other hand, the 
significance of exports to the domestic economy (Ross, 1999, 2012). 
3.3.3 Different types of natural resource 
To shed more light on the effect on economic growth of different types of natural 
resource as primary commodities, this research investigates both ‘point’ resources, 
such as fuel and minerals, and ‘diffuse’ resources, such as agriculture (Auty, 2001). 
Point resources are more problematic because they are usually capital intensive and 
controlled centrally by government (Auty, 2001). Furthermore, the huge rents 
generated by point resources are easily appropriable as a source of rent-seeking and 
conflict, rather than a benefit to resource-abundant countries (Ross, 2012; Karl, 
1999). 
3.3.4 Cross-sectional model versus panel data model 
In the first step, this study examines the effect of natural resources on economic 
growth, as well as its relationship with institutional quality and human resources, by 
constructing the interaction terms in the context of a cross-section of countries. The 
cross-sectional model has been employed by most empirical studies (e.g. Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, 1997; Sala-i-Martin and Sulbramanian, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006b; 
Boschini et al., 2007). 
However, the cross-sectional method has some well-known drawbacks. On the one 
hand, this methodology is biased because of the unobserved heterogeneity of so-
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called omitted variables. On the other hand, being cross-sectional, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator relies entirely on a between-country comparison. This is 
misleading because of specific country characteristics not captured by other 
variables, such as culture, geographical features and political structure. Another 
significant drawback of the cross-sectional method is that cross-country regressions 
do not capture the effects of the dynamic behaviour of the data, for example the 
change over time of primary commodity prices such as crude oil, which have 
fluctuated greatly since 1970 and have a crucial effect on the economic growth of all 
oil-based economies.  
Panel data offer a potential solution to the above-mentioned problems. This method 
makes more observations over longer time periods, which may diminish problems 
arising from omitted variable bias (Bond, 2002). This research employs both 
methods: cross-sectional analysis using average growth rate for the 1970-2010 
period; and a panel data analysis with data averaged in five- year periods to help to 
eliminate the negative influence of cyclical business fluctuations on the economic 
analysis (Durlauf et al., 2005). 
3.4 Cross-Sectional OLS Regression 
The cross-sectional regression model is based on equation 3.3.1 as follows: 
2 gi = !0 +!1g1970 +!2NRi +!3Invi +!4ToTi +!5HRi +!6Insti +"i (3.4.1)  
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where the dependent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per worker g of 
country i over a forty-year period (between t-1 and t) and g1970 is the log of per 
worker GDP in 1970 as the base year for the growth analysis as this was the first 
year of consistently available data for all countries. The ratio of natural resources 
exports to GDP (NR), including fuel, mineral and agricultural exports, investment as 
a share of GDP (Inv), the percentage of secondary school education attained in the 
total population (HR), and institutional quality (Inst), including government 
effectiveness, accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability, 
control of corruption and annual growth of terms of trade, are calculated over a 
forty-year period (1970-2010). 
The second stage estimates the interaction between natural resources and 
institutional quality and human capital using equation 3.4.2 to test whether the 
growth effects of natural resources are conditional on the pre-existing level of 
institutional quality and human resources in natural resource-based economies. 
gi = !0 +!igit!1 +!2NRi +!3Invi +!4ToTi +!5HRi +!6Insti
+!7(NR*HR)i +!8(NR* Inst)i +"i (3.4.2)
 
The effects of different types of natural resource (fuel, mineral and agricultural) 
exports on economic growth are reported as follows. 
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Table 6: Estimated effect of share of natural resource exports in GDP 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
 Fuel Exports Mineral Exports 
Agricultural 
Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GDP per worker 70 -1.2713*** -1.2679*** -1.1535*** -1.1875*** -1.1766*** -1.2120*** 
 (-9.23) (-9.19) (-9.54) (-9.69) (-9.18) (-9.15) 
Natural Resource Exports 
(NrExp) 0.0185 0.0870*** -0.0544*** 0.0194 -0.0471 0.1539* 
 (1.52) (3.97) (-4.63) (0.55) (-1.07) (1.70) 
Investment (Inv) 0.0372*** 0.0259* 0.0392*** 0.0426*** 0.0358*** 0.0389*** 
 (2.89) (1.97) (3.20) (3.50) (2.79) (3.00) 
Terms of trade (TOT) -0.0107 -0.0316 0.0322 0.0343 0.0134 0.0169 
 (-0.30) (-0.87) (1.07) (1.13) (0.40) (0.52) 
Human Resource (HR) 0.0238*** 0.0277*** 0.0220*** 0.0273*** 0.0231*** 0.0291*** 
 (3.75) (3.93) (3.53) (3.84) (3.64) (3.85) 
Voice and Accountability 
(EstVA) -0.1237 -0.2306 -0.2641 -0.2571 -0.2765 -0.2731 
 (-0.50) (-0.95) (-1.35) (-1.27) (-1.29) (-1.25) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 0.2541 0.3652** 0.2940* 0.2910* 0.2975 0.3039 
 (1.36) (2.05) (1.68) (1.67) (1.62) (1.63) 
Government Effectiveness 
(EstGEF) 1.5959*** 1.6890*** 1.3887*** 1.3501*** 1.4607*** 1.2889** 
 (3.13) (3.03) (2.90) (2.78) (2.84) (2.13) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 0.0226 0.2384 0.1489 0.1790 0.0872 0.1109 
 (0.06) (0.67) (0.46) (0.54) (0.26) (0.33) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) 0.1687 0.1613 0.2081 0.2082 0.3011 0.2542 
 (0.32) (0.30) (0.42) (0.42) (0.58) (0.48) 
Control of Corruption 
(EstCC) -0.9752** -1.2347*** -0.9302** -1.0262** -1.0210*** -0.9534* 
 (-2.43) (-2.93) (-2.47) (-2.54) (-2.64) (-1.90) 
NrExp*EstGEF  -0.0612***  -0.0016  0.0801 
  (-2.82)  (-0.04)  (0.83) 
NrExp*EstCC  0.0586***  0.0388  0.0196 
  (2.66)  (0.76)  (0.16) 
NrExp*HR  -0.0010***  -0.0014***  -0.0042** 
  (-3.01)  (-2.70)  (-2.39) 
Intercept 10.3472*** 10.3649*** 9.5453*** 9.4759*** 9.7107*** 9.6369*** 
 (9.71) (9.66) (10.41) (10.40) (9.71) (9.53) 
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 150 
R-sq 0.573 0.622 0.604 0.615 0.565 0.573 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%, **5% and ***1% level 
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Table 6 provides results estimated by a simple OLS regression for a cross-section of 
countries over the period 1970-2010. In Columns 1 and 2, the average growth in 
GDP per worker is regressed on the share of fuel exports (FEG). In the following 
columns, the log of initial GDP per worker in 1970, investment, terms of trade, 
human resources and institutional quality (6-index) explanatory variables are added. 
It can be seen that the coefficient of the initial GDP is always negative and highly 
significant, confirming the convergence predictions of neo-classical growth theory. 
The expected positive and significant impact of investment and education on 
economic growth is confirmed in Columns 1 and 2, which is consistent with the 
arguments of the Solow model that shows conditional convergence and a positive 
effect of education and investment on economic growth. 
However, the terms of trade variable has a negative and statistically insignificant 
estimated coefficient. The high volatility of commodity prices causes terms of trade 
shocks, particularly in economies that specialise in commodities with less stable 
prices. This trade specialisation has a negative effect on growth (Van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke, 2007). 
The government effectiveness variable appears statistically significant and its 
coefficient is positive, whereas the control of corruption variable is significant but its 
coefficient is negative. These results indicate that institutional quality is a significant 
growth determinant, as presented in the resource curse literature (Isham et al., 2005; 
Bulte et al., 2005; Ross, 2012). 
Turning to the coefficient of the fuel export variable, it is found that, after 
controlling for economic, social and institutional variables, it becomes positive and 
insignificant. To test the conditional hypothesis, interaction terms between the fuel 
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exports variable and the statistically significant institutional indices (government 
effectiveness and control of corruption) are added, together with the human 
resources variable. 
The conditional hypothesis suggested by Mehlum et al. (2005) and Boschini et al. 
(2007) states that quality of institutions plays a fundamental role in the effect of 
natural resources on economic performance. In estimating the conditional hypothesis 
interaction terms using equation (3.4.2), the interaction terms assert that the effect of 
a change in fuel exports on GDP growth in fuel-dependent countries is conditional 
on the quality of governmental effectiveness, control of corruption and human 
resource capacity. The results given in Table 6 show that the coefficient of the fuel 
export variable appears positive and significant after adding interaction terms. 
The interaction effect with respect to the control of corruption variable outweighs the 
impact of fuel on fuel-dependent economies, and hence fuel resources tend to be 
positive for growth when corruption is controlled sufficiently. The estimate of 
interaction with government effectiveness and human resource variables has 
negative signs and is significant at the one per cent level. This implies that 
dependence on natural resources contributes to economic growth only if institutional 
quality is high. This combined effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
level of dependence on fuel exports and the quality of institutions (using government 
effectiveness) leads to a decline of 0.061 of a standard deviation in economic 
growth. In the same way, the combined effect of a one-unit increase in dependence 
on fuel exports and the quality of human resources leads to a 0.0001 per cent drop in 
economic growth. 
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Table 6 also presents the estimated effect of mineral exports on economic growth. 
Column 3 shows that the coefficient of the initial GDP is always negative and highly 
significant. The effect of mineral exports on growth is negative and significant at the 
one per cent level, but its effect does not remain significant in Column 4. The 
estimate of investment is positive and statistically significant and its effect is the 
same in Column 4. The effects of human resources and government effectiveness on 
economic growth are positive and highly statistically significant. However, the effect 
of corruption on economic growth is negative and statistically significant at the one 
per cent level. 
The results indicate that the interaction term is insignificant between mineral exports 
and both government effectiveness and control of corruption variables. However, the 
interaction between mineral exports and human resources is negative and highly 
significant at the one per cent level. This illustrates that the effect of a one-unit 
change in mineral exports on economic growth is negative and 0.002 per cent when 
the quality of human resources increases. 
The findings relating to agricultural exports in Table 6 (Columns 5 and 6) show that 
the coefficient of the initial GDP is always negative and highly significant. However, 
agricultural exports have a negative and statistically insignificant relationship with 
economic growth. It can be seen that, in contrast to the corruption variable which is 
negative and significant at the one per cent level, investment, human resources and 
government effectiveness are highly significant and positive. The estimate of 
interaction terms with government effectiveness and control of corruption is not 
significant, while with human resources it is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10 per cent level. The coefficient is negative with respect to the interaction terms 
between agricultural exports and human resource capacity, indicating that a one per 
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cent increase in mineral exports brings about a decline in economic growth when 
human resource capacity increases. 
3.4.1 Marginal effect of natural resources on economic growth 
To investigate the total effect of natural resource exports on economic growth, the 
following equation was used, composed of direct and indirect (interactive) effects of 
natural resource exports on growth: 
!gi
!NRi
= "2 +"7(HRi )+"8(Insti )  
To calculate the total effect, which is estimated as a derivative of GDP growth with 
respect to fuel, mineral and agricultural exports, summary statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) are used, as shown in Table 2 and Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 6. 
Marginal effects measure the impact of a one-unit change in one regressor in the 
dependent variables. If both regressors and dependent variable are in logs, the 
marginal effect measures the proportional change in percentage, which is equivalent 
to the elasticity. In the case of the growth regressions, the growth rate is measured as 
a change in logs while the institutional variable is measured by using a scale between 
-1 and 1 (see Table 7). As a consequence, percentage changes or elasticities are not 
adequate, therefore it was used the effect of a unit change of the institutional variable 
(improvement in institutions) on economic growth (measured in percentage points). 
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Table 7: Marginal effects of share of natural resource exports on GDP per 
worker, 1970-2010 
Marginal effects of natural resources in cross-sectional model 
Natural Resource Exports 
High Institutional Quality = 1 
High Human Resource Quality = 87 
Low Institutional Quality = -1 
Low Human Resource Quality = 25 
Fuel Exports 0 0.07 
Mineral Exports -0.07 -0.05 
Agricultural Exports -0.25 -0.12 
 
Table 7 shows that a one-unit increase in fuel exports has no impact on economic 
growth as institutional and human resource quality improves. However, the effect of 
a one-unit increase in fuel exports is positive and 0.07 per cent with low-quality 
institutions and human resources. As the average growth rate is one, a positive effect 
of 0.07 is approximately 1/14 of average growth. This represents a growth from 1 to 
l.14 over a period of 40 years, which is inconsistent with the literature suggesting 
that resource-rich countries with poor institutions and human resource quality suffer 
from the curse (Mehlum et al., 2006). 
Turning to the marginal effect of mineral exports on growth, each additional point of 
mineral exports leads to a seven per cent decline in economic growth for a high level 
of institutional and human resource quality. This means that a one-unit increase in 
mineral exports has a negative effect on economic growth as institutional and human 
resource quality improves. The negative effect of -0.07 is around 1/14 of average 
growth, and shows a reduction in the growth rate from 1 to 0.86 over a period of 40 
years. This outcome is consistent with the resource curse theory; however, it violates 
the conditional hypothesis. 
The results also indicate that the estimate of the marginal effect of a one-unit 
increase in agricultural exports on economic growth associated with high levels of 
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institutional and human resource quality is -0.25. This means that a one per cent 
increase in agricultural exports leads to a decline in the growth rate from 1 to 0.96 
over the period 1970-2010. These results do not confirm the conditional hypothesis. 
A potential explanation that might be compatible with the main findings is that 
natural resource-dependent economies tend to reduce their economic dependence on 
the natural resource sector by diversifying their economic structure when 
institutional and human resource quality improve. This does not mean that economic 
growth will fall as a whole, because greater revenues will be generated from other 
sectors of the economy. The above results are supported by Meller’s (2009) finding 
that natural resource-rich countries in Latin America became less dependent on 
natural resources over the period 1980-1990 by increasing the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to economic growth. 
The next section reports on testing to establish whether there is a difference between 
high and low natural resource-dependent economies in the effect of natural resources 
on growth. In order to do this, a dummy variable was used to split the sample into 
low and high natural resource-dependent countries. This was investigated only for 
fuel exports because dependent agricultural and mineral exports are small. 
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3.4.2 High fuel-dependent economies 
As stated earlier, the resource curse affects natural resource-rich countries that are 
heavily dependent on natural resource revenues (Karl, 2004). Therefore, to examine 
more closely the effects of resource dependence on economic growth, the mineral-
dependent index was used to identify fuel-dependent economies. Mineral- and fuel-
rich countries whose mineral and fuel exports account for 8 to 10 per cent of GDP 
are considered to be resource-dependent (Auty, 1993; Gelb, 1998; Davis, 1995), 
although Auty (1990) proposed that a more comprehensive mineral-dependence 
index, accounting for the contribution of minerals to GDP, would be more than 20 
per cent. 
Given this explanation, two dummy variables, D10 and D20, were created to identify 
how fuel resources influence economic growth in fuel-dependent economies. These 
new variables describe countries whose fuel export share of GDP is not less than 10 
and 20 per cent respectively and are defined as resource-dependent economies, and 
are used to estimate the following models: 
gi = !0 + !1gi970 + !2FuelExpi + !3Invi + !4TOTi +!5(FuelExp*D10 )i + !6HRi
+!7EstVAit + !8EstPSi + !9EstGEFi + !10EstRQi + !11EstRLi
+!12EstCCit +"it (3.4.3)
 
gi = !0 + !1gi970 + !2FuelExpi + !3Invi + !4TOTi + !5(FuelExp*D10 )i + !6HRi
+ !7EstAVi + !8EstPSi + !9EstGEFi + !10EstRQi + !11EstRLit + !12EstCCi
+!13(D10 *EstGEF)i + !14 (D10 *EstCC)i + !15(D10 *HR)i +"i (3.4.4)
 
gi = !0 +!1gi1970 + !2FuelExpi + !3Invi + !4TOTi + !5(FuelEXP*D20 )i + !6HRi
+ !7EstVAi + !8EstPSi + !9EstGEFi + !10EstRQi + !11EstRLi
+ !12EstCCi + "i (3.4.5)
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gi = !0 + !1gi1970 + !2FuelExpi + !3Invi + !4TOTi + !5(FuelExp*D20 )i + !6HRi
+ !7EstAVi + !8EstPSi + !9EstGEFi + !10EstRQi + !11EstRLi + !12EstCCi
+!13(D20 *EstGEF)i + !14 (D20 *EstCC)i + !15(D20 *HR)i +"i (3.4.6)
 
The above models are tested for the appropriateness of the specification by applying 
the Ramsey RESET. In other words, the results showed that the regressions are 
correctly specified by not rejecting the null hypothesis. Furthermore, because the 
models are nested, an F-test was used to compare the statistical the models (see page 
60). The F-test uses sums of squared residuals or a Likelihood Ratio test using 
likelihood values to select the accepted model specification to be used in the final 
analysis of the results. The test statistic of F=7.4 (greater than the critical value of F-
distribution= 4.3) led to the rejection of the null hypothesis so the second model 
(3.4.4) is statistically better than the first model (3.4.3). The F-test for the models 
3.4.5 and 3.4.6 indicated that the second model (3.4.6) is the accepted model. 
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Table 8: Estimated effect of fuel exports on GDP for dependent economies 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log GDP per worker 70 -1.2667*** -1.2521*** -1.2716*** -1.2381*** 
 (-9.18) (-9.21) (-9.20) (-8.86) 
Fuel Export/GDP (FEG) 0.0451 0.0290 0.0049 0.0047 
 (0.97) (0.57) (0.14) (0.13) 
FuelExp*D10 -0.0262 -0.0062   
 (-0.60) (-0.12)   
EstGEF*D10  -2.4855**   
  (-2.49)   
EstCC*D10  1.8237*   
  (-1.93)   
HR*D10  -0.0045   
  (-0.61)   
FuelExp*D20   0.0132 0.0401 
   (0.40) (1.00) 
EstGEF*D20    -2.7660** 
    (-2.04) 
EstCC*D20    2.1138 
    (1.65) 
HR*D20    -0.0224* 
    (-1.89) 
Investment (Inv) 0.0375*** 0.0353*** 0.0373*** 0.0344*** 
 (2.90) (2.85) (2.89) (2.75) 
Terms of trade (TOT) -0.0123 -0.0170 -0.0089 -0.0200 
 (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.25) (-0.55) 
Human Resource (HR) 0.0236*** 0.0218*** 0.0243*** 0.0237*** 
 (3.73) (2.92) (3.62) (3.47) 
Voice and Accountability (EstVA) -0.1242 -0.1746 -0.1440 -0.2253 
 (-0.50) (-0.70) (-0.58) (-0.88) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 0.2476 0.3105* 0.2603 0.3463* 
 (1.30) (1.73) (1.37) (1.84) 
Government Effectiveness (EstGEF) 1.5351*** 1.7906*** 1.6593*** 1.7441*** 
 (2.74) (3.14) (2.84) (2.92) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 0.0207 0.1599 -0.0091 0.1361 
 (0.06) (0.42) (-0.02) (0.34) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) 0.2104 0.1392 0.1615 0.1304 
 (0.38) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) 
Control of Corruption (EstCC) -0.9531** -1.1524*** -1.0023** -1.1421*** 
 (-2.33) (-2.71) (-2.50) (-2.81) 
Intercept 10.2871*** 10.3215*** 10.3420*** 10.1434*** 
 (9.61) (9.85) (9.76) (9.54) 
Countries 150 150 150 150 
R-sq 0.574 0.605 0.574 0.603 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%, **5% and ***1% level 
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Table 8 shows that the estimated effect of a high degree of resource dependence on 
economic growth is positive but insignificant. The coefficient of the lower fuel 
export dependence (using 10 per cent of fuel exports to GDP) is negative and 
insignificant. The total effects of fuel exports associated with each threshold of 
dependence are as follows: 
FuelExport >10%= !1 +!2 = 0.0290! 0.0062 = 0.22  
FuelExport <10%= 0.03  
FuelExport > 20%= !1 +!2 = 0.0049+ 0.0401= 0.05  
FuelExport < 20%= 0.005  
The results indicate that the total effect of fuel exports in both groups is positive. 
However, the total effect of fuel exports using 20 per cent of GDP is lower than for 
economies that are less dependent on fuel exports. With regard to the effect of 
institutional quality, the effect of government effectiveness (EstGEF) on growth is 
negative and insignificant for countries whose shares of fuel exports to GDP exceed 
both 10 per cent and 20 per cent. However, control of corruption (EstCC) appears 
positive and significant only for countries that are less dependent. The effect of 
human resource development is negative and significant at the 10 per cent level in 
the highly dependent economies. The findings show that the institutional effect on 
economic growth is lower for countries with high dependence. This confirms the 
theory that the effect of fuel exports is lower in countries with poor institutions 
(Isham et al., 2005; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Boschini et al., 2007). 
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However, the results should be treated with caution since endogeneity problems 
remain because of potentially unobserved factors across countries that do not change 
over time and may cause a bias in model. To address these endogeneity issues, panel 
data were used, as described in the next section. 
3.5 The Dynamic Econometric Model 
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2007) observe that empirical resource curse studies 
have used a variety of different methodologies to investigate growth determinants in 
resource-rich countries. Most studies have employed cross-sectional growth 
regression that has failed to consider the effect of commodity prices – namely, the 
dynamics of the resource curse. Therefore, they have suffered from endogeneity 
problems due to the omission of relevant variables. To remedy these problems, a 
wide range of empirical studies associated with economic growth has used the panel 
data method (Quah, 1993 and Islam, 1995). 
Bond (2002) argues that panel data allow for increased estimation efficiency by 
controlling individual effects. However, estimates based on fixed or random effects 
are biased and inconsistent when estimating a dynamic panel model. The argument 
for the inappropriateness of individual effects methods (fixed or random) to estimate 
a dynamic panel data model is that the error term and the lagged dependent variables 
are negatively correlated in the differentiating transformed equation. For instance, 
the following economic growth equations indicate that lagged GDP growth is 
correlated with the lagged error term after differencing the equation: 
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git-1 is correlated with !it-1; therefore, it is necessary to use instrument variables. git!2  
or git-2–git-3 may be used as instruments: both are valid since they are correlated with 
git-1–git-2 and uncorrelated with !it–!it-1 (Roodman, 2006). 
Another relevant argument, with which Lederman and Maloney (2008) concur, is 
that independent variables are not strictly exogenous, and hence are possibly 
correlated with past and current realisations of error terms. Generally, the context of 
a linear regression model is composed of one left-hand variable that is dynamic 
(depending on its own past realisation) and right-hand explanatory variables that are 
endogenous or predetermined, using generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimators. 
The predetermined variables are not strictly exogenous and correlated with past and 
possibly current realisations of the error term. This means that current and past 
shocks exert some feedback on the current values of the variables: 
E[Xit,!is ]! 0 for s < t but E[Xit,!is ]= 0 for s >= t  
The endogenous variables are correlated with the current error term: 
E[Xit,!is ]! 0 for s =< t but E[Xit,!is ]= 0 for s > t  
The GMM method described by Bond (2002) is useful for eliminating the above-
mentioned econometric problems. A method generally referred to as the Arellano-
Bond GMM is used to estimate the following dynamic panel equation: 
git ! git!1 = !1(git!1 ! git!2 )+ !2 (Xit ! Xit!1)+ ("it !"it!1)
git = !0 + !1git!1 + !2Xit + µi + "it
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git = !0 + !1git!1 + !2Xit + µi + "it i =1,...,N and t = 2,...,T (3.5.1)  
where i and t represent country and time periods respectively, and git and GDPit-1 are 
the contemporaneous and lagged realisations of the dependent variable, respectively. 
Xit is a vector of both exogenous and endogenous variables, !it is a random error term 
and "i is the unobserved country-specific time invariant effect. 
The unobserved country-specific time invariant effect is not observed by OLS 
methods because it is included in the residual term. Therefore, the error term (vit) is 
composed of !it and "i. Observation creates specific errors and unobserved country-
specific time invariant effects that generate the following model: 
git = !0 + !1git!1 + !2Xit +Vit , Vit = µi + "i (3.5.2)  
According to the assumptions of the GMM method, Model 3.5.2 violates the OLS 
estimations of strict exogeneity since the lagged dependent and independent 
variables are correlated with the fixed unobserved country effects and the lagged 
error term. 
E(Vit X it ,git!1) " 0  
An alternative GMM technique suggests two steps to tackle the problems of omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity in order to obtain efficient and consistent estimators. 
The first step in GMM estimation deals with the unobserved country-specific effect 
"i by first differencing the model: 
git =!0 + !1git!1 + !2Xit + µi + "it i =1,...,N and t = 2,...,T  
git ! git!1 =!1(git!1 ! git!2 )+ !2 (Xit ! Xit!1 )+ ("it !"it!1) i =1,...,N and t = 2,...,T  
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!git = !1!git"1 + !2!Xit + !"it i =1,...,N and t = 2,...,T (3.5.3)  
As Arellano and Bond (1991) argue, the transformed equation 3.5.3 still violates the 
assumption of strict exogeneity. Therefore, they propose a second step, which is 
concerned with building valid instruments using gt-2 as an instrument for the lagged 
levels of the dependent, predetermined and endogenous variables. As a result, as 
long as the errors are not serially correlated, the method assumes: 
E[git!2 , "!it ]= 0 t >=3,...,T  
E[Xit!2 , "!it ]= 0 t >=3,...,T  
However, in the case of highly persistent variables across time, lagged levels tend to 
be weak instruments for differential variables. To overcome this issue, a system 
GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is used. System GMM uses 
additional moment conditions in which lagged differences in explanatory variables 
as instrument level for equations in level. The additional moment conditions operate 
under the assumption that variables are not correlated with individual effect µi : 
E[!Xit"s , µi ]= 0 s >=1 t = 0,...,T  
 
As Roodman (2006, 2009) explains, the difference and system GMM method results 
in a more efficient outcome than the work of Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
Blundell-Bond system estimates equations through a combination of moment 
restrictions for differences and levels. Thus, this study uses the Blundell-Bond 
system GMM estimator, employing the Stata command ‘xtabond2’ provided by 
Roodman (2006, 2009) for estimations. As a rule of thumb, the difference GMM 
E[!git"s , µi ]= 0 s >=1 t = 0,...,T
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method requires the number of instruments used for estimations to be less than the 
number of cross-sectional units in the dataset (Roodman, 2006, 2009). To keep the 
instrument count below the number of units, the instrument matrix is collapsed, as 
suggested by Roodman (2006, 2009). Further, the difference GMM has one- and 
two-step variants. Although the two-step variant is asymptotically more efficient and 
automatically produces standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, these 
standard errors are typically downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
In order to test the consistency and efficiency of the GMM estimator, three 
specification tests were employed: the Sargan/Hansen, AR (1) and AR (2) tests. The 
Sargan/Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions examines the null hypothesis of 
the validity of the set of instruments. Failure to reject this null hypothesis is therefore 
possible in the presence of a high p-value for the Sargan statistic; otherwise, the 
model or the instruments should be reconsidered. The AR (1) or Arellano-Bond test 
for autocorrelation proceeds under the null hypothesis that there is no correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals. The AR (2) or Arellano-Bond test for second-order 
autocorrelation is important, because the lagged values of the variables are used as 
instruments in order to test the following condition in which the disturbances are 
autocorrected up to an order greater than one; in other words, there is autocorrelation 
in levels: 
!!it =!it "!it"1  and !!it"1 =!it"1 "!it"2  both have !it!1  
Therefore, the assumption of the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation 
for the second-order form. Furthermore, the residuals in the levels equation are not 
serially correlated. Thus, rejecting this null hypothesis implies model 
 76 
!
misspecification. As a general estimation strategy, the first equation is estimated in 
order to identify the economic growth determinants. 
git = !0 +!igit-1 +!2NRit +!3Invit +!4ToTit +!5HRit +!6Instit (6 indices)
+µi +"it (3.5.4)
 
Therefore, the first baseline equation contains lagged GDP growth and the natural 
resource variables – fuel, mineral and agricultural exports of GDP (NR) – the 
economic variables, investment (Inv), terms of trade growth (TOT) and political and 
social variables, and the institutional variables (Inst) and human resource (HR). The 
interaction term between the natural resource variables and both institutional quality 
and human resource variables are added in a second model. The analytical aim of 
using different types of natural resource and their interaction with institutional and 
human resource quality is to identify the transmission channels of the resource curse. 
git = !0 + !1git-1 + !2NRit + !3Invit +!4TOTit +!5HRit + !6EstVAit + !7EstPSit
+!8EstGEFit + !9EstRQit + !10EstRLit + !11EstCCit + µi + "it (3.5.5)
 
git = !0 + !1git-1 + !2NRit + !3Invit + !4TOTit + !5HRit +!6EstVAit +!7EstPSit
+!8EstGEFit +!9EstRQit + !10EstRLit + !11EstCCit
+!12 (NR* Inst)it + !13(NR*HR)it +µi + "it (3.5.6)
 
Applying the Ramsey RESET tested the appropriateness of the specification of the 
above models. The results showed that the regressions are correctly specified by not 
rejecting the null hypothesis. Furthermore, because the models are nested, an F-test 
was used to compare the models statistically (3.5.5 and 3.5.6). The F-test uses sums 
of squared residuals or the Likelihood Ratio test using likelihood values to select the 
accepted model specification to be used in the final analysis of the results. The test 
statistic of F=9.3 (greater than the critical value of F-distribution= 6.1) resulted in 
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the rejection of the null hypothesis so the second model (3.5.6) is statistically better 
than the first model (3.5.5). Both models described above investigate the potential 
determinants of economic growth, as well as the hypothesis of conditional 
convergence. However, they do not allow the economic growth rate during the 
transition to steady state to be subject to short-run business cycle fluctuations driven 
by trade shocks, which account for 45 to 60 per cent of observed fluctuations in GDP 
(Mendoza, 1995). Therefore, the first lags of natural resource, terms of trade and 
investment variables are added to Model 3.5.6 and are treated as predetermined. 
However, the lag in investment is omitted because it is not significant. In the same 
way, the lag in GDP growth is considered to be predetermined. Furthermore, 
predetermined variables Xi and Xit–Xit-1 will be correlated with!it !!it!1 . In this case, 
Xi1...Xit are valid instruments, since they are uncorrelated with !it–!it-1 and correlated 
with Xit–Xit-1. Therefore, the momentary conditions for predetermined variables are: 
E[GDPit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 2 and 1# s < t  
E[NRit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 2 and 1# s < t  
E[TOTit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 2 and 1# s < t  
git = !0 + !1git!1 + !2NRit + !3NRit!1 + !4Invit +!5TOTit +!6TOTit!1 + !7HRit
+ !8Instit +!9 (NR*HR)it +!10 (NR* Inst)it + !11(NRit!1 *HRit )
+!12 (NRit!1 + Instit )+µi + "it   (3.5.7)
 
In using the model for system GMM, the different natural resource variables, growth 
in terms of trade, investment, institutional indices and human resources are treated as 
endogenous. Moreover, independent variables Xi are endogenous: Xit–Xit-1 is 
correlated with !it–!it-1 because Xit is correlated with both !it and !it-1. In this case, 
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Xi1... Xit-2 are valid instruments since they are uncorrelated with !it–!it-1 and 
correlated with Xit–Xit-1. Therefore, the momentary conditions for endogenous 
variables are as follows: 
E[NRit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 3 and 2 # s < t  
E[TOTit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 3 and 2 # s < t  
E[Invit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 3 and 2 # s < t  
E[Instit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 3 and 2 # s < t  
E[HRit!s , !it !!it!1]= 0 t " 3 and 2 # s < t  
The baseline mode tested for the correct functional form for variables by applying 
the Ramsey RESET. The test showed that there are no omitted- nonlinear-variables 
to include in the models. The model is run with the system GMM, using STATA, 
comprising the two-step difference GMM, Windmeijer-correlated standard errors, 
small-sample adjustments and orthogonal deviations (Roodman, 2009). 
Xtaband2 :GDPgrowth L1.GDPgrowth NR L1.NR Inv TOT L1.TOT HR EstAV
EstPS EstGEF EstRL EstCC NR* Inst i, t, gmmstyle(L1.GDPgrowthL.NRL1.NRL.TOT
L1.TOT L.InvL.HRL.EstAV L.EstpsL.EstGEF L.EstRQL.EstRL L.EstCCL.(NR* Inst))
ivstyle(t)two! steprobust small orthogonal
 
3.5.1 Estimation results 
The estimated results for the share of resource exports in GDP for different types of 
aggregate resources are as follows. Fuel, mineral, and agricultural exports are 
reported in Tables 9, 10, and 11 for the dynamic panel model specification. The 
output of the system GMM associated with all resource exports is consistent and 
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efficient due to rejection of the null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions as 
valid. 
Table 9 indicates that the lag sign for GDP is insignificant, which is inconsistent 
with the convergence predictions of neo-classical growth theory. The 
contemporaneous coefficient estimate of fuel exports is out of line with the existing 
empirical resource curse literature. It also appears to be insignificant over the next 
five years. The investment variable is positive and significant at the one per cent 
level, which shows a high impact on growth rate of a one per cent increase in the 
investment rate. The sign of the coefficient associated with the terms of trade 
variable in the current period appears significant at the 10 per cent level. However, 
the effect of terms of trade on economic growth five years later is insignificant. Of 
the six dimensions of institutional quality, three – political stability, regulatory 
quality and rule of law – have significant effects on economic growth. The 
interaction of these significant measures of institutional quality with fuel exports is 
added into the model for estimation. The effect of interaction terms on economic 
growth is not significant. In the next step, the effect of the degree of fuel dependence 
on economic growth in fuel-dependent economies was tested, based on the two fuel-
dependence indices. 
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Table 9: Estimated effect of share of fuel exports in GDP per worker (system 
GMM panel data estimates) 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDPgrowth t-1 -0.0083 -0.0287 0.0224 
 (-0.16) (-0.40) (0.34) 
Fuel Export/GDP (FEG) 0.0169 -0.0357 0.0131 
 (0.21) (-0.69) (0.19) 
FuelExp*EstRQ  0.0915 0.1083 
  (1.26) (0.66) 
FuelExp*EstPS  -0.0058 0.0446 
  (-0.15) (0.64) 
FuelExp*EstRL  -0.0942 -0.1635 
  (-1.10) (-0.85) 
Fuel Export/GDP t-1 (FEG) -0.0770 -0.0475 -0.0746 
 (-1.04) (-0.98) (-1.16) 
FuelExp t-1*EstRQ   -0.0931 
   (-0.64) 
FuelExp t-1*EstPS   -0.0499 
   (-0.70) 
FuelExp t-1*EstRL   0.1485 
   (0.86) 
Investment (Inv) 0.1141*** 0.0892** 0.0773** 
 (3.07) (2.00) (1.99) 
Terms of trade (TOT) 0.0208* 0.0183* 0.0135 
 (1.80) (1.66) (1.04) 
Terms of trade t-1 (TOT) 0.0037 0.0060 0.0076 
 (0.21) (0.50) (0.43) 
Human Resource (HR) -0.0016 0.0205 0.0135 
 (-0.10) (1.16) (0.80) 
Voice and Accountability (EstVA) -0.1875 -0.5496 -0.4407 
 (-0.21) (-0.74) (-0.60) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 0.9103* 0.7567 0.8438 
 (1.77) (1.25) (1.58) 
Government Effectiveness (EstGEF) -0.9014 -0.7425 -0.5301 
 (-0.77) (-0.70) (-0.50) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 2.7987*** 1.8564** 2.0118** 
 (2.65) (2.04) (2.34) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) -2.7261* -1.8391 -1.9705 
 (-1.86) (-1.42) (-1.44) 
Control of Corruption (EstCC) 0.4697 0.3223 -0.1247 
 (0.46) (0.32) (-0.13) 
Intercept -3.7788*** -4.6271*** -4.2836*** 
 (-2.62) (-3.09) (-2.83) 
Observations 324 324 324 
Countries 132 132 132 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.317 0.085 0.089 
Hansen test (P-value) 0.986 0.871 0.966 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%, **5% and ***1% level 
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The results from regression of GDP per worker on mineral exports show that the 
effect of mineral exports is not statistically significant. As can be seen in Table 10, 
the estimate of lagged GDP is insignificant. The estimate of investment and terms of 
trade is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level. A one per cent increase in 
investment increases economic growth by 0.09 per cent, and a one per cent increase 
in terms of trade increases growth by 0.02 per cent. The effects of both voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality variables on growth are significant and 
positive. The coefficient of the rule of law variable is negative and economically 
significant at the five per cent level. To test the conditional hypothesis, the 
interaction of these significant measures of institutional quality with mineral exports 
is added into the model and is not significant. 
Table 11 indicates that the current effect of agricultural exports on growth is 
negative and statistically significant at the five per cent level. This is consistent with 
the resource curse hypothesis. However, the coefficient of lagged agricultural 
exports is positive and also significant at the one per cent level, suggesting that a 
one-unit increase in future agricultural exports leads to a 0.037 per cent rise in 
economic performance, and to 0.09 per cent in the long run. The effect of investment 
on growth is positive and significant at the 0.01 per cent level. The coefficient of 
both voice and accountability and terms of trade variables have a positive sign and 
are statistically significant at the ten per cent level. After controlling the interaction 
term, agricultural exports lose their significant effect on economic growth in the 
current and next five-year period. The estimate of the interaction term between 
institutional quality (voice and accountability variable) and agricultural exports 
appears insignificant, which does not confirm the conditional hypothesis. 
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Table 10: Estimated effect of share of mineral exports on GDP per worker 
(system GMM panel data estimates) 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDPgrowth t-1 0.0244 -0.0520 0.0009 
 (0.34) (-0.79) (0.01) 
Mineral Exp/GDP (MEG) -0.0853 -0.2663 -0.1103 
 (-0.84) (-1.16) (-1.09) 
MinExp*EstAV  0.3747* 0.1156 
  (1.85) (0.60) 
MinExp*EstRQ  -0.1352 -0.1083 
  (-0.38) (-0.34) 
MinExp*EstRL  -0.1894 0.0170 
  (-0.45) (0.05) 
Mineral Exp/GDP t-1 (MEG) -0.0258 0.1137* 0.0475 
 (-0.35) (1.89) (0.51) 
MinExp t-1*EstAV   -0.1013 
   (-1.26) 
MinExp t-1*EstRQ   -0.2068 
   (-0.64) 
MinExp t-1*EstRL   0.1310 
   (0.39) 
Investment (Inv) 0.0902* 0.0915* 0.0776 
 (1.89) (1.82) (1.31) 
Terms of trade (TOT) 0.0222** 0.0327*** 0.0287*** 
 (2.40) (3.50) (2.72) 
Human Resource (HR) -0.0117 0.0102 0.0166 
 (-0.70) (0.33) (0.60) 
Voice and Accountability (EstVA) 1.0777* 0.5849 1.2534 
 (1.69) (0.66) (1.29) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 0.6044 1.0467 1.5999* 
 (1.01) (1.19) (1.91) 
Government Effectiveness (EstGEF) -0.8613 0.2186 -0.1166 
 (-0.68) (0.11) (-0.06) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 2.6190** 3.1981 3.8922* 
 (2.09) (1.47) (1.87) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) -2.7705* -3.3089 -5.0452* 
 (-1.66) (-1.47) (-1.95) 
Control of Corruption (EstCC) 0.1692 -0.7803 -0.0808 
 (0.11) (-0.46) (-0.05) 
Intercept -3.5019** -5.8387*** -5.8908*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.82) (-2.97) 
Observations 389 389 389 
Countries 137 137 137 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.153 0.2 0.152 
Hansen test (P-value) 0.243 0.425 0.354 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%,**5% and ***1% level 
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Table 11: Estimated effect of share of agricultural exports on GDP per worker 
(system GMM Panel Data Estimates)  
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
 (1) (2) 
GDP growth t-1 0.0295 0.0427 
 (0.44) (0.64) 
Agricultural Export/GDP (AEG) -0.4563** -0.2306 
 (-2.56) (-1.23) 
Agricultural Export/GDP t-1 (AEG) 0.3665*** 0.2102 
 (2.79) (1.26) 
Investment (Inv) 0.1281*** 0.1110** 
 (2.62) (2.52) 
Terms of trade (TOT) 0.0162* 0.0117 
 (1.84) (1.24) 
Human Resource (HR) -0.0144 -0.0080 
 (-0.95) (-0.44) 
Voice and Accountability (EstVA) 1.1585* 0.6572 
 (1.72) (0.82) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 0.4520 0.5076 
 (0.79) (0.89) 
Government Effectiveness (EstGEF) -0.0577 -0.8989 
 (-0.04) (-0.72) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 1.6268 2.0348* 
 (1.30) (1.90) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) -2.1568 -2.3708* 
 (-1.50) (-1.95) 
Control of Corruption (EstCC) -0.3617 0.4593 
 (-0.32) (0.45) 
AEG*EstAV  0.5679 
  (1.23) 
AEG t-1*EstAV   -0.3173 
  (-0.82) 
Intercept -3.2659** -2.7684 
 (-2.53) (-1.65) 
Observations 388 388 
Countries 137 137 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.304 0.251 
Hansen test (P-value) 0.441 0.376 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%, **5% and ***1% level 
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3.5.2 Long-term effect of natural resource exports on growth 
To investigate the long-run effect of natural resource exports on economic growth, 
the following equation was used, composed of direct and indirect (interactive) 
effects on growth in natural resource exports in the current and previous five-year 
periods: 
!git
!NRit
= "2 +"9 (HRit )+ "10 (Instit )  
!git
!NRit!1
= "3 + "11(HRit )+ "12 (Instit )  
To calculate the total effect (Table 12), estimated as a derivative of GDP growth 
with respect to fuel, mineral and agricultural exports, the summary statistics (mean 
and standard deviation) in Table 2 and the last regressions of Tables 9, 10 and 11 
were used.  
The outcome indicates that estimates of the long-range effect of a one-unit increase 
in fuel exports on economic growth with good institutional quality are negative. 
Estimates of the long-term effect of a one-unit increase in mineral exports on 
economic growth for a high level of institutional quality are also negative. Neither 
set of results confirms the conditional hypothesis, but both are consistent with the 
resource curse theory. 
In Table 12, the outcome indicates that estimates of the long-term effect of a one-
unit increase in agricultural exports on economic growth with a high level of 
institutional quality are positive. This implies that the diverse effects of the resource 
curse may be mitigated through the improvement of institutional quality, which is 
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consistent with the conditional hypothesis. Furthermore, The short and long marginal 
effects changes across countries when one adds interaction terms to the institutional 
variables. As a consequence, short and long run effects changes across countries 
depending on their institutional variable levels. Table 12 indicates that the short and 
long-run marginal effects vary for countries with low and high fuel-dependence as 
countries have different values of institutional quality.  
Table 12: Long-run effects of natural resources with institutional quality 
Long-run effects of natural resources with high institutional quality= 1 
Natural Resource Exports Current effect Effect five years later Long-run effect 
Fuel Exports 0.003 0.07 -0.07 
Mineral Exports 0.04 -0.13 -0.10 
Agricultural Exports 0.34 -0.11 0.24 
Long-run effects of natural resources with low institutional quality= -1 
Natural Resource Exports Current effect Effect five years later  Long-run effect 
Fuel Exports 0.023 -0.08 -0.06 
Mineral Exports -0.23 0.23   0 
Agricultural Exports -0.80 0.53 -0.27 
 
3.5.3 Fuel-dependent countries 
As explained in the cross-sectional model, 3dummy variables D10 and D20 were 
used to investigate the economic performance of fuel economies with fuel exports 
more than 10 per cent (D10) and 20 per cent (D20) of GDP, See Table 13. 
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!"#$%&'()&*+,-.+#/-+01&"12&3014+2%13%&+1-%.5"$&04&2+44%.%1-&6.0/7,&
Variables Mean Standard error [95% Conf. Interval] 
FuelExp*D20 3.94 0.41 3.14      4.75 
FuelExp*D10 4.78 0.42 4            5.6 
 
As explained in Section 3.4.2, different thresholds for fuel export dependency are 
used that are based on the resource curse literature. However, Table 13 and 14 show 
that the differences between the effects of fuel export for two groups(D10 and D20) 
on economic growth is negligible. Furthermore, the results presented in Table 14 
show that in fuel-dependent countries (using D10), the effect of fuel exports on 
economic performance is positive (0.4303–0.2591 = 0.17) in the current period, but 
appears negative (-0.5599+0.2910 = -0.27) five years later. The long-term effect of 
fuel exports in dependent economies, taking into account dummy variable D10, is 
(0.17–0.27) / (1–0.0196) = -0.1. A one per cent increase in fuel exports (using D10) 
leads to a 0.1 per cent decline in economic growth. This demonstrates the existence 
of the resource curse in countries where fuel exports form more than 10 per cent of 
GDP.  
It is evident from Column 2 of Table 14 that the effect of institutional quality 
(regulatory quality) is positive and significant at the one per cent level for economies 
that are less dependent on fuel exports. However, institutional quality has less effect 
on economic growth in dependent economies. The sign of the coefficient relating to 
the human resource variable is positive but insignificant for economies both 
dependent and non-dependent on fuel exports. Column 4 indicates the insignificant 
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effect of institutions and human resources on growth for countries highly dependent 
on fuel exports (using D20). 
Column 4 also indicates that a one-unit increase in fuel exports in countries where 
fuel revenues are the main source of national income leads to a 0.11 per cent 
increase in economic growth in the current period, with a 0.25 per cent reduction in 
growth in the next five years. Its long-run effect on economic performance is also 
negative (-0.25 + 0.11) / (1 – 0.0063) = -0.14).  
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Table 14: Estimated effect of fuel exports in low- and high-dependence 
countries (system GMM panel data estimations) 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per worker (1970-2010) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth t-1 0.0053 -0.0196 0.0087 -0.0063 
 (0.07) (-0.22) (0.12) (-0.08) 
Fuel Export/GDP (FEG) 0.2979 0.4303* 0.1878 0.2936 
 (1.61) (1.72) (1.12) (1.59) 
Fuel Export/GDP t-1 (FEG) -0.5247*** -0.5599** -0.1801 -0.2225 
 (-2.85) (-2.10) (-1.38) (-1.26) 
FuelExp*D10 -0.1444 -0.2591   
 (-0.84) (-1.10)   
FuelExp*D10 t-1 0.2896* 0.2910   
 (1.78) (1.27)   
EstRQ*D10  -1.7361   
  (-1.13)   
FuelExp*D20   -0.0933 -0.1829 
   (-0.66) (-1.44) 
FuelExp*D20 t-1   -0.0074 -0.0249 
   (-0.10) (-0.16) 
EstPS*D20    -4.3052 
    (-1.28) 
EstRQ*D20    -1.5051 
    (-0.36) 
EstRL*D20    5.6440 
    (1.49) 
Investment (Inv) 0.1510*** 0.1589*** 0.1583** 0.1704*** 
 (3.17) (2.89) (2.45) (2.90) 
Terms of trade (TOT) -0.0042 -0.0023 0.0058 0.0031 
 (-0.27) (-0.10) (0.33) (0.18) 
Terms of trade t-1 (TOT) 0.0311** 0.0351** 0.0231 0.0211 
 (2.28) (2.38) (1.26) (1.42) 
Human Resource (HR) 0.0206 0.0112 0.0034 0.0052 
 (0.86) (0.39) (0.11) (0.19) 
Voice and Accountability (EstVA) -0.8046 -0.8674 -0.4758 -0.7081 
 (-0.99) (-0.88) (-0.46) (-0.67) 
Political Stability (EstPS) 1.0922 0.8183 1.4711* 1.5395 
 (1.35) (1.12) (1.86) (1.53) 
Government Effectiveness (EstGEF) -1.4636 -0.7031 0.0084 -0.5505 
 (-0.96) (-0.48) (0.00) (-0.30) 
Regulatory Quality (EstRQ) 3.7429** 4.1992*** 4.1530** 3.9050* 
 (2.59) (2.83) (2.44) (1.96) 
Rule of Law (EstRL) -3.2735* -3.2489 -4.0549* -3.3862 
 (-1.69) (-1.56) (-1.82) (-1.42) 
Control of Corruption( EstCC) 0.2493 -0.5133 -0.8745 -0.6820 
 (0.17) (-0.29) (-0.50) (-0.48) 
Intercept -6.7467*** -7.2339*** -6.6707*** -6.4693*** 
 (-3.73) (-3.56) (-3.19) (-3.14) 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
Countries 132 132 132 132 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.317 0.27 0.162 0.207 
Hansen test (P-value) 0.986 0.881 0.954 0.953 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significant at *10%, **5% and ***1% level 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Using the cross-sectional model, the set of regressions shows that the effect of the different 
types of natural resource is positive on growth after controlling the interaction terms. 
However, the effect of the different dimensions of institutional quality on growth varies. For 
example, the impact of control of corruption (EstCC) is positive and significant with respect 
to fuel exports, whereas effectiveness of government (EstGEF) has a negative impact on 
growth, while other dimensions remain insignificant. Therefore, the estimations of 
interactions also vary. 
The main findings indicate that both fuel and mineral exports delay economic growth, 
conditional on low institutional quality (using control of corruption). In other words, most 
natural resource-dependent economies, especially oil and gas exporters, suffer from the 
resource curse when their wealth is combined with poor-quality human and institutional 
capacity, resulting in a high level of dependence on natural resource exports (Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte, 2008). 
The marginal effects of all types of natural resource are negative, evaluated in terms of high 
and low levels of institutional and human resource quality. The results show that the effect of 
fuel exports on economic growth will be negligible with high-quality institutions and human 
resources. The marginal effect of mineral and agricultural exports on economic performance 
is negative when institutional and human resource quality improves. This is compatible with 
Meller’s (2009) finding that resource-rich countries in Latin America tend to reduce their 
economic dependence on natural resources by diversifying their export structure, thus 
increasing non-resource exports. This leads to a reduction in the impact of natural resources 
on economic growth. 
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However, using the panel data model, the findings indicate that the long-term effect of fuel 
and mineral exports is negative, thus confirming the existence of the resource curse in fuel- 
and mineral-rich countries. Conversely, the long-run effect of agricultural exports on growth 
is positive. This means that countries abundant in point resources are more prone to the 
resource curse than diffuse resource-abundant countries. In contrast to the cross-sectional 
model, the interaction terms between all natural resources and economic growth are not 
significant using the panel data. In other words, the results of the dynamic panel model do not 
confirm the hypothesis that the effect of natural resources is conditional on the quality of 
institutions. 
The results of both cross-sectional and panel data models indicate that high economic 
dependence on fuel exports leads to lower economic performance. The main finding 
associated with the effect of fuel exports on economic growth is that fuel exports have an 
adverse effect on growth only for countries that are heavily dependent on fuel exports. 
Moreover, the effect of institutions is lower in highly fuel-dependent countries than in those 
with economies less reliant on fuel export revenues. As a result, the economic performance of 
fuel-dependent economies is more likely to suffer from the detrimental effects of the resource 
curse (Karl, 2004; Auty, 1993; Ding and Field, 2005). 
These results should be treated with caution since limited data are available and the various 
dimensions of institutional quality are subject to measurement error. As Ross (2014) argues, 
definitions of institutional quality indices are ambiguous, and institutions may also be 
affected by natural resources. This makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the possible 
existence of a causal relationship between fuel exports and institutional quality. Moreover, 
how natural resources are measured may affect the results, including the distinction between 
natural resource dependence and natural resource abundance, and how they are gauged. 
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In this study, the empirical results show the importance of economic, political and social 
transmission mechanisms of the resource curse with regard to the different types of natural 
resource, particularly in fuel-exporting countries, which is the main focus here. Comparative 
studies of resource-rich countries will be necessary to shed light on causal explanations for 
poor economic growth through these transmission channels and highlight causal explanations 
for economic, political and social channels in which natural resource dependence may affect 
economic growth; in other words, to help draw policy lessons from the experience of other 
resource-based industries to tackle the diverse curse effects of petroleum revenues on long-
run economic development. 
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Chapter 4: Lessons from Other Petroleum-Rich States 
(Cross-Country Qualitative Method) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The fact that some resource abundant countries, such as Norway, have escaped the 
resource curse while many others, such as Nigeria, have not is of particular interest 
to this study. The limitations of the economic literature on the resource curse lie in 
the inability of statistical analysis to answer a crucial question: why are some 
resource-rich countries able to utilise their natural resources to promote development 
while others are not? 
The cross-country quantitative method of research is the most common analytical 
approach to analysis of the natural resource curse (Rosser, 2006). However, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, this method falls short when attempting to 
explain obvious differences in the development experiences of various petroleum-
rich countries. Ross (1999) highlights a gap between economic understanding and 
the politics of resource-rich countries. Furthermore, explaining causality in the 
transmission mechanisms of the resource curse requires deeper analysis of the 
particular natural resource at individual country level (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). 
As Maxwell (2004) emphasises, the qualitative approach considers causality in terms 
of processes and mechanisms, rather than simply demonstrating a correlation 
between existing variables. Ebbinghaus (2005) suggests that qualitative cross-
country analysis is a more appropriate method than cross-country statistical analysis, 
based on assumptions regarding homogeneity, independence and the 
representativeness of the sample. 
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The qualitative method used in this chapter is a cross-country comparative approach 
(Bryman, 2004; Rosser, 2006). The goal is to demonstrate that, although statistical 
analysis of the resource curse seems to account for most of the difficulties 
confronting oil-rich states, a different picture is revealed when oil-abundant 
countries’ economic, political and social policies and strategies are viewed in 
relative rather than absolute terms. From this perspective, the resource curse no 
longer appears to be inevitable or inescapable. Furthermore, undertaking cross-
country comparative research will allow the Kurdistan region to learn from other 
countries’ best practice in the governance of their oil and gas industries, enabling the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to frame policy options for developing a 
long-term sustainable economy. 
However, comparative analysis suffers from certain limitations, such as 
comparability, availability of datasets and generalisability. There is also the potential 
for differences, such as cultural factors, to be unobserved, while the historical, 
political and institutional context may make it difficult to replicate a policy from one 
country in another (Lijphart, 1971; Synder, 2001; George and Bennett, 2005). 
Therefore, in this research an issue-oriented strategy (Stake, 1995; Yin 2003) is used 
to analyse the adopted polices and measures across four selected cases. These policy 
areas are limited to the economic, political and socio-economic policies adopted by 
four major oil-exporting countries in response to the related transmission channels of 
the resource curse, based on the resource curse literature. 
These countries – Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria – were selected on the 
basis of the research questions, the theoretical framework and prior knowledge of the 
cases (Ragin, 1987). As major oil-exporting countries, considering their role in 
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global energy security, the four case studies represent both the extremes and the 
middle range of oil-rich and resource curse characteristics. They also represent 
different approaches to governance of the oil and gas sector. 
The following research questions framed the investigation of the best policy tools for 
addressing economic, political and socio-economic issues across the selected 
petroleum-producing countries: 
1) How effective are institutional design and structure measures in addressing 
the political and economic issues associated with accountability, transparency 
and checks and balances? 
2) How effective are policies and measures aimed at human resource capacity 
building? 
3) How effective are economic policies in dealing with macroeconomic and 
petroleum revenue management issues? 
Documentary sources were used for this cross-country comparative research. The 
general principles involved in handling and dealing with documentary resources are 
similar to those in other areas of social research. According to Scott (1990, P.6), in 
handling documentary resources it is necessary to consider four criteria:  
“…1) Authenticity – whether the evidence is genuine and is of unquestionable 
origin;  
2) Credibility – whether the evidence is free from error and distortion; 
 3) Representativeness – whether the evidence is typical of its kind and, if not, 
whether the extent of its specificity is known; and  
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4) Meaning – whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible.” Against this 
background, analysis of surveys, documents and reports published by governments 
relating to governance of the oil and gas sector provides information about the 
political, economic and social mechanisms that policy makers have chosen to 
manage their oil and gas resources and associated revenues. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 starts with general 
information relating to the oil and gas industries of the selected countries, and then 
describes the implementation of institutional and administrative policies in 
governing the oil and gas sectors of the four petroleum exporters. Section 4.3 
presents policies adopted by the respective governments to enhance their human 
resource capacity. Section 4.4 explains the economic policies adopted by the four 
cases to manage their petroleum revenues, as well as the measures taken to reduce 
their economic dependence on hydrocarbon revenues. Section 4.5 compares the 
institutional, human resource capacity-building and economic policies adopted by 
the four major oil-exporting countries, and Section 4.6 discusses the lessons learned 
from best practice. 
4.2 Institutional Policy: The Role of Institutional Design and 
Frameworks in Petroleum Sector Governance 
Institutional design should be taken into account in attempts to enhance the 
performance of the petroleum sector (Turber et al., 2011). Furthermore, setting up an 
effective petroleum-sector management system allows governments to make more 
efficient decisions on ways to manage their petroleum wealth. 
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The World Bank (Alba, 2009) has set out an “extractive industry value chain” 
approach, which offers potential insights into the governance and institutional 
arrangements of petroleum-rich countries (Alba, 2009). The natural resource 
management value chain focuses on institutional arrangements across the following 
key pillars of the extractive industry’s value chain: 1) award of contracts or licences; 
2) regulation and monitoring of operations; 3) revenue collection; and 4) revenue 
management (Alba, 2009, p.3). This section considers the first three of these pillars, 
as shown in Figure 9, while the fourth is discussed in Section 4.4. 
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Figure 9: Extractive industry value chain (Source: Alba, 2009) 
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4.2.1 Norway 
Oil production began in Norway in 1971. The country has a population of more than 
five million. At that time, the country had well-functioning institutions, and 
shipping, fishing and the hydroelectric industry dominated its economy. However, 
petroleum exports formed 65 per cent of its total merchandise exports in 2014 
(World Development Indicators, 2015). 
Norway is now an important supplier of both oil and natural gas to other European 
countries. At the end 2014, its proven oil and natural gas reserves were about 6.5 
billion barrels and 1.9 trillion cubic metres, respectively (BP, 2015). All of Norway’s 
oil reserves are located offshore on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), which 
is divided into the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea areas (NPD, 2015). 
Norway is one of the major exporters of natural gas and crude oil. In 2013, it ranked 
as the third largest natural gas exporter after Russia and Qatar, and the twelfth largest 
exporter of crude oil in the world (OECD, 2007; EIA, 2014a). However, its 
petroleum production has gradually declined since 2001, as its oil fields have 
matured (see Figure 10). The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) recognises 
that maintaining production levels will be a big challenge for Norway as result of a 
continuing decline in crude oil production. Potential new discoveries will be the 
determining factor of future production levels (NPD, 2015). 
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Figure 10: Norway’s crude oil production and consumption, 1971-2014 (Source: 
BP, 2015) 
By contrast, the share of natural gas in Norway’s total primary energy supply has 
grown since 1973, as it has progressively developed its large offshore gas fields on 
the NCS (IEA, 2011). Only a small proportion of oil and natural gas is consumed 
domestically in Norway, as illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. This is enabled by 
domestic reliance on renewable energies, including hydropower, wind and biomass 
(EIA, 2014a). Consequently, Norway exports the vast majority of its oil and gas, and 
is a significant exporter of crude oil and natural gas to EU countries, including the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy (NPD, 
2015). Norway is also a major supplier of refined fuel products, such as gasoline and 
diesel fuel, to European countries. 
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Figure 11: Norway’s natural gas production and consumption, 1977-2014 
(Source: BP, 2015) 
Figure 12 illustrates the location of the governance functions of the oil and gas sector 
in three separate organisational bodies: 1) policy-making (ministry), 2) regulation 
(NPD) and 3) operation (national oil company) (Hunter, 2014).
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Figure 12: Organisational structure of Norway’s petroleum sector (Source: NPD, 2015, P.17) 
Parliament 
Norwegian 
Government  
Ministry of 
Petroleum &  
Energy 
The Norwegian 
Petroleum 
Directorate 
Petoro As 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Ministry of 
Labour 
Ministry of 
Fisheries & 
Coastal Affairs 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Government 
Pension Fund 
The Petroleum 
Tax Office 
The Petroleum 
Safety Authority 
Norway 
The Norwegian 
Coastal 
Administration 
Climate and 
Pollution 
Agency 
Policymaking  
Regulatory 
body 
Gassco As 
Transport of Gas 
Statoil ASA 
Research Programs 
Commercial 
body 
  
 
!
"#$!
Petroleum resources and all related revenues are the property of the Norwegian state. 
The fiscal regime in Norway is based on a concessionary system, under which the 
Norwegian government grants a licence to one or more oil companies giving 
exclusive rights for a limited period to the surveying, exploratory drilling and 
production of petroleum within the geographical area covered by the licence. This 
fiscal regime works through the payment of royalties and taxes to the state. Under 
the Petroleum Act, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is authorised to 
award licences and approvals for operators’ field and pipeline development plans, 
while the NPD plays an advisory role in all steps of the licensing process when it 
comes to negotiation with individual companies (NDP, 2015). 
The Norwegian parliament has delegated responsibility for policy making to the 
MPE, which manages resources on the NCS to ensure that petroleum activities are 
carried out in line with guidelines set by the parliament and the government. The 
MPE is also charged with impact assessment regarding environmental and social 
aspects of petroleum activities prior to the opening of new areas. It fully owns two 
companies, Petro AS and Gassco AS, and partially owns Statoil. In order to gain 
control of the transmission of natural gas, the Norwegian government established a 
stated-owned company, Gassco AS, which manages the transportation of gas in the 
NCS and is the operator for Gassled (NDP, 2015). The petroleum sector has 
cooperative links with a number of ministries, such as the Ministry of Labour, as 
well as the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Coastal Affairs and the Ministry of 
the Environment (NPD, 2015). 
The NDP is an independent technocratic agency and has a regulatory function. It 
reports to the MPE. Its key duty is to collect and analyse data relating to the NCS. 
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When it was established in 1973, this was a challenging task due to its limited 
knowledge and resources (Engen, 2009), but systematic efforts to increase its 
technical competence have transformed it into an independent, well-established 
regulatory body that monitors and controls petroleum activities in the Norwegian oil 
and gas sector. It is also an advisory body in the policy-making process (Engen, 
2009). 
The Norwegian organisational model includes the national oil company (NOC), 
Statoil, which handles the commercial functions of the sector. It is a state-owned oil 
company established in 1972, with 50 per cent participatory interest in all licences 
granted and a dominant role in the decision-making process. It also serves as a 
channel for technology transfer and economic development. Statoil has pursued the 
development of Norwegian industrial and technological capability through long-term 
research and development programmes, as well as through direct involvement in 
highly technological projects. It has also played a key role in the development of 
domestic service companies (Thurber and Istad, 2010; Thurber et al., 2010). 
The Norwegian state restricted Statoil’s power to a commercial function by 
transferring the state’s holdings into the State Direct Financial Interest Agency 
(SDFI), which was established in 1985, eliminating its veto power over field 
decisions (Hunter, 2014). Statoil also lost its right automatically to grant interest in 
all licences, in line with Article 4 of EEA agreement and EU Directive 94/22 EC, 
which requires objective, non-discriminatory granting of licences (Hunter, 2014). 
Statoil was partially privatised in 2001. The Norwegian state has a 67 per cent 
holding in Statoil, managed by the MPE. The major shareholders of the remaining 33 
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per cent are the USA, Norwegian private owners, the rest of Europe, the UK, and the 
rest of the world (Statoil, 2015). 
The Norwegian state participates in production licences through a fully state-owned, 
non-operational company called Petoro. In addition to its commercial interest as a 
licensee, it regulates petroleum activities as a member of management committees in 
the field (Hunter, 2014). 
In summary, the primary goal of Norwegian petroleum governance has been to gain 
comprehensive state control over the petroleum industry; therefore, the NOC helped 
build domestic expertise through learning by doing. In this context, Statoil became a 
global competitive oil company. Norway’s institutional design, which separates the 
different roles within the petroleum sector, has played a key role in increasing the 
checks and balances and avoiding conflicts of interest. 
4.2.2 Kuwait 
Oil production started in Kuwait in 1965. The country has a population of less than 
four million and has the fifth largest conventional oil reserves in the world. It is a 
small economy, with proven crude oil reserves of about 101.5 billion barrels and 
proven natural gas reserves of about 1.9 trillion cubic metres at the end of 2014. 
Petroleum exports account for about 94 per cent of total exports. Thus, its economy 
is heavily reliant on petroleum rents (EIA, 2014b; BP, 2015). 
Kuwait’s oil exports started in 1946 and it is now a major oil-exporting country. It is 
one of the few OPEC members with spare capacity, which is used to compensate 
when there is a shortage of supply in the world market. For example, it increased oil 
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production in response to the loss of Libyan supplies in 2011 (EIA, 2014b; BP, 
2014). 
Production capacity is growing following a collapse in production resulting from the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. The major customers for Kuwaiti oil are the 
United States, Europe, South Korea and India. As shown in Figure 13, the proportion 
of domestic oil consumption is small: most of its production is available for export. 
However, the consumption of crude oil has been steadily increasing owing to the use 
of oil by power plants for electricity generation and by domestic refineries (EIA, 
2014b). 
 
Figure 13: Kuwait’s crude oil production and consumption, 1965-2014 (Source: 
BP, 2015) 
Kuwait is dependent on imported natural gas on account of its small natural gas 
production, which is unable to meet domestic demand (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Kuwait’s natural gas production and consumption, 1970-2014 
(Source: BP, 2015) 
Kuwait has tended to develop its natural gas sector by attracting international oil 
companies to invest in the exploration and production of natural gas. Increasing 
domestic demand for natural gas and oil is attributable to the high consumption of 
combined power and water desalination plants. A subsidisation policy plays a major 
role in keeping electricity prices low, resulting in inefficient use. Therefore, in recent 
years the Kuwaiti government has stepped up efforts to increase its supply of natural 
gas to the domestic market. Kuwait’s refinery sector grew during 2014, with a 
production capacity of 936 barrels per day, and Kuwait exports petroleum products 
to various global markets (EIA, 2014b).  
Current fiscal policy for the petroleum sector is based on technical services 
agreements (TSAs). The Kuwaiti Constitution limits the involvement of international 
oil companies (IOCs) to the operation of local fields. TSAs provide a fixed rate of 
return on investment. Under such agreements, IOCs cannot acquire any interest in 
the underlying resource (Stevens, 2008). Following nationalisation of Kuwait’s 
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petroleum industry in 1977, the entire oil and gas sector was brought under the 
control of the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC), which is headed by the prime 
minister. The council is charged with setting government policy on petroleum 
wealth. However, it lacks the capability to address issues facing the Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation (KPC), and hence has been unable to develop an effective 
strategy for the oil and gas sector. SPC is not accountable to parliament because the 
emir, rather than the parliament, appoints the government’s cabinet. A lack of trust 
between parliament and government has resulted in obstacles being set up by 
parliament to protect natural resources (Stevens, 2008). 
The Ministry of Oil is responsible for policy making and regulating the KPC. The 
Minister of Oil is the chair of KPC; thus, it is under the direct control of the 
Ministry, and has the power of veto over all KPC decisions. Consequently, the KPC 
seems not to be an independent entity in managing petroleum activities. The board of 
KPC comprises all directors of its subsidiaries. KPC is a fully state-owned company 
responsible for all petroleum activities. In 1980, the organisational structure of the 
petroleum sector was changed and KPC began to bring all related state-owned 
entities under a single umbrella, as shown in Figure 15. KPC is accountable to its 
shareholder (the SPC) as well as parliament. It has faced difficulties in controlling its 
subsidiaries and implementing its projects effectively, a burden stemming from poor 
cooperation between the various subsidiaries and KPC, long hierarchical and 
bureaucratic decision-making processes, political and elite interference, and low 
technical skills (World Bank, 2007; Stevens, 2008). 
Authority over the oil sector is fragmented. Governance of the oil and gas sector 
lacks clarity of goals, roles and responsibilities between the agencies involved in the 
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sector, as illustrated in Figure 15. Moreover, in practice, there is no regulatory 
agency in the Kuwaiti oil and gas sector; thus, both the Ministry of Oil and PSC 
supervise KPC (Stevens, 2008). 
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Figure 15: Organisational structure of Kuwait’s petroleum sector (Source: Based on data from World Bank, 2007; Stevens, 2008).  
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4.2.3 Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is one of the world’s oldest oil-producing countries. It is located in the 
South Caspian Sea basin with a population of more than nine million people. Since 
becoming independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan’s economy has 
relied heavily on its vast deepwater, offshore oil and gas resources in the Caspian 
Sea (EIA, 2014c). British Petroleum (BP, 2015) estimated Azerbaijan’s crude oil and 
natural gas reserves at the end of 2014 to be 7.0 billion barrels and 1.2 trillion cubic 
metres, respectively. Crude oil exports account for 93 per cent of total merchandise 
exports (World Bank, 2015). 
As illustrated in Figure 16, oil production in Azerbaijan grew from 307,000 barrels 
per day (bpd) in 2002 to 1.0 million bpd in 2010. However, the production volume 
has since declined, falling to 919,000 bpd in 2011 and 848,000 bpd in 2014. Falling 
production has contributed to technical problems in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshi 
(ACG) field, which is Azerbaijan’s main production field. Crude oil is exported 
through pipeline, truck and rail to world markets (EIA, 2014c). 
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Figure 16: Azerbaijan’s crude oil production and consumption, 1985-2014 
(Source: BP, 2015) 
Since 2007, natural gas production has increased with the commencement of 
production in the Shah Deniz field, developed by BP. Figure 17 also shows an 
increase in the consumption of natural gas, which is a major domestic energy source. 
The plan is that natural gas will be used for the country’s future power generation. 
At present, the major natural gas customers are Turkey and Greece (EIA, 2014c). 
Turkey is the major importer of Azerbaijani natural gas, and natural gas to Greece is 
transported through Turkey. However, under the 2011 Izmir agreement, Azerbaijan 
exports natural gas directly to Europe through Turkish territory. Azerbaijan has two 
refineries with a combined production capacity of 399,000 bpd as of 2014. The 
refineries need to be modernised to increase production (EIA, 2014c). 
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Figure 17: Azerbaijan’s natural gas production and consumption, 1985-2014 
(Source: BP, 2015) 
In Azerbaijan, the fiscal regime is a contractual system. Under production sharing 
agreements (PSAs), Azerbaijan allows IOCs to invest in the oil and gas sector. The 
President of the Republic approves the rules for negotiations and contracts with 
IOCs, and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is involved 
in the negotiation process. SOCAR has its own share in all contracts. At the same 
time, it acts as a government representative in contracts. This dual role results in 
conflicts of interest. Furthermore, SOCAR plays a major role in setting policy on 
petroleum resources as a result of its close cooperation with the president. It has a 
dominant role in the oil and gas industry, and thus it manages and regulates all 
petroleum activities. The role of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is very limited 
(EIA, 2014c; Energy Charter Secretariat, 2011; Kjaernet, 2010; Gojayev, 2010). 
In short, Azerbaijan has NOC-dominated governance model for its oil and gas 
sector. The NOC, namely SOCAR, has multiple responsibilities and functions, 
including policy-making, regulatory and commercial (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18: Organisational structure of Azerbaijan’s petroleum sector (Source: Author, based on data from EIA, 2014c; Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2005; Kjaernet, 2010). 
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4.2.4 Nigeria 
Nigeria is rich in oil and gas. It is located on the Gulf of Guinea on Africa’s western 
coast, and has a population of 172 million. Nigeria is a member of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and petroleum exports account for 88 
per cent of total national exports (OPEC, 2014). Nigeria’s petroleum reserve was 
estimated to be 37.1 thousand million barrels of crude oil and 5.1 trillion cubic 
metres of natural gas at the end of 2014 (BP, 2015). 
 
Figure 19: Nigeria’s crude oil production and consumption, 1965-2013 (Source: 
BP and EIA, 2014d). 
Crude oil production reached a peak of 2.4 million bpd in 2005. As shown in Figure 
19, its oil production suffers from significant volatility, stemming from social 
conflicts resulting in attacks on oil pipelines and related infrastructure. Nigeria is a 
major crude oil exporter to the United States; however, the volume of exports to the 
US has been falling due to a growth in shale oil production. The refinery sector 
accounts for the largest share of domestic consumption, but capacity cannot meet 
local demand and Nigeria has to import oil products (EIA, 2014d).  
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Nigeria’s natural gas production capacity has been growing gradually since 2003 and 
reached a peak of 12.28 billion cubic metres in 2008 (see Figure 20), but this has 
been declining due to the same security issues threatening oil production capacity. It 
is the world’s twenty-fifth largest natural gas producer, and the majority of its 
natural gas reserves are located in the Niger delta (EIA, 2014d). Widespread natural 
gas flaring is a critical issue that the Nigerian government has failed to resolve. 
Despite the presence of a vast natural gas energy source, shortage of electricity 
remains an unresolved problem (Bloom, 2010). 
 
Figure 20: Nigeria’s natural gas production and consumption, 1965-2012 
(Source: BP and EIA, 2014d). 
Nigeria has four refineries, which operate below full capacity because of operational 
failures, fires and sabotage, mainly on the crude pipelines feeding refineries. As a 
result, Nigeria has to import petroleum products. The government has planned for 
the construction of new refineries, but these have been delayed due to shortage of 
finance (EIA, 2014d; OPEC, 2014). 
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In view of the financial burden on the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) in funding numerous joint venture operations, since the 1990s the Nigerian 
government has relied on production sharing agreements (PSAs) with IOCs 
(Thurber, et al., 2010). NNPC was created in 1977 to oversee regulation of the oil 
and natural gas industry. In 1988, the government divided NNPC into 12 
subsidiaries, which expanded the scope of activities of NNPC in the oil and gas 
sector. The most significant functions of subsidiaries of NNPC include control over 
international companies operating in Nigeria, buying and selling crude oil and 
refined petroleum products, upstream and downstream operations, gas transportation 
and service activities (NNPC, 2015; Thurber et al., 2010). 
The Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (FMPR) is responsible for initiating 
policies for the oil and gas sector, and supervises the implementation of approval 
policies. It is organised into a number of departments and agencies, as illustrated in 
Figure 21. The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), within the FMPR, is the 
key regulator responsible for processing all applications for licences, for monitoring 
upstream and downstream activities, and for all rent payments in the oil and gas 
sector (NNPC, 2014; Thurber et al., 2010). 
In summary, the governance model of the oil and gas sector in Nigeria has an 
overlapping institutional framework in which various agencies are involved. This 
results in duplications and conflicting regulatory functions.  
 
  
 
!
""#!
Figure 21: Organisational structure of Nigeria’s petroleum sector (Source: Based on data from FMPR, 2014; NNPC, 2014; Thurber et 
al., 2010) 
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4.3 Capacity-Building Policy: Role of Human Resource 
Development in Petroleum-Exporting Countries 
Building capacity is a major determinant of the effective and efficient management 
of natural resources, particularly with regard to petroleum wealth. The shortage of 
local administrative and technical know-how, as well as new knowledge and 
technology, restricts the contribution of an indigenous labour force to industrial 
activities (International Labour Organization, 2012; Marcel, 2013). Support for 
education and training policies to build the right skills may contribute to economic 
prosperity through the improvement of productivity and growth. It contributes to 
social cohesion by increasing employment in good quality jobs and social 
engagement (OECD, 2014). This section considers human capacity-building policies 
across the four cases.  (Deleted Figure 22) 
4.3.1 Norway 
The Norwegian government’s policy for the oil and gas sector pursues the 
development of local capacity to maximise participation in exploration and 
development of the petroleum industry (Tordo et al., 2013). The establishment of a 
state-owned company stemmed from the need for an appropriate tool to implement 
national petroleum policy and also to fulfil the ambition of localising petroleum-
related activities in order to increase national control over the country’s oil and gas 
industry. Norway’s advanced technological capacity in its shipbuilding industry 
facilitated the development of local engagement in the petroleum sector, which is 
located offshore (Wolf and Pollitt, 2009; Heum, 2008). 
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The MPE sought to enhance the technical capability and competiveness of NPD by 
providing incentives to attract adequate technical expertise (Thurber and Istad, 
2010). The MPE has also established various research programmes and partnerships 
covering a wide range of activities relating to employment creation, engagement of 
society in the petroleum industry, expansion of business markets, and building links 
with other industries (NDP, 2015). 
The Norwegian government’s expenditure on education and training is nine per cent 
of GDP, which is the highest of all OECD countries (OECD, 2014). With a vast fund 
for education and training purposes, the government aims to design a better-
performing skills system in cooperation with employers, trade unions, universities, 
students and teachers. Furthermore, Norway’s expenditure of GDP on research and 
development (R&D) is 1.61 per cent of GDP. In addition to financial support, 
foreign companies operating on the NCS are committed to conducting at least 50 per 
cent of research activities related to the development of fields in Norwegian 
institutions (Leskinen et al., 2012). 
In summary, capacity building forms the key policy for the development of 
Norway’s oil and gas sector. 
4.3.2 Kuwait 
Education expenditure accounts for nine per cent of Kuwait’s GDP. However, the 
poor quality of the education and training system has led to a shortage of competent 
labour in Kuwait (IMF, 2013). Kuwait has one of the lowest levels of expenditure on 
R&D among Gulf states, and there is no effective link between universities and 
industry (IMF, 2014). 
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Kuwaitis are employed mainly in the public sector. High pay and benefits for public 
jobs reduce incentives to work in the private sector, a classic problem in the “rentier 
states” of the Gulf (Gelb et al., 2002). The attractiveness of public employment also 
limits the number of workers engaging in entrepreneurship and skills training 
programmes to match their competence with the tradable labour market. Therefore, 
Kuwait suffers from a lack of specialised indigenous skills in the industrial sector 
(IMF, 2013), a problem exacerbated by the small size of its population. 
In addition, the lack of highly skilled workers is reflected in weak middle-level 
management across KPC’s subsidiaries. The lack of managers with a deep 
knowledge of the oil industry stems from political interference in the recruitment 
process and the failure of KPC to devise a system that identifies training needs and 
promotes the most talented employees (Victor et al., 2011). 
In short, the human resource capacity-building policy with respect to Kuwait’s oil 
and gas sector has not been successful in educating and training the manpower to 
perform creditably the functions required by the petroleum industry. 
4.3.3 Azerbaijan 
There is growing concern about a decline in the number of participants in higher 
education institutions and the vocational training sector in Azerbaijan (Allahveranov 
and Huseynov, 2013). Another factor that plays a major role in increasing the 
unemployment rate is a noticeable mismatch between the skills supplied by the 
educational system and labour market demands. Consequently, shortage of skills 
remains a significant barrier to productivity increases (Allahveranov and Huseynov, 
2013). In response, the government has adopted a range of measures to develop this 
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capacity, such as introducing new curricula in academic institutions, new bachelor 
and master’s programmes, and the establishment of new training centres (World 
Bank Group, 2015). 
The Azerbaijani government uses local content rules in PSAs with foreign 
companies to develop its workforce through employment and training. These local 
content rules also target the development and procurement of local supplies and 
services. However, the effective implementation of regulations calling for local skills 
and suppliers is dependent on the quality and quantity of the domestic workforce and 
manufacturing companies (Tordo et al., 2013). 
Human capacity-building for Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry faces many 
challenges, such as funding limitations and the low quality of the education system 
and training programmes. 
4.3.4 Nigeria 
The low skills of college graduates in Nigeria reflect the poor quality of the 
education system (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015). This can be explained by a low level 
of public capital spending on human capacity development. Public funding of 
education and R&D is inadequate to meet the needs for development of the 
education system. The share of education spending in the 2013 budget was 8.5 per 
cent (Barungi, 2014). Consequently, the inadequacy of funding in education and 
training has a negative effect on economic development, thereby reducing living 
standards and welfare in Nigeria (Omoijmite, 2011). 
The local content policy introduced to develop a petroleum-competent Nigerian 
workforce started in 1971. In compliance with the Oil and Gas Industry Content 
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Development Act of 2010, foreign petroleum companies in Nigeria must support the 
skills acquisition and empowerment of Nigeria’s workforce and the enhancement of 
its existing manpower capacity. The local content rule also aims at effective 
involvement of Nigerian companies in the service and supply side of the oil and gas 
sector (Tordo et al., 2013). 
The NNPC has established a Nigerian content development strategy investing in 
human capacity building. It awards joint venture agreements as a prime vehicle for 
the development of a range of skills in different disciplines, including engineering, 
geology and geophysics. However, achievement of the second objective of the 
content development strategy associated with enhancing the active participation of 
indigenous service companies in oil and gas activities is facing obstacles owing to 
poor fiscal policy and inadequate infrastructure (Balouga, 2012). 
The Nigerian government has set up a separate authority called the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board that has responsibility for local content 
management. The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) was 
established to develop domestic manpower for the oil and gas industry through 
training and education. For example, in order to fill the skills gap, overseas 
scholarships are granted to increase the number of master’s and doctoral degree 
holders in several scientific disciplines related to the oil and gas industry (PTDF, 
2015). 
The ineffective local capacity-building policy has resulted in an acute local skills 
shortage and a dearth in the competent technical manpower required by the oil and 
gas industry. 
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4.4 Economic Policy: To Maintain Macroeconomic Sustainability 
and Long-Term Economic Development 
In the wake of the recent sharp fall in oil prices, as discussed in chapter 2, economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability are big challenges facing oil-centred 
economies. According to the research reviewed in Chapter 2 and the results of 
Chapter 3, the uncertain and volatile nature of oil revenues, when they are the 
dominant source of government income, has a significant impact on inflation and the 
account balance in oil exporting countries and often delays sustainable growth of the 
non-oil economy. Stevens (2015) emphasises the importance of an effective fiscal 
policy in response to unstable oil revenues in the major petroleum exporters. He 
argues that the more successful oil-exporting nations insulate their economy from 
fluctuating oil prices through the establishment of revenue stabilisation or savings 
funds. These well designed petroleum funds allow petroleum-exporting countries to 
manage their hydrocarbon revenues efficiently in order to stimulate long-term 
economic growth. 
This section focuses on the fourth pillar of the extractive value chain, namely 
revenue management and long-term economic growth. The problems facing 
petroleum revenue management are two-fold. First, there is the question of large and 
unpredictable swings in oil prices, which make oil revenues uncertain. The second 
problem is associated with high dependence on the petroleum sector, which plays a 
dominant economic role in terms of generating national income. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse the economic policies and mechanisms that the four countries 
have undertaken to create a buffer against economically damaging oil shocks. It is 
also important to assess how they have formulated economic policies to ensure the 
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diversification of the national income portfolio, and thus sustainable economic 
development in the post-petroleum era. 
4.4.1 Norway 
In the most successful petroleum-exporting countries such as Norway, the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund as a fiscal policy instrument serves both as 
a buffer for fluctuations in government revenues, and as a long-term investment. The 
Norwegian “Petroleum Fund” was set up in 1990 and was renamed the “Government 
Pension Fund” in 2006. The fund absorbs surpluses of petroleum revenues and 
pursues four objectives: 1) to shield the Norwegian economy from overheating and 
“Dutch disease”; 2) to save revenues for future generations; 3) to provide a fiscal 
buffer for “rainy days”; and 4) to ensure that physical oil and gas assets are gradually 
transferred into financial assets to replace oil and gas income as a source of state 
revenue (Ovesen, 2008; Fearnley, 2012). 
The fund is integrated into the government budget, which means all spending and 
allocation should happen through the normal budget. A fundamental principle of 
Norwegian fiscal policy is a budgetary rule that restricts government spending to 
four per cent of the balance of the fund over the course of an annual business cycle. 
Norges Bank manages the fund, and the Ministry of Finance sets the investment 
policy and the broad allocation of assets. Transfers from the fund require 
parliamentary approval (Humphreys et al., 2007). 
The Government Pension Fund is divided into two parts: the Government Pension 
Fund Global (GPFG), which is invested abroad, and the Government Pension Fund 
Norway, invested in Norway. The GPFG holds 60 per cent of its assets in equities, 
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35-40 per cent in fixed income and as much as five per cent in real estate. Its 
investments are spread globally outside Norway (Ovesen, 2008; Fearnley, 2012). 
In addition to revenue management measures, Norwegian economic policies aim to 
reduce dependence on oil and gas revenues, thereby promoting Norway’s long-term 
economic health and stability. Leskinen et al. (2012) highlight that the Norwegian 
local content policy aims for greater engagement of local service companies in the 
oil and gas sector. To achieve this goal, oil companies are obliged by law to provide 
the Ministry with a list of bidders. The Ministry is able to change the decision in 
favour of local companies if they are technically competitive. In this way, the 
Norwegian government plays an active role in ensuring that contracts are awarded to 
local companies by operators working in the Norwegian oil and gas sector. Heum 
(2008) explains another local content support mechanism adopted by the Norwegian 
government to enhance the quality of local suppliers through learning by doing: the 
government offers tax incentives to support foreign oil and gas companies working 
in local development programmes. Furthermore, the government aspires to make the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry globally competitive and able to contribute to 
economic growth, even if the domestic petroleum industry stagnates (Heum, 2008). 
In addition, joint venture contracts between domestic and leading foreign companies 
have facilitated the transfer of technology, knowledge and expertise. 
In this context, non-oil activities increased over the period 2000-2011; however, 
much of this growth was actually related to oil and gas production (IMF, 2013). As 
shown in Figure 23, oil rents fluctuated over the period 2000-2012 due to a gradual 
decline in petroleum production as a result of ageing oil fields. Since 2010, 
Norway’s GDP has continued to grow despite a downward trend in oil and gas 
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revenues. Thus, it can be concluded that Norway’s dependence on the sale of 
hydrocarbons has not increased, owing to the presence of other productive sectors in 
its economic system such as the service sector, which contributes about 53 per cent 
to GDP (Leskinen et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 22: Norway’s economic indicators (Source: World Indicator 
Development, World Bank, 2015) 
(Note: GDP per capita on the right axis; oil rents, natural gas rents, and gross capital 
formation on the left axis). 
Since June 2014, the crude oil price has fallen by more than 50 per cent, declining 
from over US$100 per barrel in January 2014 to around US$40 per barrel during the 
second part of 2015, the lowest since the bottom of the 2009 recession. This has 
reduced the return on investments associated with the Norwegian wealth fund, which 
stood at US$882 billion as of June 2015 (SWFI, 2015). The current decline in oil 
prices has increased unemployment in Norway, as the petroleum industry has 
reduced spending by laying off 10 per cent of the sector’s total workforce (Hovland, 
2014). Moreover, Statoil now has an international portfolio and is behaving more 
like an IOC in seeking cost cuts in the current low-price environment: “… Statoil 
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needs an oil price of between US$115 and US$120 this year to be able to pay its 
dividend without raising new debt” (Financial Times, 2015). 
In short, the Norwegian government’s prudent oil investment policy has resulted in a 
decline in its economic dependence on the oil and gas industry. Oil rents have been 
used to diversify the Norwegian economy; however, the oil-based sectors are still 
subject to a downturn in oil prices. 
4.4.2 Kuwait 
In order to manage petroleum revenues, in 1953 Kuwait was the first country in the 
world to establish a sovereign wealth fund. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 
was established in 1982 and is now responsible for Kuwait’s state assets. KIA 
manages two funds: the General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the Future Generations 
Fund (FGF). GRF was established in 1960 and is the main treasury for the state. All 
revenues, including petroleum rents, are transferred into GRF and all national 
expenditures are paid out of this fund. FGF was created in 1976 through a transfer of 
50 per cent of GRF’s assets at that time. Ten per cent of state revenues are now 
allocated to GRF annually. GRF’s money is invested in assets, including bonds and 
cash asset classes, outside Kuwait. The purpose of KIA is to build up sufficient 
assets, and in turn achieve a long-term return on investment (KIA, 2015). 
The Kuwaiti government uses a range of means to distribute its oil rents. The major 
redistribution mechanisms of petroleum revenues include the following: 1) domestic 
investment in infrastructure and economic diversification programmes; 2) land 
purchases and their sale at low prices to the public; 3) public transfer payments to 
Kuwaiti nationals and businesses; 4) subsidies, for example on electricity, water, 
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food and housing; 5) public employment with well-paid salaries and benefit 
packages (91 per cent of the Kuwaiti national labour force works in the public 
sector); 6) interventions in the private sector, including the provision of public 
infrastructure and services, with the exception of personal or corporate income tax; 
7) regulation of Kuwait’s FDI environment; and 8) involvement of Kuwaiti nationals 
in business by requiring foreign investors to sponsor them (El-Katiri et al., 2011). 
In addition, Kuwait’s economic policies pursue the goal of economic diversification 
through the establishment of a small and medium-sized enterprise fund to support 
industrial activities. Forty per cent of industrial establishments supported by this 
fund are in trade, hotels and restaurants, and 33 per cent are in construction and 
industry (IMF, 2014). The other major diversification is in the oil and gas sector, 
using crude oil and gas outputs to produce downstream products such as 
petrochemicals, fertilizers and chemicals, transport and logistics. Thus, Kuwait 
garners more value added from its endowments (Brinkley et al., 2012; El-Katiri et 
al., 2011). 
Despite all these policies, Kuwait’s economy is still overly-dependent on petroleum 
rents; hence, economic growth is subject to fluctuations in the global price of oil. As 
shown in Figure 24, oil returns contribute more than 50 per cent of GDP; therefore, a 
sustained decline in oil prices, and in turn oil rents, delivers a large, negative shock 
to the economy (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Furthermore, fiscal policy in 
terms of invesment spending seems to be rather “procyclical” (IMF, 2012) in 
Kuwait: investment expenditure increases after a positive rent shock and declines 
after adverse shocks in oil rents. 
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Figure 23: Kuwait’s economic indicators (Source: World Indicator 
Development, World Bank, 2015) 
(Note: GDP per capita on the right axis; oil rents, natural gas rents, and gross capital 
formation on the left axis). 
The dramatic fall in oil prices has forced the Kuwaiti government to cut current 
spending. Restriction of subsidies, which continues at over eighty-five per cent of 
total expenditure, has been the main fiscal policy response to the dramatic drop in 
current oil prices in Kuwait. However, it will not reduce capital spending on projects 
(Kuwaiti Time Magazine, 2015). In addition, the large drop in oil prices has led to a 
government budget deficit. Consequently, the Kuwaiti state needs to balance its 
budget, which is based on oil valued at US$45 per barrel in 2015, down from its 
previous estimate of US$75 (Reuters, 2015). The Kuwaiti sovereign wealth fund 
creates a buffer against the negative impact of oil price volatility, and Kuwait’s 
petroleum fund is one of the largest in the world, valued at US$592 billion in June 
2015 (SWFI, 2015). 
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4.4.3 Azerbaijan 
The State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAR) was established in 1999. 
The fund aims at macroeconomic stabilisation by smoothing public expenditure and 
growing non-oil sectors of the economy. It was set up to save revenues for the 
benefit of future generations. SOFAR is a legal entity managed by the Supervisory 
Council, and its membership is approved by the President of the Republic (SOFAR 
website, 2014). The Azerbaijani sovereign wealth fund has been invested in a range 
of areas, such as real estate and gold (Centre for Economic and Social Development, 
2012). SOFAR currently has US$37.3 billion in reserves (SWFI, 2015). Azerbaijan’s 
high foreign exchange reserves serve as a buffer against oil price shocks. 
The Azerbaijani government has sought to diversify its economy by setting priorities 
for budgetary expenditure in education, infrastructure and the development of non-
oil sectors, but its economy still relies on the hydrocarbon sector. According to the 
Central Bank of Azerbaijan, the country’s GDP growth in 2012 was driven entirely 
by public spending in non-oil sectors. Economic reform focuses on supporting small 
and medium-sized business establishments, developing the region and opening up 
the economy to private capital investment. 
Azerbaijan’s budget has become heavily dependent on petroleum revenues. The oil 
and gas industry provides more than half of the country’s GDP, as shown in Figure 
25. Since 2003, annual GDP per capita rose as a result of increased oil and gas 
production, as did the value of exports because of the increase in oil prices. 
However, oil prices trended upward in 2011 and 2012, with the share of oil rents in 
GDP fluctuating because of a decline in oil production as a result of technical 
problems in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshi (ACG) field. This decline in oil rents was not 
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reflected in the GDP per capita due to growing public investment expenditure. This 
supports the evidence of Chapter 3 showing a decline in the impact of petroleum 
rents on economic growth due to increasing investment in non-oil projects. 
 
Figure 24: Azerbaijan’s economic indicators (Source: World Indicator 
Development, World Bank, 2015) 
(Note: GDP per capita on the right axis; oil rents, natural gas rents, and gross capital 
formation on the left axis). 
The decline in oil prices in 2014 resulted in a big loss of budget revenue, and thus 
reduced the inflow of oil revenues into the State Oil Fund of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), which is the main source of transfers to the state budget. 
Transfers from SOFAZ into the state budget increased seven-fold over the period 
2003-2013 (Centre for Economic and Social Development, 2012). In the wake of the 
oil price drop, increases in production volumes have been unable to limit losses in 
revenue for SOFAZ. Consequently, the Azerbaijani government has balanced its 
2015 budget by setting the price of oil at US$90 per barrel, down from US$100 in 
2014. In addition, low oil prices may lead to negative social consequences in terms 
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of increased unemployment, as SOCAR and BP have reduced their costs by cutting 
eight per cent of their workforce (Farchy et al., 2015). 
4.4.4 Nigeria 
In recent years, Nigeria has taken several initiatives to set up a sovereign wealth 
fund. The first fund, the Excess Crude Account (ECA), was established in 2004 and 
aims to save surplus oil revenues according to a conservative benchmark oil price, 
thereby insulating the budget and the economy from fluctuating oil prices. The 
second fund is the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA), established in 
2011 following parliamentary approval. This fund serves as an instrument to support 
sustainable development strategies and thus long-term economic growth (Brown et 
al., 2014). 
NSIA is divided into three further funds based on its multiple policy objectives: the 
Nigeria Infrastructure Fund, the Stabilisation Fund, and the Future Generation Fund 
(NSIA website, 2014). The Finance Ministry is responsible for overseeing these 
accounts. Most of the excess oil revenues allocated to the ECA have already been 
used (Wallis, 2014), and it has US$2 billion in 2015 (IMF, 2015). 
While oil prices have become increasingly volatile since the 2000s, oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP have also fluctuated over the same period (see Figure 26) due to 
production disruptions and the activities of crude oil thieves and oil pipeline vandals, 
as explained earlier. Nevertheless, GDP per capita has been growing, owing mainly 
to the continuing positive performance of non-oil sectors, primarily agriculture, 
services and trade (IMF, 2014). Furthermore, Figure 27 indicates that investment 
spending has risen over the period 2008-2011. 
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Figure 25: Nigeria’s economic indicators (Source: World Indicator 
Development, World Bank, 2015) 
(Note: GDP per capita on the right axis; oil rents, natural gas rents, and gross capital 
formation on the left axis). 
This upward trend in GDP per capita suggests that increasing investment in non-oil 
projects is an important factor in reducing the negative impact of oil rents on 
economic growth. This finding again supports the results of Chapter 3. Furthermore, 
the Nigerian government tend to promote manufacturing sector by encouraging 
small and medium scale enterprises, which can play a major role in creation job 
opportunities, skill development and poverty alleviation (Aigboduwa and Oismaoje, 
2013). 
In the wake of the recent fall in oil prices, the Nigerian government has revised its 
2015 state budget based on an oil price of US$65 per barrel, rather than the previous 
assumption of US$77.5 per barrel (Hou et al., 2015). In addition, the Nigerian 
government intends to double its value added tax income, reduce public investment 
  
 
!
"&'!
expenditure by delaying or cancelling projects (Mcgrorarty et al., 2015), and reduce 
fuel subsidies (Hou et al., 2015). 
4.5 Assessment 
The previous sections have discussed the various policies adopted with respect to 
petroleum resource management in Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. This 
section presents a comparative analysis of the institutional design, human resource 
capacity development, and revenue management policy frameworks implemented by 
the four petroleum-producing countries in order to identify best practice.  
Table 15 provides a comparison of the four variables used in revenue management 
policy between the case studies. Moreover, it indicates that the fuel rent share is 
negatively associated with gross capital formation. It also shows that the countries 
with the oil sector as a dominant economic sector have spent less of their oil 
revenues on capital investment. 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics  
  Mean Standard Deviation GDP per worker Gross capital formation Oil rent Natural Gas rent 
Norway ! ! ! ! ! !GDP per worker 39156.42 16020.35 "!
! ! !Gross capital formation 23.65 2.30 #$%"! "!
! !Oil rent 10.58 2.35 #$%&! '#$("! "!
!Natural Gas rent 3.13 1.86 #$)*! #$#(! #$&#! "!
Kuwait ! ! ! ! ! !GDP per worker 71580.57 11477.66 "!
! ! !Gross capital formation 17.45 5.89 #$%(! "!
! !Oil rent 43.74 11.31 #$&+! '#$#"! "!
!Natural Gas rent 2.29 0.77 #$#)! #$#)! #$(,! "!
Azerbaijan ! ! ! ! ! !GDP per worker 7093.03 5006.58 "!
! ! !Gross capital formation 25.69 13.29 '#$"&! "!
! !Oil rent 34.78 13.20 #$,,! #$(%! "!
!Natural Gas rent 7.74 2.95 '#$)#! #$"-! #$#)! "!
Nigeria ! ! ! ! ! !GDP per worker 3057.83 1240.90 "!
! ! !Gross capital formation 10.218 3.45 #$+)! "!
! !Oil rent 32.28 9.95 '#$)-! '#$(+! "!
!Natural Gas rent 2.29 1.46 #$+#! '#$%)! #$"%! "!
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4.5.1 Institutional design 
With regard to the institutional design of petroleum sector governance, Norway has 
opted for an oil institution model based on a separation of powers between the NOC, 
which is engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations, the regulatory body, which 
provides oversight and technical expertise, and the government ministry, which 
helps set policy. 
Statoil has sought to enhance its commercial competiveness and operational 
performance, thereby increasing its financial returns to the state, by carrying out 
extensive oil and gas operations both in Norway and abroad. Furthermore, 
exploration and production agreements between Statoil and foreign companies are 
designed to increase Norwegian state control over the petroleum industry by 
strengthening Norwegian expertise in exploration and production. 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate has advisory and regulatory functions, and 
parliament is responsible for the overall framework. These well-designed institutions 
are underlying factors that prevent any conflict of interest and have contributed to 
successful policy implementation in Norway’s petroleum industry. Norway’s 
experience with its oil institutional structure is different from that of the other cases 
here, with a strong emphasis on transparency and accountability. 
Conversely, Kuwait’s oil and gas industry lacks a clear administrative body. The 
parliament does not appoint the government, and only has the ability to veto rather 
than initiate major policy decisions; hence, many petroleum decisions have been 
halted by parliamentary veto. Through veto power, the oil minister, as chairman of 
KPC’s board, monitors the extent of its control and authority. KPC suffers from 
inadequate authority to initiate and deliver needed political and regulatory reforms. 
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Taking into account the very poor state of Kuwait’s economy prior to the discovery 
of oil and its lack of expertise in exploration, the concessionary fiscal system was the 
best option for its government. Following nationalisation of its petroleum wealth, the 
state-owned oil company took control of oil and gas activities, while the 
participation of foreign petroleum companies was limited to service petroleum 
contracts. 
However, this strategy has had to change due to a pressing need for technical 
assistance from IOCs to work on the country’s new fields. KPC lacks experienced 
management and has insufficient technical knowledge as a result of political and 
personal interference in the appointment and employment of personnel. 
In Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Industry and Energy is responsible for the preparation 
and implementation of state policy in the oil and gas sector. In contrast to Norway 
and Kuwait, Azerbaijan’s oil ministry plays both a policy-making and a regulatory 
role in the oil and gas industry. SOCAR is a state-owned oil company and acts as the 
commercial body of the oil and gas industry. It also has its own (state) share in all 
contracts and is thus a contractor. 
At the same time, SOCAR represents the government in PSA contracts. As a 
contractor, SOCAR is interested in increasing its share in the contract; however, this 
might also reduce government revenues. Consequently, a conflict of interest has 
come about. This has occurred partly due to a lack of adequate law and regulation 
over the oil industry, and partly due to the considerable power of SOCAR and its 
influence over the oil and gas sector (Ciarreta and Nasirov, 2012). 
  
 
!
"#%!
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector has an overly complicated and inefficient administrative 
design, resulting in the duplication of functions between NNPC and DPR. NNPC is a 
commercial entity, but is also a quasi-regulator with very diverse activities. Its 
operations are more focused on oil marketing and downstream functions. Nigeria’s 
oil and gas sector is negatively affected by an ineffective bureaucratic system, as in 
the hydrocarbon sector in Kuwait and Azerbaijan. 
Nigeria now uses PSAs rather than the joint venture model, which historically was 
the main form of agreement between NNPC and IOCs. As with Azerbaijan, the 
technical inability of the state-owned oil company (NNPC) and funding problems are 
reasons behind the use of PSAs. NNPC and SOCAR are ineffective in monitoring 
the operational activities of foreign oil companies; thus, contracts are weakly 
enforced. For example, Watts (2004) maintains that oil companies have not made 
serious efforts to report the results of environmental assessments of their extractive 
activities in Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
4.5.2 Developing human resource capital 
A review of the human resource capacity-building policies of the four selected 
countries highlights that Norway benefits from a competent labour force, thanks to 
its efficient, transparent and accountable governance structure and institutions. The 
terms of IOCs’ licences make it mandatory to transfer skills and competence to 
Norwegian companies. Norwegian oil companies, mainly Statoil, set personnel 
training as a key objective. In addition to training schemes, the transfer of 
technology and the development of research by promoting cooperation between 
IOCs and Norwegian research institutions is one of the most successful aspects of 
Norway’s hydrocarbon policy. 
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Unlike Norway, the other countries are suffering from the limited technical 
competence of their state-owned companies and a shortage of research activities in 
the oil and gas sector. Kuwait lacks skilled labour at competitive prices, as well as 
competent management. It has historically imported most of its workers, particularly 
those with high skills. Similarly, low human resource and limited research capacity 
are serious challenges faced by Azerbaijan and Nigeria. The NOCs in these three 
countries are very ineffective and rely on foreign companies to perform the most 
complex functions in their oil and gas sectors. 
4.5.3 Revenue management 
In terms of revenue management, all of the countries under investigation have 
adopted institutional vehicles to combat the negative effects of fluctuating oil 
revenues. In contrast to the other cases, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has 
favoured policies aimed at sound oil revenue management, including: 1) a strict and 
precise fiscal rule that constrains transfers to the non-oil deficit budget; 2) 
integration into the overall fiscal framework; 3) approval of spending decisions by 
parliament; and 4) partial investment abroad. Norway has diversified its sources of 
income, partly by investing its petroleum revenues abroad in order to diversify risk 
and increase the expected rate of return. This diversified investment portfolio 
insulates the domestic economy from Dutch disease and external shocks. The non-oil 
tradable sectors are gradually growing; however, the greater proportion of non-oil 
tradable sectors is still linked to hydrocarbon industries. 
Unlike Norway, the governments of Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria have been 
unwilling to impose fiscal rules on their respective funds. A lack of firm fiscal rules 
regarding inflows and outflows, as well as inadequate independent oversight, has 
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resulted in arbitrary withdrawals of funds. In addition, oil funds have not been 
integrated into the state budgetary process, and powerful political and elite groups 
control transactions from the fund. Given this context, in contrast to Norway, 
transparency and accountability remain a major challenge for Kuwait, Azerbaijan 
and Nigeria (Bauer, 2014). 
One explanation for the major differences between the selected countries lies in their 
contrasting economic backgrounds. Since the early 1970s, Norway has had a 
developed and diversified economy, with a highly educated population and a good 
standard of living. Its economy does not rely directly on petroleum revenues. This is 
in contrast to Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria, which depend heavily on oil and gas 
rents. However, economic reforms are being introduced through increases in public 
capital expenditure, leading to the growth of non-oil sectors. The insufficient number 
and low quality of local graduates, poor infrastructure and ineffective investment 
regulations to attract foreign investors are major factors that have led to declining 
productivity and competitiveness in the petroleum and non-petroleum sectors of 
Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
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Figure 26: GDP per capita (PPP, current international $), 1990-2012 (Source: 
World Indicator Development, World Bank, 2015). 
A comparison between Norway’s GDP per capita and those of the other three 
countries shows that Norway’s rate seems relatively stable, while those of Kuwait, 
Azerbaijan and Nigeria indicate a greater correlation with the negative and positive 
oil price shocks of the 1990s and 2000s, as illustrated in Figure 27. This implies that 
the high proportion of petroleum revenues contributing to GDP makes the economy 
vulnerable to changes in the price of the dominant commodity, on account of limited 
non-oil exports from Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This assessment of the institutional policies of the four selected petroleum exporters 
illustrates the importance of institutional design in the oil and gas sector as a 
determinant of the effective governance of the petroleum industry. The design of 
institutions should establish the goals, roles and responsibilities of the main 
stakeholders involved in the oil and gas sector. The key actors are the ministry, 
including an independent, highly capable regulatory agency, foreign and national oil 
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firms, and parliament (Lahn et al., 2007). The development of such an administrative 
structure provides a sound business environment, reduces excessive bureaucracy and 
provides stability. Indeed, clarity of goals, roles and responsibilities between 
agencies or departments is crucial in mitigating the opportunity for patronage 
activities, and increases levels of transparency, accountability and checks and 
balances. 
Analysis of policies associated with developing indigenous technological capacity 
shows that, with the exception of Norway, the respective governments have been 
unable to support local skills development, capacity building and utilisation. A lack 
of highly skilled manpower has served to increase technical dependence on foreign 
oil companies for oil and gas development in Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. The 
dearth of effective policies to develop higher education systems or cooperation and 
links between local universities and research institutions has led to the poor 
performance of the domestic petroleum industries (Glyfason, 2001). 
The oil and gas sector is the major source of government revenue in Kuwait, 
Azerbaijan and Nigeria. However, all of these countries have attempted to diversify 
their economies through the effective allocation of oil funds to diverse capital 
investment areas. Kuwait’s diversification policy concentrates on the expansion of 
horizontal links within the petroleum industry, which still rely on oil and gas, while 
in Azerbaijan and Nigeria public capital spending has been a driver of non-oil 
growth, including the construction and service sectors. An improved business 
environment is crucial to enabling increased private investment. There is a need for 
more effective public spending on infrastructure in both Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
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However, the creation of non-petroleum-based links still seems to be a challenge for 
all selected countries. 
Several key lessons emerge from this comparative analysis that may be relevant to 
the effective governance of oil and gas in the Kurdistan region: 
1. Governments have used NOCs as a tool to achieve wider socio-economic policy 
objectives, such as economic diversification and raised local educational levels. 
However, the dual functions of NOCs, as both regulators and oil companies, may 
discourage IOCs from investing in the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, the 
regulatory function of NOCs impacts negatively on the efficiency of projects, 
and a potential conflict of interest emerges when an NOC acts simultaneously as 
a government representative and in pursuit of commercial goals. An independent 
NOC board may reduce political interference in the decision-making process and 
delays in the approval process, as well as enabling the NOC to maximise its 
limited technical capacity and become more transparent and accountable. 
2. A government ministry or independent entity should carry out the functions of 
regulation and oversight. However, the technical capability of the regulatory 
body is important for the effective monitoring and control of all hydrocarbon 
activities, thus ensuring a comprehensive follow-up of petroleum activities. The 
regulatory agency may also provide technical assistance to policy makers and 
thus act as an advisory arm. 
3. Efficient local content measures are crucial for increasing levels of productivity 
and competitiveness in oil- and gas-exporting countries. This key strategy 
pursues two major goals: localisation of the workforce and the development of 
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local servicing companies. Furthermore, mechanisms for enhancing the quality 
of the education and vocational systems, staff training and a constant upgrading 
of workers’ skills are the pillars of effective local content policy. 
4. A well-functioning petroleum fund is an important element in the process of 
moving away from a hydrocarbon-based economy. An economy is well served 
by a petroleum fund when it is run according to precise fiscal rules and is 
integrated into the state budget. In such a context, funds can be immunised 
against political interference. The petroleum fund acts as a catalyst for the 
creation of economic links with the wider economy. Petrochemical 
manufacturing and service sectors account for the creation of economic links 
within the oil and gas sectors: the service sector plays a major role in increasing 
economic productivity and, in the context of local content policy, local service 
companies accelerate the transfer of skills and technologies and the creation of 
jobs. In addition to the hydrocarbon-related sectors, other non-petroleum 
productive sectors, such as agriculture and industrial manufacturing, appear to be 
determinants of the success or failure of petroleum-abundant states in the 
development of sustainable economic growth. 
Best practice in petroleum wealth management indicates that a petroleum resource 
curse is not inevitable. Prudent and sound institutional, human resource capacity 
building and petroleum revenue management policies help avoid transmission of the 
resource curse. This study suggests that a well-designed institutional governance 
model for the petroleum industry is vital to addressing common problems associated 
with effective economic and human resource development.  
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Table 16: Summary of comparative cross-country case studies 
General Information 
Characteristics Norway Kuwait (OPEC) Azerbaijan Nigeria (OPEC) 
Geography Europe Middle East Caspian Africa 
Access to sea Yes Yes No Yes 
Reserves at end 2014:     
Oil (billion barrels) 6.5 101.5 7.0 37.1 
Gas (trillion m3) 1.9 1.8 1.2 5.1 
Production at end 2014 
    
Oil (thousand bpd) 1657(exports) 2618 (exports) 747 (exports) 2361 (total production) 
Gas (billion m3 daily) 104.1 (exports) 3.7 (imports) 7.7 (exports) 38.6  (total production) 
(Refinery capacity 
(thousand bpd) 316 936  - - 
National oil company Statoil KPC SOCAR NNPC 
Fuel export (% of 
merchandise exports) 67% 94% 93% 88% 
 
 
 
Governance of Oil and Gas Sector 
Characteristics Norway Kuwait Azerbaijan Nigeria Notes 
Fiscal regime Concessionary 
System: Licence 
TSA PSA Joint 
Venture and 
PSA 
Technical and financial capabilities 
play major role in selection of 
model for exploration and 
production agreement 
Policy-Making 
Function: set 
policy of oil and 
gas sector 
Ministry PSC Ministry Ministry In Norway, policy-making body is 
separate from regulatory body, but 
not in Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
Kuwait has an extra agency for 
policy-making function 
Regulatory 
Function: 
monitor and 
oversee 
petroleum 
activities 
NPD Ministry SOCAR and 
Ministry 
NNPC and 
Ministry 
In Nigeria different agencies are 
involved in regulatory functions 
Technical competence of regulatory 
body is to effectively curtail and 
oversee all activities in oil and gas 
sector 
Operator 
Function: 
Role and degree 
of autonomy of 
NOC 
NOC: 
Statoil has high 
technical 
capacity and 
plays major role 
in technical 
transfer and 
development of 
domestic supply 
sector. 
Also IOCs. 
KPC SOCAR NNPC In Norway Statoil has commercial 
function and is partially privatised. 
In Nigeria, because NNPC acts as 
regulatory body and in PSA 
contracts as NOC, multiple 
functions cause conflicts of interest. 
Same applies to Azerbaijan due to 
multiple roles of SOCAR. 
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Human capacity building 
Characteristic
s 
Norway Kuwait Azerbaijan Nigeria Notes 
Education High quality 
and adequate 
funding 
Low quality 
and low 
funding 
Low quality 
and low 
funding 
Low quality 
and low 
funding 
Common issue is mismatch 
of supply and market 
demand. 
Training 
system 
NOC plays key 
role 
Well-designed 
programme and 
R&D. 
NOC plays 
poor role 
Inefficiently 
functioning 
programme 
and R&D 
NOC plays 
poor role 
Inefficiently 
functioning 
programme and 
R&D 
NOC plays 
poor role 
Inefficiently 
functioning 
programme and 
R&D 
Norway introduced 
effective regulation and 
funding to develop local 
capacity 
Kuwait relies on 
expatriates and ineffective 
training system. 
Cooperation 
with research 
and academic 
institutions 
Establishment 
of petroleum 
research centre 
and cooperation 
with local and 
international 
universities and 
research 
institutions 
Low funding 
and 
cooperation 
with research 
institutions 
Low funding 
and cooperation 
with research 
institutions 
Low funding 
and cooperation 
with research 
institutions 
Norway has introduced 
regulation obliging IOCs to 
conduct research in 
Norway. 
 
 
Petroleum Revenue Management and Economic Diversification 
Characteristics Norway Kuwait Azerbaijan Nigeria Notes 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
Saving and 
future 
generation 
fund 
Saving and 
future 
generation 
fund 
Saving fund Infrastructure
, saving and 
future 
generation 
fund 
Design and fiscal rules of the 
fund plays a major role in 
effective and transparent use 
of petroleum revenues.  
Diversification Growth of 
non-oil 
sectors 
Within 
petroleum 
sector and 
other non-oil 
sectors 
Low growth 
of non-oil 
sectors 
More within 
petroleum 
sector 
Low growth of 
non-oil sectors 
Reform consists 
of increase in 
public capital 
spending, such 
as infrastructure 
and services 
Low growth 
of non-oil 
sectors 
Reform 
consists of an 
increase in 
public capital 
spending, 
such as 
infrastructure 
and services 
Norway’s economy is less 
dependent on petroleum 
sector, thanks to its non-oil 
industries 
Other countries tend to 
increase productive activities 
to diversify sources of 
revenue generation by 
increasing capital spending. 
This is reflected in growth of 
GDP in recent years. 
Lack of adequate 
infrastructure development 
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Chapter 5: Importance and Development of the Oil and 
Gas Industry in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan region has received significant 
political and strategic attention, not only because of the implications of increased oil 
and gas activities for the relationship between the Kurdistan region and the Iraqi 
central government (The Guardian, 2014; The Economist, 2012 and 2014), but also 
because of the sector’s huge contribution to the economy of the region (Oil and Gas 
Year, 2014). 
As in the rest of Iraq, the Kurdistan region lacks infrastructure, production capacity 
and capability in agriculture and industry, which may be the main reason for its 
continuing high dependence on the extraction of natural resources. The oil and gas 
industry is the driving force behind development in many areas in the region, such as 
electricity, water supply, healthcare, education, telecommunications and housing. 
A qualitative case study approach is used in this chapter to answer the third research 
question of the thesis, which examines the pattern of development of oil and gas by 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its role in the wider economy. The 
Kurdistan region offers an interesting opportunity to study oil and gas policy, as it 
has chosen a different path from its central government counterpart in Baghdad in 
terms of management of the industry. In this study, the term ‘oil and gas policy’ 
refers to the framework of regulations, fiscal devices, institutional arrangements and 
procedures that constitute the environment of Kurdistan’s oil and gas industry, which 
explores, develops, produces, transports and markets oil and gas products. Since the 
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oil industry and its management style are in the early stages of development in the 
Kurdistan region, it is of particular interest to observe how it is evolving. 
Oil and gas is a relatively new sector in the Kurdistan region and, as such, provides a 
unique opportunity to assess how policy instruments (with respect to the fiscal 
regime and human resources) and administrative arrangements interact to influence 
the pace of development. In addition to highlighting both shortcomings and positive 
aspects of this newly-established industry, this study may be used as a potential 
reference for studying other regions and states in similar circumstances. 
A within-case analytic strategy has been used, based on thematic analysis (Yin, 
2009), to explore the development of this new petroleum sector and its contribution 
to the growth of other economic sectors. Three themes, based on the literature review 
and findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4, delimit the scope of this study: the 
development of the economy, the unemployment rate, and the oil and gas industry in 
the Kurdistan region. 
Secondary data sources are used in this chapter. As explained in Chapter 4, general 
rules have been considered with respect to evaluating the dataset. Data and statistics 
published by the ministries of Planning and Natural Resources and other related 
ministries in the Kurdistan region, together with published surveys in the public 
domain, have been used to assess the development of the oil and gas sector and the 
wider economy of the Kurdistan region. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 charts KRG’s economic growth and 
the role of public and private investment. Section 3 examines factors affecting the 
unemployment rate in the region. Section 4 focuses on the development of KRG’s 
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oil and gas sector, from exploration to production and distribution, infrastructural 
enlargement and the more complex process of institutionalisation of the oil and gas 
industry. The final section summarises the findings of the chapter, setting the context 
for the next chapter, which will present an in-depth analysis of the opportunities and 
challenges facing the region’s petroleum industry and wider economy. 
5.2 Economic Development in the Kurdistan Region 
The whole of Iraq is heavily dependent on its petroleum revenues: the proceeds of 
the oil and natural gas industry account for over 90 per cent of the federal budget 
(IEA, 2012). Iraqi public income has been dramatically affected by the oil price 
collapse in 2014 and by ongoing conflict within the country (Reuters, 2015), and 
uncertainty over oil revenues has also had an impact on KRG’s budget. 
In principle, the Kurdistan region’s budget is allocated annually by the central 
government once the Iraqi parliament has approved the national budget. The region’s 
budget is about 17 per cent of the federal budget, reflecting the percentage share of 
Kurdistan’s population within the state of Iraq. This fiscal arrangement was laid out 
in the 2005 constitutional amendment (UNDP, 2009); however, the KRG has 
constantly complained that the allocated budget has never been received in full 
(UNDP, 2009). Uncertainties in both the timing and the transfer of the actual 
amounts of its budget entitlement have significantly affected economic development 
in Kurdistan. This dependence on fiscal transfers from the federal government makes 
the Kurdistan region subject to political pressure from Baghdad, which has used the 
region’s budget share as a basis for negotiation in ongoing verbal disputes between 
the federal government and KRG (Reuters, 2014; Passche and Mansurbeg, 2014). 
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Budgetary transfers from Baghdad to Kurdistan constitute a major source of the 
region’s income and contribute directly to its economic growth. As a result of an 
improved security situation and a more business-friendly environment than in the 
rest of Iraq, the Kurdistan region experienced remarkable economic growth between 
2003 and 2011. The region’s GDP increased from US$0.6 billion in 2003 to US$23 
billion in 2011 (see Figure 28). 
 
Figure 27: Development of the Kurdistan region’s GDP, 2003-2011 (Source: 
KRSO, 2015) 
However, no reliable statistics are available to inform research on the level and 
growth rate of GDP over the period covered by this study. The only accessible 
statistics are from a report published by the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office 
(KRSO) with respect to the contribution of different economic sectors to overall 
GDP in 2011. 
Productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing have not grown in 
Kurdistan since 2011. Examination of the relative shares of different economic 
sectors in the Kurdistan region reveals that the service sector (public administration 
and other services) forms 50 per cent of GDP, while the contributions of productive 
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sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture are 9.4 and 17.5 per cent respectively 
(see Figure 29). It can be concluded that the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, 
as determinants of economic diversification in the Kurdistan region (USAID, 2008; 
Heshmati, 2012), show much lower growth rates than the service sector. 
Furthermore, KRG’s expenditure on and investment in infrastructure are critical 
components of GDP growth, and play a major role in increasing outputs across the 
various sectors. 
 
Figure 28: Distribution of annual growth rates in valued added of non-oil 
sectors of the Kurdistan region’s economy, 2011 (Source: KRSO, 2015) 
5.2.1 Public capital investment 
The government’s total capital expenditure is a critical indicator of the contribution 
of public investment to the Kurdistan regional economy, and is funded from two 
sources. The first is KRG’s revenues from the federal budget and non-oil revenues 
generated within the region, such as administration tax, import/export taxes, income 
tax and customs/duties. According to the Economic and Finance Committee of the 
Kurdistan Parliament (2013), fiscal transfers from the federal budget made up 96 per 
cent of KRG’s revenues in the 2013 budget. The second source is Kurdish oil 
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revenues, which are transferred into a separate account outside the region’s budget 
and are managed by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) in Kurdistan (MNR, 
2014). 
Relatively little budgetary income has been channelled towards investment projects. 
The government’s non-capital and capital expenditure accounted for nearly 70 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively of the total budget for the period 2010-2013 
(Economic and Finance Committee of Parliament, 2010, 2011, 2013; KRSO, 2012). 
This indicates an imbalance between revenues and expenditures, or between 
producing and consuming sectors. On the expenditure side, government spending 
falls into three main categories: public servants’ wages, public recurrent non-wages 
(non-capital spending) and capital expenditure. 
However, public capital expenditure increased during the period 2009-2013 (see 
Figure 30), from US$89 million in 2007 to about US$4 billion in 2013. Figure 30 
also highlights that in 2014 investment in Kurdistan was dramatically affected by the 
Iraqi central government freezing the region’s share of the national budget. Political 
disputes between Baghdad and Erbil stem from continuing problems regarding the 
management of Kurdistan’s oil and gas industry (Holland, 2012), as a result of which 
KRG has been unable to decrease its dependence on fiscal transfers (oil revenues) 
from the central government. 
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Figure 29: Kurdistan region’s public capital investment, 2007-2013 (Source: 
Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Planning, 2015) 
As illustrated in Figure 31, the level of government funding for agriculture has been 
relatively high compared to other sectors in recent years; however, the budgetary 
allocation to this sector has been inconsistent. The Kurdistan region has suffered 
from under-investment in industry, resulting in a very low contribution to GDP of 
the productive manufacturing sector, including the agricultural products processing 
industry (see Figure 30 above). 
 
Figure 30: Kurdistan region’s public capital investment across different sectors 
(Source: Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Planning, 2015) 
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In addition to budgetary income, Kurdish oil revenues (see Figure 32) have also been 
allocated by MNR to support various economic sectors (MNR, 2014). In contrast to 
regional budget allocations, a limited amount of capital expenditure from oil 
revenues has been invested to develop education and support the agricultural sectors. 
A large proportion of oil revenues have been spent on purchasing fuel and fuel 
products to meet local consumption needs (see Figure 33). 
 
Figure 31: Kurdistan region’s oil revenues, 2007-2013 (Source: MNR, 2014) 
 
Figure 32: Distribution of Kurdistan region’s oil revenue expenditure, 2013 
(Source: MNR, 2014) 
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This section has examined trends in public investment expenditure in different 
sectors of the Kurdistan region’s economy. The results show that public expenditure 
on agricultural and industrial investment projects, as a proportion of total public 
investment expenditure is low. This is inconsistent with KRG’s agricultural and 
industrial policy, as elaborated in its medium-term development plan (2012-2016), 
which prioritises the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors 
(Heshmati, 2012). 
In addition, ineffective implementation of investment projects is another major 
hindrance to economic development in the Kurdistan region. A United Nations 
report (UNDP, 2009, 2013) sheds light on the fact that a lack of checks and balances 
due to poor oversight has hampered efforts, resulting in ineffective and inefficient 
investment implementation. As a result, the Kurdistan region has become a 
consumer of imported goods rather than a productive region capable of catering for 
its own basic needs, added to which its public services are poor. For example, the 
electricity industry, which is under the control of the ministry of electricity, is 
heavily dependent on the government financial support as a result of very low 
electricity tariff and high electricity losses. The ministry of electricity’s budgetary 
support in form of financial subsidies (the difference between the direct cost faced 
by the government ministry) and operational subsidies (the differences tariffs and 
economic costs of fuels) are annually about US$3 billion annually. This puts heavy 
pressure on the Kurdistan region’s annual budget (UNDP, 2012; Ekurd Daily, 2015) 
but, despite such an outlay, efficient and adequate supplies of electricity remain a 
major challenge in the region (Ekurd Daily, 2015). 
  
 
!
"*+!
5.2.2 Private capital investment 
The KRG claims that one of its aims is to increase foreign investment in Kurdistan. 
An investment law enacted in 2006 to create a business-friendly environment for 
foreign companies in the Kurdistan region (KRG, 2015) stipulates that foreign 
investors are permitted to repatriate their profits freely, are treated equally with 
national investors under the law, are entitled to all the capital assets of any project, 
are exempt from taxes, duties and the requirement to obtain import licences, and 
enjoy the same rights as local investors to purchase and own land. It also establishes 
additional tax incentives and benefits to encourage foreign entrepreneurs. However, 
this law covers all economic sectors except the oil and gas sector. The priority 
sectors appear to be agriculture, industry and tourism (Kurdistan Board of 
Investment, 2015). 
Since 2014, private investment has declined. Total private investment fell by about 
66 per cent in 2014 compared with the previous year (see Figure 34). Again, this can 
be attributed to the fiscal crisis caused by the federal government freezing all 
payments to KRG after January 2014 (Shafaq, 2014; Rudaw, 2014). Private 
investment also fell owing to the war against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria, also known as ISIS (World Bank, 2015). These two factors have negatively 
affected the flow of private investment into the Kurdistan region. 
  
 
!
"*$!
 
Figure 33: Private capital investment in the Kurdistan region (excluding oil and 
gas investments), 2006-2014 (Source: Kurdistan Region’s Investment Board, 
2015) 
In common with public capital investment priorities, private investment in 
productive sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture is also very low compared 
with the construction sector. Private sector investment falls into three types in the 
Kurdistan region – national, joint venture and foreign investment, accounting for 
13.75, 9.07 and 77.18 per cent of total private investment respectively. Since 2006, 
private funding has been directed primarily towards housing, tourism, industry and 
trade, with the importation of durable and non-durable goods clearly dominating (see 
Figure 35). The low contribution of private investment to capacity building and 
diversification of the economy indicates that KRG has failed to encourage domestic 
and foreign investors to engage in financing non-oil productive sectors in Kurdistan. 
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Figure 34: Distribution of private investment (US$) in Kurdistan, excluding oil 
and gas sector, 2006-2014 (Source: Kurdistan Region’s Investment Board, 
2015) 
5.2.3 Unemployment Rate in the Kurdistan Region 
The Kurdistan region’s population reached 5.2 million in 2014. It is a young society, 
with 36 per cent aged 0-14 years, 20 per cent aged 15-24, and only four per cent 
aged over 63 years (Figure 36). In recent years, the percentage of potentially 
economically active people has increased for both males and females from 38.4 per 
cent in 2012 to 39 per cent in 2013 (KRSO, 2014). 
 
Figure 35: Kurdistan region’s population (Source: KRSO, 2014) 
In 2012, the unemployment rate in the Kurdistan region was 7.9 per cent, which is 
lower than the overall level of 8.6 per cent in Iraq (KRSO, 2012). The public sector 
currently employs the majority of the working population in Kurdistan. Employment 
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rates in the public and private sectors are around 50 per cent and 51 per cent 
respectively. These are aggregate rates covering various economic sectors. The 
service sector registers the highest employment rate (77.3 per cent), followed by 
industrial activities (16.6 per cent), while the lowest rate (6.1 per cent) is for 
agricultural activities (KRSO, 2012). 
Given this context, public wage payments continue to exert significant pressure on 
the regional government’s budget, resulting in the crowding out of important public 
investment programmes. The major obstacle hindering the creation of non-public 
sector jobs and opportunities for the economically active population is a shortage of 
necessary skills and expertise (Heshmati, 2007; UNDP, 2012). The KRG’s human 
resource development policy has failed to establish “a direct link between a 
successful investment strategy and a successful skills supply system that is 
responsive to market needs for skills in the labour force” (UNDP, 2012, P.92). The 
main reasons for this are the poor quality of higher education, the absence of a 
vocational training system and a mismatch between the supply of suitably educated 
people and the skills demanded by the labour market. An uncompetitive workforce 
has led to an increase in the unemployment rate among young people in the 
Kurdistan region (Heshmati, 2007, 2010; UNDP, 2012). 
5.3 Development of the Oil and Gas Industry 
The Kurdistan region has plentiful oil and gas reserves. According to British 
Petroleum (2015), Iraq’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be between 141 billion 
and 150 billion barrels, making it one of the world’s top holders of proven oil 
reserves (MNR, 2014). Iraq’s main hydrocarbon basins are located in the Zagros fold 
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belt (Kurdistan region), the Mesopotamia Foredeep (central and southern Iraq), and 
the Widyan Basin interior platform (western desert). The Kurdistan region’s 
resources are located in the Zagros and Taurus fold belts (see Figure 37). It is 
estimated that the Kurdistan region may have 45 billion barrels of oil reserves 
(MNR, 2015), which, if Kurdistan were an independent country, would place it 
among the 10 richest countries in terms of oil and gas reserves (Pfluger and Duero, 
2011). This does not include reserves in the super-giant field near Kirkuk, an area 
disputed by the Kurdish region and the central government in Baghdad (Gray, 2012). 
 
Figure 36: Structural domain of Kurdistan region’s oil and gas resources 
(Source: MNR, 2015) 
In short, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the world’s largest remaining onshore 
oil frontiers. The region has gone through several phases of exploration since the 
first well was drilled in 1901 in the Chia Surkh area, which was also the first well 
ever, drilled in the Middle East (Mackertich and Samarrai, 2015). After the fall of 
Saddam Hussain, and with further strengthening of KRG against the central 
government, the region witnessed a dramatic boom in exploration activities, and 
many international oil companies entered the region (MNR, 2014). 
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In recent years, well-known companies such as Exxon Mobil (US) and Total France 
have entered the exploration race. At the same time, smaller firms have also 
achieved some significant breakthroughs, not only by discovering and producing 
Kurdish oil, but also by actually managing to deliver it to the international market 
(MNR, 2014). Since 2005, over 180 wells have been drilled in the region and, 
despite fluctuating oil prices, exploration activities are still thriving. The region has 
always been considered risky, not only because of political uncertainty, but also 
because of its different geological setting from the rest of Iraq (Mackertich and 
Samarria, 2015). However, the success of the recently discovered fields in the 
Kurdistan region has opened new horizons for de-risking deeper targets previously 
considered non-productive, both in Iraq as a whole and in the Kurdistan region 
(Mackertich and Samarria, 2015). 
Direct foreign investment by multinational energy companies is the main driver of 
oil and gas industry development in the region (MNR, 2014). One perceived 
advantage of making deals with KRG is the fact that the region has its own 
petroleum law, which was approved by the Kurdistan region’s parliament in 2007. 
This has stimulated new foreign private sector participation in Kurdistan’s oil and 
gas sector (MNR, 2014). Contracts signed between KRG and foreign companies are 
based on a product-sharing contract (PSC) model (MNR, 2014). By the end of 2014, 
58 PSCs had been issued by KRG, as presented in Table 14 (MNR, 2014). 
5.3.1 Oil production 
As can be seen from Figure 38, since 2007, KRG has successfully increased oil 
production capacity (MNR, 2014). There are three key oil fields in Kurdistan 
capable of significant production: Tawke (operated by DNO), Taq Taq (operated by 
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TTOPCO) and Khurmala (operated by Kar Group). Over the period 2003-2015, oil 
production has grown steadily and sustainably. In December 2015, the crude oil 
production capacity of fields operating in the KRG was 637,137 monthly average 
barrels per day.  
 
Figure 37: Kurdistan region’s oil production, 2003-2015 (Source: based on data 
from MNR, 2015) 
The Kurdistan region’s share of total domestic oil consumption is 17 per cent of 
Iraq’s total oil domestic consumption. However, since 2004, the KRG has faced a 
historical and systematic shortfall in its entitlement of domestic oil consumption. 
Therefore, the KRG continues a policy of supplying the needed refined products 
such as diesel, benzene and kerosene to domestic demand by swapping and selling 
crude oil, as illustrated in Figure 39 (MNR, 2014). 
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Figure 38: Kurdistan’s annual oil production and consumption, 2004-2013 
(Source: based on data from MNR, 2014) 
5.3.2 Oil exports 
Kurdish oil has found its way to the global market. Kurdistan has been exporting its 
oil through a pipeline between Kirkuk and the Turkish port of Ceyhan, but this 
continues to be controlled by Baghdad. The federal government’s marketing 
organisation, SOMO, was directly responsible for controlling it from 2008 to 2012 
(see Figure 40). 
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Figure 39: Kurdish oil exports via trucking, KRG pipeline and SOMO (Source: 
based on data from MNR, 2015) 
The KRG has a goal of marketing its crude oil independently and, to this end, has 
finished building its own pipeline to Turkey, the Taq Taq-Khurmala-Fish Khabur 
pipeline (see Figure 41). This new pipeline has significantly boosted the Kurdistan 
region’s oil exports and has also strengthened Erbil’s role by linking it to the Kirkuk 
oilfield (Burr, 2014; Barbosa, 2014). 
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Figure 40: Kurdistan region’s pipeline infrastructure (Source: MNR, 2015) 
Official KRG crude exports have faced serious challenges. The federal government’s 
unwillingness to further KRG’s independence in the development of its oil and gas 
industry has resulted in political tension between Erbil and Baghdad. As a result, 
Kurdistan’s budget, as a constitutional entitlement, has been cut by the central 
government (Rudaw, 2014), increasing political tension still further. 
In December 2014, the Kurdistan region signed a new oil agreement with Iraq’s 
federal government, aiming to put an end to years of conflict over oil and gas 
management. Under this oil deal, KRG will supply 550,000 bpd of oil for sale under 
Baghdad’s supervision. This deal includes the export of 300,000 bpd from Kirkuk oil 
fields, which were added to the producing fields in the Kurdistan region after 
Kurdish forces regained the city of Kirkuk from ISIS (The Guardian, 2014). In 
addition to Kirkuk’s oil, KRG also sends 250,000 bpd of Kurdish oil through the 
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KRG-Turkey pipelines. In return, KRG receives its 17 per cent share of Iraq’s total 
budget (Reuters, 2015). 
5.3.3 Refineries 
Kurdistan’s downstream sector has been developing through the involvement of the 
private investment (MNR, 2014). The Kurdistan region has two officially recognised 
refineries. The Kalak refinery, operated by the KAR Group, is the largest oil refinery 
in the Erbil governorate, and currently has a capacity of 100,000 bpd. Efforts are 
ongoing, with the help of international expertise, to expand this capacity to 200,000 
bpd in the near future. Secondly, the Qaiwan Group operates the Bazian refinery, 
located in the Sulaimaniya area, with a capacity half that of the Kalak refinery. The 
Qiwan Group intends to double its refined product capacity in the coming years 
(MNR, 2014). 
Despite the initiatives mentioned above, the fuel crisis remains unresolved in 
Kurdistan. The refinery sector faces constant challenges, including the severe 
shortage and poor quality of refined products such as gasoline. As a result, both the 
public and Kurdistan’s members of parliament have frequently criticised the quality 
of the gasoline produced, questioning why there are no major public refineries that 
could deliver products in accordance with internationally-recognised standards 
(Rudaw, 2014). 
5.3.4 Natural gas 
The Kurdistan region’s giant natural gas field has made the region a potential key 
player in global energy security (Dickel et al., 2014; Gray, 2012; European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2012). It is estimated that the region holds approximately 708 
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billion cubic metres of proven gas reserves, and an estimated 2.8-5.6 trillion cubic 
metres of unproven gas resources (MNR, 2014). The Bina Bawi and Miran gas fields 
are the most significant in the Kurdistan region, holding an estimated 238 billion 
cubic metres of natural gas reserves between them (Invest In Group, 2014). Genel 
Energy was awarded a production-sharing agreement by KRG for these fields. In 
addition, Khor Mor and Chamachamal fields produce an average of 9.5 million cubic 
metres per day. Natural gas produced by Crescent Petroleum and its affiliate Dana 
Gas of the United Arab Emirates, OMV of Austria and MOL of Hungary supply to 
power stations in the Sulymani and Erbil areas (Crescent Petroleum, 2015). DNO 
and Genel Energy also deliver natural gas from the Summail field to a power station 
in the Dohouk area (MNR, 2014). The replacement of diesel-fired power plants with 
plants fuelled by natural gas is expected to provide KRG with savings on expensive 
fuel costs, as well as bring environmental benefits. 
In addition to domestic demand, natural gas is an alternative supply source for 
Turkey and Europe. The Kurdistan region’s natural gas production could be a 
possible future source of diversification of EU’s natural gas supply through the 
Southern Gas Corridor, which aims to decrease European dependence on Russian 
gas (See Figure 42). The Southern Gas Corridor is a project designed to transport 
natural gas from Caspian and Middle East region to Europe across Turkish territory. 
The project includes the Southern Caucasus pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural 
Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (Finon, 2011; 
Coordinator et al., 2013; Winrow, 2013). The European Council on Foreign 
Relations (2015) has identified the need for diversification of the EU’s natural gas 
supply. The current conflict in Ukraine has triggered a need for the EU to seek 
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alternative natural gas supplies in order to reduce its dependence on Russia (Gray, 
2012), and the Kurdistan region is now at the top of the list of potential supply 
sources (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). 
 
Figure 41: Southern Gas Corridor pipeline (Source: The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2014) 
5.3.5 Fiscal regime of Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector 
The current fiscal regime of the region’s petroleum sector is based on PSCs. The 
Kurdistan oil and gas law allows KRG to establish PSCs for the exploration, 
development and production of oil and gas, while the Federal Government of Iraq 
favours a risk service contract (RSC) regime (MNR, 2014). Under the PSC model, 
KRG, as the owner of the petroleum, engages international oil companies (IOCs) as 
contractors to provide technical and financial services for exploration and 
development operations. The IOCs carry the entire exploration risk. If the companies 
find no commercial hydrocarbon accumulations, they are not entitled to any sort of 
compensation (MNR, 2014). 
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When petroleum is produced, the produced oil and gas is shared between the IOC 
and the host country. The basic elements of a PSC are royalty oil, cost recovery oil 
and profit (Taverne, 2008). The IOCs pay a royalty of 10 per cent of gross total 
production to KRG. Cost recovery is determined as a proportion of final production 
after deduction of the royalty, not exceeding 40 per cent for crude oil and 60 per cent 
for natural gas (MNR, 2014). After deducting the royalty and cost recovery, the 
remainder of the proceeds is profit. 
In general, the share of profit oil produced is based on a factor ‘R’, which is the ratio 
of cumulative oil revenues earned to cumulative costs incurred by the contractor. 
The share of profit oil between KRG and the IOC is based on a function of a 
stepwise increasing value of the R factor as follows. R is less than one when a 
petroleum contract first begins; in other words, the IOC is incurring costs but is not 
yet producing. R reaches one once project revenues equal project costs, and once R 
is larger than one, then the project revenues are greater than project costs, which 
means the petroleum contract is in the production phase. Once R reaches two, the 
profit split is 85/15 per cent in favour of KRG. The higher the value of the R factor, 
the more the sharing proportion changes in favour of KRG. 
As demonstrated in Figure 43, the contracts also require IOCs to allocate almost five 
per cent of their profit share to social welfare programmes to ensure lasting benefit 
to communities affected by petroleum operations (MNR, 2014). 
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Figure 42: PSC profit sharing in the Kurdistan region (Source: based on data 
from MNR, 2014) 
The benefits of the Kurdistan region’s PSCs seem to outweigh their disadvantages 
(Jalo, 2012). The KRG PSCs have contributed to the rapid growth of the oil and gas 
sector. They offer incentives to foreign oil companies to invest in the Kurdistan oil 
and gas sector, while simultaneously favouring KRG if oil prices rise, which in turn 
increases oil recovery and thus revenues. Moreover, the KRG PSCs force oil 
companies to protect Kurdistan’s environment (Jalo, 2012). The oil companies are 
also engaged in local content development and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programmes through capacity-building payments and their own self-funded CSR 
projects (MNR, 2015). 
5.3.6 Governance of the oil and gas industry 
Kurdistan’s petroleum governance model currently lacks a national oil company 
(NOC). As illustrated in Figure 44, the Regional Council (RC) and MNR carry out 
policy-making and regulation respectively (MNR, 2014). 
In fact, MNR handles various regulations, including auditing, health and safety, and 
economic and social regulations. It also proposes licensing policy and bidding 
  
 
!
"$"!
processes to the RC, and supervises petroleum exploration, field development and 
production, as well as governing all related issues through management committees. 
MNR also issues guidelines, standards and objectives for petroleum exploration, 
field development and production phases, and is responsible for petroleum revenue 
management, marketing, transport, infrastructure and downstream activities (MNR, 
2014). 
Governance of the petroleum sector in the region suffers from inadequate institutions 
and regulation, and an inefficient localisation strategy. The various public entities 
appointed by Kurdistan’s oil and gas law have not yet been set up. These entities 
include Kurdistan Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO), Kurdish 
National Oil Company (KNOC), Kurdish Oil Marketing Organisation (KOMO), and 
Kurdistan Organisation for Downstream Operations (KODO) (Kurdistan Petroleum 
Law, 2007). 
 
Figure 43: Organisation of MNR (Source: author based on data from MNR) 
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The health, safety and environment executives (HSE) lack proper regulations and 
guidelines, resulting in inefficient monitoring of the environmental performance of 
petroleum operations, particularly the refinery sector (Whitcomb, 2014). 
The local content development programme, which aims to localise the oil and gas 
sector, has been unable to engage the domestic workforce in technical, skilled and 
managerial positions. Domestic employment is limited to a low-skilled workforce in 
petroleum activities (see Figure 45). Mismatches in skills supply and demand in the 
labour market are principal obstacles preventing local graduates from entering oil 
and gas companies at management level (MNR, 2013). The inadequately skilled 
workforce may also be attributed to an ineffective vocational education system that 
has failed to offer incentives to students. Vocational programmes in the Kurdistan 
region seem to suffer from poor quality of the training system, which has been 
unable to make itself more relevant to the labour market, particularly for the 
extractive industry (UNDP, 2012). 
 
Figure 44: Local and expatriate staff breakdown by level (Source: MNR, 2013) 
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5.4 Conclusions 
Oil and gas reserves are important assets for the Kurdistan region. Its oil production 
capacity has increased and it has reached 637,137 bpd in 2015. This rapid progress 
has resulted in the region’s transformation into a regional and even global economic 
player. 
Despite the opportunities generated by the oil and gas industries, they may also bring 
risks of high economic dependence on the oil and gas sector due to KRG’s failure to 
diversify the economy away from resource extraction towards productive and 
sustainable activity, as well as a worsening of the relationship between the people 
and the government, through economic distortion, lack of transparency and 
accountability, increased environmental pollution and internal tensions. Furthermore, 
oil and gas discovery and production lead the people of the Kurdistan region to 
expect jobs and prosperity. To the extent that these are not realised, the risk of social 
unrest may increase. 
Given this background to the development of the Kurdistan region’s economy and 
oil and gas sector, and the problem of diversifying its economy away from over-
reliance on oil revenues, the next chapter discusses in greater depth the political, 
economic and socio-economic issues surrounding the oil and gas industry in the 
Kurdistan region through the conduct of semi-structured interview research. 
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Chapter 6: Management of Oil and Gas Resources in Iraqi-
Kurdistan 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 discussed the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector as its main engine of 
economic development, and both the internal and external challenges facing this 
industry were highlighted. A number of key issues remain unresolved between the 
Federal Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 
such as the right to control oil and gas resources and the right to export (and receive 
revenue) independently. The Kurdistan Region also faces a number of concurrent 
challenges, including a financial crisis, the low quality of public services, and 
chronic shortages in electricity, water and gasoline supplies. In this context, the 
purpose of this chapter is to develop an improved understanding of the political and 
socio-economic challenges facing the transformation of the Kurdistan Region’s 
petroleum wealth into other assets that will support sustained economic 
development. 
The analysis presented in this chapter addresses a key research question: how 
effective is the current governance structure of the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan 
Region? In order to answer this question, a case study approach is adopted, which is 
designed to examine the challenges and opportunities surrounding the development 
of the oil and gas sector within the Kurdistan Region (Yin, 2003). 
A semi-structured interview technique was used for data collection, which included 
pre-formulated questions but was open to new ideas or questions during the 
interview process (Myers, 2013). The twenty interviewees were key stakeholders 
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involved in the oil and gas industry in the region, enabling analysis of the issues 
facing the development of the hydrocarbon sector from various angles. The target 
groups were: the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Parliament (Natural 
Resource Committee), foreign oil and gas companies, domestic suppliers, and the 
media. 
The findings of the previous chapters suggest that institutional strengthening and 
human capacity-building strategies are of particular importance in understanding the 
ability of a petroleum resource-rich country or region to deal with a potential 
‘resources curse’. Therefore, the interview research focused on the following 
questions relating to the three economic, political and socioeconomic transmission 
channels of the resource curse: 
1. How effective, accountable and transparent are institutions in the Kurdistan 
Region? What are the challenges and opportunities? 
2. How effective and capable are domestic human resources within the Kurdistan 
Region? What are the existing obstacles and opportunities? 
3. What are the challenges currently facing economic development as a whole 
within the Kurdistan Region? 
Having produced transcripts of all the interviews, an inductive thematic analysis 
strategy was applied to analyse the data (Creswell et al., 2007). The responses were 
carefully read and coded to look for patterns in the data. In order to verify the 
accuracy of the emerging codes and categories, they were subjected to independent 
review. Section 6.2 presents an analysis of the interview data, and Section 6.3 
summarises the research. 
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6.2 Interview analysis 
This section presents the interview analysis. Section 6.2.1 presents the five-target 
groups’ perceptions regarding institutional challenges, Section 6.2.2 presents the 
social challenges, and Section 6.2.3 presents the economic challenges facing the oil 
and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region. 
6.2.1 Institutional challenges 
In 2007, the Kurdistan Parliament approved a new Oil and Gas Law, which proposed 
seven separate institutions: 
1. The Regional Council (policy-making body) 
2. Ministry of Natural Resources (regulatory body) 
3. Kurdistan Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO, operational function 
relating to future fields) 
4. Kurdistan National Oil Company (KNOC, operational function with respect to 
current fields) 
5. Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation (KOMO, commercial functions) 
6. Kurdistan Organisation for Downstream Operations (KODO, operational 
function regarding downstream activities) 
7. Kurdistan Oil and Trust Organisation (KOTO, the petroleum fund). 
In this context, the regional Oil and Gas Law suggested a governance model for the 
oil and gas sector that would separate the policy-making, regulatory, marketing and 
operational functions. However, the Kurdistan Region currently administers its 
petroleum resources through two government bodies: the Regional Council (RC), 
which directs policy, and the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), a regulatory 
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body providing oversight and technical expertise as well as engaging in commercial 
activities. There is no national oil company and none of the suggested entities have 
so far been established, despite the clear decree of the Oil and Gas Law. 
This section examines the effectiveness of oil and gas resource governance in the 
Kurdistan Region and the potential challenges affecting the current regulatory 
framework and institutional arrangements. When the respondents were interviewed 
about the effectiveness of the Kurdistan Region’s governance of hydrocarbon 
wealth, most were of the opinion that the sector has not been managed in an optimal 
manner. The feedback obtained from the interviewees highlights three main 
challenges facing the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region: poor institutional 
design, low institutional quality, and poor safeguards and quality controls. 
• Poor institutional design 
The findings from the interviews reveal that the Kurdistan Region’s hydrocarbon 
industry lacks an effective institutional framework within which to discharge its 
responsibilities. The interviewees were of the opinion that there are serious issues 
affecting governance of the region’s petroleum sector. 
- Ineffectiveness of the policy-making body 
The participants explained that the Regional Council, as the policy-making body, has 
not yet been institutionalised. For instance, Interviewee 03 stressed: 
“... the entire council is under the influence of the Minister of Natural 
Resources, since he is the only person with extensive background and 
expertise in the oil and gas industry. Furthermore, one cannot exclude 
incidents of conflict of interest, as the person who is head of the 
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regulatory body, in this case the Minister of Natural Resources, is also 
an effective and even an influential member of the Regional Council.” 
Interviewee 17 elaborated more explicitly: 
“...the Regional Council is not working as an independent agency and 
lacks experts and a technical body to advise the council in terms of 
political, technical, managerial and economic subjects. Therefore, it is 
not able to make effective petroleum policy and oversee the Ministry 
of Natural Resources.” 
In the same vein, Interviewee 05 commented: 
“The Regional Council lacks an institutional structure which will 
enable the policy makers to formulate prudent policy based on 
appropriate and effective ‘checks and balances’ for the petroleum 
industry, as well as to monitor the implementation of the formulated 
policy by the Ministry of Natural Resources.” 
- Delay in the establishment of entities in compliance with the region’s 2007 
Oil and Gas Law 
In addition, the majority of interviewees stated that inadequate agencies impact on 
the performance of Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector. Interviewee 02 said: 
“I believe that the KRG will not be able to effectively exercise 
authority over the oil and gas industry in the Kurdistan region unless it 
possesses powerful, competent and state-owned upstream and 
downstream companies.” 
Furthermore, Interviewee 09 emphasised that: 
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“The petroleum sector suffers from an ineffective institutional 
framework due to a lack of state-owned companies and other agencies, 
which has also necessitated endorsement of the concept of “separation 
roles” as a fundamental tool to build a healthy business culture to 
prevent conflict of interest.” 
Interviewee 04 expanded on this point: 
“The establishment of the stated-owned oil company is very necessary. 
The Ministry of Natural Resources currently has two potentially 
conflicting roles: that of regulator and secondly of joint-venture 
partner (through the government share). The Management Committee 
(MC) reflects the JV aspect, but the regulatory role is not respected 
and the MC Chairmen often also try to act in this capacity, even 
getting into a conflict of interest situation.” 
- Political and powerful elite group interference 
The third reason why most respondents did not believe that the oil and gas sector is 
successful and effective is because of the politicisation of the regulatory and 
oversight function of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Interviewee 10 said: 
“...the dominant political parties and their close network have 
positioned themselves to profit from the sector by functioning as a 
petroleum industry gatekeeper for foreign companies and lining up 
private companies to take advantage of contracts, particularly in the 
refinery sector and the area of logistics.” 
Interviewee 05 stated: 
 180 
!
“...the tendering system is not transparent in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources because of political interference and elite groups. Therefore, 
business activities are based not on competiveness but on monopoly 
for a number of companies, which many claim belong to powerful 
political parties and their associates.” 
Overall, the interviewees revealed that the current organisational structure of the oil 
and gas sector endorsed by the Ministry of Natural Resources fails to maximise the 
benefits and meet the challenges of providing an appropriate petroleum management 
system and procedures, as required by the Oil and Gas Law. A weak policy-making 
body, namely the Regional Council, and the absence of a national oil company has 
created a ministry-dominant model of petroleum governance. In this context, the 
government ministry carries out all policy-making, regulatory and monitoring 
functions. Moreover, the lack of effective institutional building poses a severe 
challenge for transparency and accountability in the Kurdistan Region’s hydrocarbon 
sector, raising doubts among the public. Such observations are largely in agreement 
with results reported in the literature (e.g. Heller and Marcel, 2012; Lahn et al., 
2007, 2009; Thurber et al., 2010, 2011; Al-Kasim et al., 2008, 2013; Al-Kasim, 
2006; Barma et al., 2012). These authors conclude that a well-designed institutional 
framework is crucial for the effective management and oversight of all phases of the 
oil and gas sector, thereby enhancing the performance of the petroleum industry. In 
addition to the importance of strong institutions, the findings highlight the current 
structure of state ownership without accountability, which contribute to the poor 
quality of institutions and negative economic outcomes for the oil and gas sector 
(Luong and Weinthak, 2006). Under this ownership structure and as a result of the 
lack of a stated-owned oil company, the Kurdistan Regional Government has granted 
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significant managerial and operational control to international oil companies (IOCs) 
through production-sharing agreements. The IOCs are the able to play a major role 
in the management of petroleum wealth by exercising control over operations, 
investment decisions and production levels (Stevens, 2008). 
Given this explanation, it can be concluded that inadequate and ineffective 
institutional design of the petroleum sector has resulted in the poor management of 
oil and gas wealth in the Kurdistan Region. 
• Low institutional capacity 
Participants indicated a number of institutional challenges facing the Kurdistan 
Region, stemming from weak institutions relating to governance of the oil and gas 
sector. These factors include excessive bureaucracy, low technical capability, a lack 
of accurate and consistent data publishing, and interference by political and elite 
groups. 
- Excessive bureaucracy 
Almost all participants agreed that excessive bureaucracy is troublesome because it 
lays the ground for a decline in foreign investment and, in turn, to poor economic 
performance. Interviewee 11 said: 
“The Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector suffers from the 
bureaucratic/administrative-centred system. There is huge bureaucracy 
here; instead of dealing with one person it is with multiple people over 
one issue. There is not a single entity to deal with it – namely, long 
routine and bureaucracy makes the environment less attractive for 
foreign investors...” 
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Interviewee 08 also said: 
“The oil sector is suffering from the red tape of bureaucracy. In 
Nigeria, which is a difficult place to work, you find just one person 
whom you deal with, you know with whom you deal; but here, the 
investors or foreign companies deal with many different people. This 
is costly and time-consuming.” 
Interviewee 15 finally stated: 
“Excessive bureaucracy is the major impediment to our activities. 
Government bureaucracy and corruption increase the cost of doing 
business. The firms use bribes to lower their regulatory burden in the 
Kurdistan Region.” 
In short, the high level of bureaucracy is a major obstacle facing oil companies in the 
Kurdistan Region. Investment regulation is friendly and attractive and offers 
incentives to investors, but when they arrive and face a great deal of paperwork and 
bureaucracy they become frustrated. The long, cumbersome bureaucracy is due to a 
lack of coordination and collaboration between the various departments in the 
ministry. The problems cited by the participants are consistent with the literature on 
institutional challenges in oil- and gas-rich countries. For example, a study 
conducted by Eifert et al. (2002) sheds light on the fact that bureaucratic red tape is 
an obstacle to effective oil governance in oil-dependent countries, such as the Gulf 
States. An over-expanded bureaucracy leads to rent-seeking activities that distort 
economic development (Karl, 2007). 
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- Lack of technical capability 
The majority of participants agreed that a basic obstacle to the effective governance 
of the oil and gas industry is the shortage of indigenous technological capacity. 
Interviewee 14 explained: 
“There is insufficient expertise in the Ministry, and the systems and 
processes for effective oversight are largely non-existent. Much ad hoc 
control rests with the Management Committee chairmen, who are not 
necessarily skilled to address matters in all areas – legal, technical, 
commercial, human resources, environment, etc.” 
Interviewee 02 also indicated: 
“The ministry suffers from a lack of efficient capacity to deal with 
issues. Owing to the lack of competence in the Ministry, certain issues 
become more complicated and time-consuming rather being resolved.” 
Other interviewees stated that Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector lacks a research and 
development entity, which is a cornerstone for the development of knowledge and 
technology in respect of various petroleum activities. Interviewee 09 stated: 
“Technical support, consultation, research and technology for the local 
petroleum industry are provided outside the region because the 
establishment of an institute for research has been delayed.” 
Another participant 13 added: 
“Setting up an institute for research is the key institution for research 
and development within the petroleum sector. This can support 
assessments of industries and technological development in the 
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Kurdistan Region and joint scientific projects with organisations 
outside the region.” 
In addition, Interviewee 07 said: 
“Without a sound energy institute the Kurdistan region will be 
deprived of a framework for international research which could 
potentially lay the foundations for relevant, research-based study 
programmes with the potential to support interdepartmental research 
programmes. It would be very difficult to identify a new technological 
and conceptual solution that boosts oil and gas extraction in the 
Kurdistan region without having an integrative centre of excellence.” 
Most interview participants shared a common view that the weak regulatory body 
impacts on a variety of areas, including timeliness, predictability and cost-
effectiveness, resulting in duplication of effort and poor innovation. In this context, 
the weak regulatory system makes corruption possible in all petroleum activities 
from exploration to the refinery sector (McPherson and MacSearraigh, 2007). 
- Accurate and consistent data publishing 
Transparency is perceived to be lacking as a result of failure to publish production 
and other significant data regularly. Since 2007, all contracts awarded by the 
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) have been published on the Ministry’s 
website, but contracts signed with international oil companies have not been 
published since 2012. Interviewee 05 stated: 
“The Kurdistan Region Government has signed a contract for fifty 
years with Turkey. It is acceptable not to publish these contracts until 
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they are accomplished because of commercial or national interests, but 
it is not normal for them to remain unpublished. I am sure that the 
Federal Government has one version of these contracts, and why the 
Kurdistan Parliament should not have them I don’t know. For 
example, the argument that the MNR made regarding the 
confidentiality of the contract between Kurdistan and Turkey for fifty 
years is not valid because there is no need to be confidential; the same 
contract that the Iraqi government signed in 1973 for seventy years 
with Turkey was published.” 
Given this explanation, keeping contracts secret simply reflects the fact that the 
MNR has not worked effectively with the Natural Resources and Economic and 
Financial Committees of parliament. This has reduced trust between parliament and 
government (MNR), and thus it has lost parliamentary support for its petroleum 
policy. Interviewee 18 also confirmed that non-disclosure of information and 
inconsistent reporting has resulted in increased doubt about transparent management 
of the petroleum sector: 
“...we see disclosure of information and reporting is increasing but we 
still see inconsistency in the timing of it. For instance, you see some 
financial reports come out from the ministry that are useful but on an 
inconsistent basis; there are some production reports from the ministry, 
but again inconsistent. We see some product-sharing contracts (PSCs) 
published, then publication halts – once again inconsistent.” 
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However, some interviewees believed that the Kurdistan Region’s primary purpose 
is to increase the transparency and accountability of hydrocarbon management. 
Interviewee 01 said: 
“...There are few petroleum-rich countries that publish oil contracts; 
for example Malaysia, Indonesia and Egypt have never published 
contracts ... in contrast to the KRG, the Federal Government has not 
published any contracts. The reality is that we try to be transparent.” 
Interviewee 01 explained further: “In effect, there are two major reasons for 
unpublished contracts: first because of commercial issues, and second the interests of 
oil companies.” In addition, a number of participants explained that the Regional 
Council highlighted details of unpublished contracts for members of parliament 
(MPs). Interviewee 04 also confirmed that the government has attempted to make the 
petroleum sector transparent and accountable: 
“But some oil contracts, such as the contracts with Turkey, have not 
been published because of national interests. The Regional Council 
stated that it is ready to inform MPs of the details at the Council of 
Ministries, but MPs did not follow it up. Even the prime minister 
announced his readiness to discuss all details with all heads of faction 
parties, but they have not yet responded and do not show any interest 
in the Prime Minister’s suggestion.” 
In addition, the lack of accurate, detailed data has not only had implications with 
respect to making the governance of hydrocarbon wealth less transparent, but has 
also led to political conflict between the KRG and Federal Government in Baghdad. 
For example, Interviewee 13 explained: “Some of the problems the KRG has with 
 187 
!
Baghdad come down to accurate oil- and gas-related data.” Interviewee 20 also 
stated: “The financial reports are not in the detailed information; however, the only 
published report is regarding up to the 2013 fiscal year.” 
In short, the greater concern is that there seems to be a lack of accountability and 
transparency to the people of Kurdistan. The challenge is to make the Ministry of 
Natural Resources more effective, specifically as a regulator. One of the most vital 
mechanisms in successful petroleum governance is the accountability practice of the 
regulatory agency involved (McPherson, 2003). 
• Poor safeguards and quality controls 
Most participants explained that the absence of an effective system of checks and 
balances has led to poor governance of the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan 
Region. The low capability of Parliament and the Supreme Auditor Council, and a 
lack of international organisations such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) are the main factors that interviewees linked to poor oversight of 
petroleum activities. 
Interviewees stated that the low capability of MPs in terms of an understanding the 
oil and gas industry is the main reason behind the weak monitoring of the oil and gas 
sector. For example, Interviewee 02 said: 
“...a lot of questions we see from the MPs are in one direction and 
show their understanding of the industry could be better, and this can 
lead to misunderstanding that leads to mistrust. What would be better 
is for the MNR to provide better details so that the public can be more 
educated about the whole oil industry, so they can understand the 
questions and be aware of the purpose of the questions.” 
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Moreover, the participants also indicated that none of the members of the Natural 
Resource Committee of Parliament are familiar with the oil and gas industry. 
Interviewee 11 explained: 
“I don’t know anyone who works in the Natural Resource Committee 
of Parliament with any expertise in the oil and gas field. This 
committee is not capable of making any dramatic changes; so you 
cannot conduct quality control on something if you are yourself 
lacking the background expertise.” 
Most participants argued that published revenue and other data are not valid because 
a third party has not audited them. The data need to be audited by the Auditor 
General’s Office. With regard to international organisations, most interviewees 
indicated that the engagement of international organisations such as EITI and the 
World Bank could play a key role in improving quality control in the petroleum 
sector. 
In short, the Natural Resource Committee of the Kurdistan Parliament is the only 
public authority with a constitutional mandate to debate and influence petroleum 
policy through the law-making process. It oversees the implementation of oil and gas 
policy by the Ministry of Natural Resources (Kurdistan Regional Government, 
2015). The effective oversight function of parliament is crucial to the transparency 
and accountability of oil and gas governance (Myers and Mohammed, 2012; 
Chatham House, 2006; World Bank, 2010, Lindner, 2014). Specialised knowledge of 
members of the Natural Resource Committee would increase their ability to 
influence policy decisions and oversee performance in the petroleum industry 
(Acosta, 2010). 
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6.2.2 Social Challenges 
The majority of interviewees revealed that governance of the oil and gas industry in 
the Kurdistan Region has faced two key social challenges: unemployment, and 
ineffective management of public expectations. 
• Unemployment 
According to the interviewees, youth unemployment is a major social challenge for 
the region. All participants agreed that the KRG has failed to design polices to deal 
with the issue of increasing public employment by accelerating job growth in the 
private sector. One of the most critical problems highlighted in the interviews 
regarding the policy of job creation for young people is the increasing appeal of 
public sector employment. For example, Interviewee 08 said: 
“The public sector is heavily preferred owing to the benefits it offers: 
the employer has little or no control over the employee, high public 
sector salaries and the low match between the skills of public sector 
employees and the work roles they perform.” 
Interviewee 17 stated: “Working hours in the public sector are shorter than in the 
private sector, and government jobs are much safer than those in the private sector.” 
Interviewee 14 also indicated: 
“The recruitment system is not based on a merit system. The selection 
of applicants for employment is influenced by political interference, 
elite groups and personal connections rather than skills and 
competence...” 
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In addition to the attractiveness of the public sector, nearly all interviewees 
highlighted that a lack of incentives and subsidies to increase private employment 
makes working in the private sector less attractive. Interviewee 06 said: “There are 
not better wage expectations for local job seekers moving to the private sector.” 
Interviewee 19 said: “There is little interest in proactive employment development in 
the industry by offering the private sector financial and other incentives to employ 
the local workforce.” 
Another major bottleneck to youth employment cited by interviewees is mismatches 
in education and skills; namely, a serious mismatch between the skills young people 
bring with them when they leave the education system and those that are sought in 
labour markets in the Kurdistan Region. In addition, many interview participants 
identified the low quality of the educational and vocational system as a principal 
obstacle to young job seekers in labour markets. For instance, Interviewee 09 said: 
“We have difficulties in finding suitably skilled workers. There are local skill gaps 
and deficits with respect to the petroleum sector.” Interviewee 13 stated: 
“From my experience, the big challenge facing human resource 
development is qualification mismatches and the quality of education 
and skills. Employers have a great struggle to find suitable candidates 
with the proper education and skills required by the job.” 
These results are consistent with the political economy literature (e.g. Gavin, 1993; 
Auty, 1993, 1997; Gelb, 1989, 2011; Robinson et al., 2006), which shows that a 
common way of distributing rents in petroleum exports is to increase public 
spending on civil service wages. Furthermore, inefficient allocation of windfalls has 
hampered economic development polices, such as domestic capacity building with 
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appropriate quality and capabilities comparable to international standards. This 
context makes it difficult to enhance indigenous participation in petroleum activities, 
use local technology, award more contracts to indigenous firms, or stimulate joint 
venture arrangements between indigenous and foreign companies. 
• Ineffective management of public expectations 
Since the newly emerging oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region is a source of 
substantial revenue, the public has been keeping an eye on this industry. The local 
community appears already to have high expectations relating to the discovery and 
production of oil. Kurds in the region hope that oil exploitation will improve their 
quality of life. The general public also expects that oil will increase national 
prosperity as the KRG invests in roads, power plants, education, health and other 
socio-economic infrastructure. They expect to see the end of dependency on the 
federal government and to gain economic sovereignty. Most participants made it 
clear that poor communication, a low level of public involvement, and a lack of 
reliable and timely information are significant contributing factors to the poor 
performance of the government ministry in relation to managing and meeting 
domestic expectations. For example, Interviewee 20 said: “The Ministry does not 
have a clear strategy as to how to communicate effectively with the general public. 
The government promised what it could not realistically deliver.” Interviewee 07 
stated: 
“The Kurds were excited about the huge discovery of oil in Kurdistan 
and they are expecting to take a share of the proceeds. They have not 
been educated about things like PSC contracts and other arrangements. 
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As a result, they rely on politicians and media and other individuals for 
information – sometimes incorrect information.” 
Interviewee 11 was of the same opinion: 
“The government’s failure to educate people about the oil and gas 
industry, how it operates, what is possible and what is not. There is a 
wrong understanding of the industry among people. They think that 
this new sector can assure a job for everyone who expresses interest. 
In this context, there is great room for the media to mislead the 
Kurds.” 
The respondents also reported that local participation in petroleum activities is 
crucial to the effective management of public expectations. For example, 
Interviewee 10 stated: 
“The Kurdish communities feel like outsiders in the oil and gas 
industry because their involvement in petroleum activities is limited to 
low-skilled positions. Locally educated people are questioning how 
training opportunities and scholarships programmes are awarded.” 
In addition to stepping up technical support and training for local capacity building, 
the involvement of professionals and civil social organisations in petroleum sector 
development is crucial in helping shape public expectations. Interviewee 16 said: 
“Experts on oil and gas and civil society organisations have not been 
involved in setting petroleum policies. A lack of dialogue between the 
government and local experts, as well as civil society, about petroleum 
policies and current development in the oil and gas sectors leads to 
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ongoing crises in the region, such as fuel-price protests and electricity 
shortages.” 
Failure to provide reliable and timely information to the public has also contributed 
to a failure to reinforce trust between the KRG and its citizens. In this context, the 
media have furthered public confusion by reporting on issues on which they lack in-
depth knowledge. Interviewee 20 said: “The media often take the figures out of the 
original publications of various organisations and report them as if they come from a 
realistic base rather than speculative one.” Most participants indicated that the 
government plays a major role in providing true information to the public, thereby 
building realistic expectations. Interviewee 08 explained: 
“The oil and gas sector is politically sensitive in the region; every 
piece of information on the sector attracts media attention, therefore 
there is a need to manage public expectations effectively. The 
government has failed to manage public expectations by providing the 
media with accurate information relating to the oil and gas industry.” 
Interviewee 03 added: 
“The public has not been educated about the various challenges around 
the oil and gas industry, such as uncertainty in reserve estimations, 
production rates, timing and magnitude of revenues. For example, 
people are aware of cheaper gasoline in the rest of Iraq or 
neighbouring countries, but they do not understand that it is the result 
of the KRG’s subsidisation policy which is not quite sustainable in the 
long term.” 
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These findings are consistent with research conducted by Marcel (2015), who argues 
that community engagement and effective communication with the public are crucial 
to establishing trust within the public. Furthermore, failure to manage the 
expectations of local communities efficiently has had negative consequences: 
people’s resentment of the government is rising. This has also seriously impacted on 
the popularity of the political leadership in the Kurdistan Region and has created 
mistrust within society. 
6.2.3 Economic Challenges 
This section examines the major problems affecting the Kurdistan Region’s 
economy. The interviewees indicated that non-transparent revenue collection and 
spending, lack of economic links with the rest of the economy and geopolitical 
issues are significant obstacles to economic development of the Kurdistan Region. 
• Non-transparent revenue collection and spending 
Most participants explained that the KRG has failed to improve petroleum revenue 
transparency. Interviewee 19 said: 
“Petroleum revenue management has been an ongoing issue in the 
region since the Ministry of Natural Resources has received oil and 
gas revenues and control over expenditures. Such approaches have led 
to theft, fraud, abuse, and have enhanced political instability and 
thereby economic stagnation in the region.” 
Interviewee 05 said: 
“Transparent and accountable management of oil and gas revenue flow 
has been hindered by delays in the establishment of a petroleum fund. 
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Consequently, an absence of internal controls, supervision and 
transparency has enabled not only mismanagement of oil and gas 
revenues but also high profits for political and elite groups.” 
The second reason for ineffective petroleum revenue management is a lack of 
financial transparency: the government ministry has not disclosed detailed data with 
respect to how much revenue it has received from its extractive industry and how it 
spends the revenues. For instance, Interviewee 06 stated: 
“A lack of detailed key oil revenue data leaves citizens unable to hold 
their government accountable for the revenues generated and the use 
of them –namely, whether their petroleum revenues are being managed 
responsibly.” 
Interviewee 16 agreed: “The financial reports have not been consistently disclosed 
on the website in a way that the public can easily find them, and the revenue needs to 
be reported as disaggregated figures.” 
Most respondents agreed with the statement that an ineffective Auditor General’s 
Office has been a contributing factor to the lack of transparency and accountability 
of petroleum revenue management, thereby increasing abuse of petroleum revenues 
and corrupt activities in the Kurdistan Region. Interviewee 00 explained: “The 
Auditor General’s Office has engaged ineffectively in the oversight of the petroleum 
sector.” Interviewee 03 said: “The failure of the Auditor General’s Office to oversee 
and audit petroleum sector processes, as well as the production and dissemination of 
audit reports, has reduced petroleum revenue accountability and transparency.” 
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In short, government accountability and transparency has been restrained by a lack 
of detailed and consistent publication of revenue figures and a poor monitoring and 
auditing system. In this context, the exploitation of petroleum revenues has resulted 
in poverty, inequality, corruption and conflict rather than fostering economic growth 
and social prosperity (Kolstad and Wiig, 2006; Ross, 2008). 
• Lack of economic links 
Most participants indicated that Kurdistan’s economy is plagued by high dependency 
on the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, the government has been unable to generate 
further benefits from petroleum resources for the rest of the economy. The 
interviewees identified poor local content plans and failure to form other economic 
links as the main reasons for the oil-dependent economy. 
The participants revealed that the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas industry local 
content policy has not yet achieved significant success. It has failed to enhance the 
local participation, awards to indigenous firms and the stimulation of joint venture 
arrangements between local and foreign oil firms. Interviewee 07 said: “The current 
oil and gas industry local content policy has resulted in the lower participation of 
indigenous small to medium-sized firms within the industry.” 
Other interviewees, on the other hand, pointed to the fact that many indigenous 
service companies are uncompetitive with regard to prescribed contracts or services, 
as such firms demonstrate insufficient ownership of equipment, Kurdish personnel 
and the capacity to perform such operations. Therefore, the participation of local 
servicing firms is constrained to facilities such as catering and basic civil services. 
Interviewee 18 said: 
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“Local servicing companies are less competitive in the oil and gas 
sector. The government has been unable to encourage foreign 
extractive investors to foster deep links with the local economy 
through training and guidance of local firms, effective corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programmes, and engagement in local capacity 
building.” 
The majority of interviewees indicated that the problem is rather a low absorption 
capacity by domestic economic entrepreneurs that hinders the formation of economic 
links. Interviewee 05 further explained: “The real problem is political and ruling elite 
interference in industrial policies for local content development.” Interviewee 04 
agreed: “Non-transparent and corrupt institutions, and thereby poor governance of 
the oil and gas industry, has led to deeply rooted rent-seeking activities in local 
content.” Interviewee 13 said: 
“Ruling elites are interested in supporting and engaging with domestic 
economic entrepreneurs who have already captured local content 
markets, so they obtain rents from these firms to maintain their 
political power.” 
In addition to the lack of economic links within the oil and gas industry promoting 
the local supply industry, the poor contribution of oil and gas revenues to other 
economic sectors that will boost employment and income generation, such as 
agriculture, industry and services, is a major barrier to long-term economic 
development in the Kurdistan Region. Interviewee 15 said: 
“Reasons for the lack of linkage formation so far from the petroleum 
sector are numerous. Most importantly, economic development 
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policies lack the specific targets, monitoring mechanisms, incentives 
and sanctions needed to reach the overall development objectives 
relating to other economic sectors, in particular the agricultural 
sector.” 
Similarly, interviewee 10 explained that “the present institutional environment offers 
rent-seeking opportunities for ruling elites rather than productive activities within 
other economic sectors”. 
In short, the participants’ responses show that the Kurdistan Region’s economy is 
based on petroleum revenues, which has converted the region into a ‘rentier state’. 
Poor institutional quality and human resource capacity are the main reasons behind 
the inefficient and petroleum revenue-driven economy. These results are in line with 
the political economy literature discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
6.2.4 Geopolitical challenges 
Interviewees discussed the further challenge of geopolitical issues facing the 
Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector, which are a major source of uncertainty. 
These include the high economic dependency of the KRG on the federal budget, 
being a landlocked region, the risk of Islamic State attack, and fluctuations in oil 
prices. 
All interviews agreed that the Kurdistan Region has become worryingly over-reliant 
on the 17 per cent share of the federal budget allotted by Baghdad. Interviewee 17 
stated: “The Federal Government has used the region’s ongoing financial 
dependency – namely Kurdistan’s budgetary instalments from the federal budget – 
as a tool to rein in the Kurds’ economic development ambitions.” Interviewee 03 
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said: “Control over oil revenues gives Baghdad financial leverage to use against the 
Kurds. In 2014 it displayed this leverage by refusing to pay the Kurdistan Region’s 
share of the national budget.” Interviewee 05 pointed to Kurdistan’s disputes with 
Baghdad: 
“The economic sanction that has been imposed on the Kurds since 
2014, as a result of the political tension between Erbil and Baghdad, 
sheds light on the fact that the KRG relies heavily on its budget share, 
which has made the region vulnerable to economic bankruptcy.” 
All interviewees agreed that the financial dispute between Erbil and Baghdad has 
had the effect of delaying payments to oil and gas companies operating in the 
Kurdistan Region. This has posed a major threat to investment plans in the oil and 
gas industry and other economic sectors. 
Another key geopolitical issue outlined by interviewees is linked to petroleum 
exports. They explained that the Kurdistan Region is a landlocked region, which 
raises issues of infrastructural dependency in exporting its oil and gas. Interviewee 
09 said: “The Kurdistan Region relies on Turkey for oil and gas exports. Expansion 
of pipeline exports is the lifeblood of the Kurdistan economy. The future of 
landlocked Kurdistan depends on political relations between Ankara and Erbil.” 
Interviewee 01 stated: “The Kurds are landlocked and therefore always dependent on 
others, not only for gas and oil exports but also for imports. Turkey is the best option 
for the Kurdistan Regional Government because the infrastructure is more or less 
ready.” This interviewee’s account shows that the Kurdistan Region needs 
cooperation with its neighbours to access world markets and thereby guarantee the 
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development of the petroleum industry through further foreign investment in the 
hydrocarbon sector. 
Another critical challenge that has affected the oil and gas industry is security. 
Interviewee 02 said: “Islamic State attacks have affected operating activities in 
blocks which are close to the war.” Interviewee 16 further explained that: 
“After the worsening security threat, oil companies operating in the 
Kurdistan Region have had varied responses to the current security 
challenges. Some of them have evacuated non-essential staff and 
others have stopped part of their activities.” 
In short, all participants highlighted that security plays a vital role in the ongoing 
development of the petroleum sector. Security matters for optimal and long-term 
investments and employment development, which have been hit particularly badly 
since companies are limiting their commitment as a result of insurgent attacks. 
All participants explained that the collapse in oil prices has affected the region’s 
economy, which has worsened the financial crisis in the Kurdistan Region. 
Interviewee 10 said: “The KRG has started to sell its crude oil independently after 
financial sanctions were imposed by the central government. However, the KRG has 
been unable to pay civil servant salaries because of the sharp fall in oil prices.” 
Interviewee 04 said: “The oil revenue-based economy of the region has been hit hard 
by the decline in oil prices; this has had a huge impact on projects, and most 
investment projects in the region have been halted in all sectors.” 
The participants’ responses shed light on the fact that the Kurdistan Region’s 
dependency on oil revenues is a major challenge because of poor financial policy in 
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dealing with fluctuating oil prices. For example, Interviewee 18 explained: “The 
Kurdish security forces have been able to prevent Islamic State attacks and the KRG 
has also increased oil production capacity but it is suffering a financial crisis.” Under 
these conditions, the collapse in oil prices has resulted in poor welfare and thereby 
social conflict due to the low quality of institutions. These findings are consistent 
with the political economy literature discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis of interview data to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the challenges facing the newly emerging oil and gas sector in the 
Kurdistan Region. The results show that multiple issues confront the petroleum 
industry, including institutional, human resource and geopolitical challenges.  
The main institutional issues contributed to the poor design and capacity. Lack of 
effective checks and balances with in the system has resulted in the low quality of 
institutions involving in the oil and gas sector. The findings indicate that a growing 
unemployment rate and ineffective management of public expectation with respect 
to the new emerging petroleum industry are the major social challenges facing the 
Kurdistan Regional Government.  
High dependency of the Kurdistan region’s economy on the hydrocarbon revenues 
and more importantly ineffective and un-transparent petroleum revenues are the key 
challenges on the path of the region’s economic development. Furthermore, 
geopolitical factors have impacted on the performance of the oil and gas sector 
through the high economic dependency of the KRG on the federal budget, the 
problems of being a landlocked region dependent on neighbouring states for market 
access, the risk of Islamic State attack, and fluctuations in oil prices. 
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Chapter 7: General Conclusions and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study has been to investigate the key challenges faced by petroleum-
exporting countries in relation to the effective management of their petroleum 
wealth. The core question has been why have some hydrocarbon exporters been able 
to ensure that the huge revenues ensuing from oil and gas exploitation do not 
become a curse while others have not. To achieve the aims and objectives of this 
thesis, a mixed-methods research methodology has been employed (see Figure 46) as 
a new way of studying the resource curse, with a view to gaining a deeper 
understanding of the challenges facing the governance of the oil and gas sector in 
petroleum-exporting countries. 
1. Theoretical contribution 
2. Methodological contribution 
3. Empirical contribution 
Qualitative 
research method  
Single case study 
(documentary and 
interview analysis) 
Qualitative 
research method  
Cross-country case 
study (comparative 
analysis) 
Quantitative 
research method 
Cross-country 
(econometric 
analysis) 
Does resource curse exist? What are the 
major challenges facing petroleum 
exporting countries?  
!
What are the effective policies with 
respect to the institutional structure, 
human resource development and  
petroleum revenue management?  
What are the challenges 
facing  the Kurdistan 
region’s governance of oil 
and gas sector?  
 
Figure 45: Triangulation method 
On the basis of a comprehensive literature review, the existing challenges have been 
classified into three categories: economic, political and social. The economic 
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transmission challenges include Dutch disease, revenue volatility and petroleum 
dependency. Political and socio-economic transmission mechanisms explain the role 
of institutional quality and human resource capacity building in converting 
petroleum resources into a curse or a blessing. The study has used quantitative data 
to reappraise: (i) the existence of the resource curse (a negative connection between 
resource dependency and economic growth); (ii) whether human resource and 
institutional development affect growth performance positively; and (iii) the 
influence of natural resources on growth through institutional and human resource 
quality. In addition, the study has used qualitative research (cross-country case 
studies) to explore the effectiveness of the policies adopted by four petroleum-
exporting countries (Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria) to address the 
economic, political and socio-economic transmission channels of the resource curse. 
Finally, a second source of qualitative data (semi-structured interviews) has been 
used to explore the perceptions of the issues surrounding the oil and gas industry in 
the Kurdistan region from the perspective of five target groups: the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, Parliament, foreign oil companies, domestic service companies 
and the media. 
This chapter has five main objectives. First, to summarise the empirical findings on 
the importance of transmission mechanisms of the resource curse in resource-
abundant countries and sheds light on the determinants of economic performance in 
natural resource-based economies, particularly in countries in which economic 
growth is driven almost entirely by the petroleum sector. Second, to summarise the 
findings relating to lessons drawn from practices of good governance of hydrocarbon 
resources, including institutional, human resource and revenue management policies. 
Third, to integrate the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data, and to 
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highlight the implications of the findings for oil- and gas-exporting countries. 
Fourth, to summarise the target groups’ views on the challenges facing the oil and 
gas sector, and to provide policy prescriptions for petroleum governance in the 
Kurdistan region. Finally, this chapter addresses the contributions and limitations of 
the study and offers suggestions for future research. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the thesis. 
Section 7.3 presents a summary of the literature survey findings. Section 7.4 
summarises the quantitative data findings and Section 7.5 summarises the findings 
from the qualitative cross-country case studies. Section 7.6 integrates the 
quantitative and qualitative data and presents a general policy prescription for 
petroleum-exporting countries. Section 7.7 summarises the findings from the 
interview research. Section 7.8 provides a policy prescription for petroleum 
governance in the Kurdistan region. Section 7.9 describes the contributions of this 
study to the literature on the resource curse. Section 7.10 discusses the limitations of 
the study and Section 7.11 presents suggestions for future research. Finally, Section 
7.12 provides some concluding remarks. 
7.2 Overview of the thesis 
Since the 1950s, the contribution of primary products to economic growth has been a 
subject of controversial debate among economists (Perbisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; 
Hirschman, 1958), who have argued that countries highly dependent on primary 
product exports face problems of declining trade and a lack of sufficient links with 
the rest of the economy. Since the 1970s, evidence from studies of the experiences of 
oil exporters has suggested that volatile oil revenues have affected the economies of 
oil-exporting countries (Kilian, 2010). 
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The devastating potential effects of natural resource wealth on the economies of 
natural resource-abundant countries, particularly those with petroleum wealth, were 
first posited by Auty (1990, 1991, and 1993) and Gelb (1988) as the resource curse 
thesis. They shed light on the effects of the fragile structure of economies relying 
heavily on oil as their major income earner. According to Auty, such economies 
suffer from lower growth owing to a lack of domestic economic links and 
mismanagement of petroleum rents. However, the resource curse thesis did not test 
his theory by applying economic modelling. Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) first 
applied econometrics to examine the resource curse thesis in terms of explaining the 
apparent a negative correlation between natural resources and economic growth. 
They measured the economic performance of 97 developing countries for the period 
1971 to 1989 using the ratio of natural resource exports to gross domestic product 
(GDP), and concluded that natural resource abundance has an adverse effect on 
economic growth in resource-based economies. 
The emergence of a number of new oil- and gas-producing states and regions, 
including the Kurdistan region in the north of Iraq, has triggered renewed debate 
about the potential for petroleum wealth to drive economic development, as well as 
the possible constraints. Therefore, this study has aimed to understand why some 
petroleum-abundant countries have been able to translate petroleum revenues into 
advantageous economic development while others have not. It also seeks to devise 
an effective governance model for the oil and gas sector of the Kurdistan region. 
Petroleum-exporting countries face many issues in terms of translating their 
petroleum revenues into advantageous economic development. The central aim of 
the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 has been to identify and re-appraise the 
major channels through which the resource curse occurs, while the overarching aim 
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of the studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 has been to identify effective policies 
adopted by petroleum-exporting countries and the challenges facing the Kurdistan 
region’s oil and gas sector, in order to provide effective policy prescriptions for the 
good governance of petroleum wealth. 
7.3 Summary of literature survey findings 
Following Sachs and Warner’s studies, a vast amount of literature has analysed the 
existence of the resource curse and possible channels through which natural 
resources may negatively impact economic growth. The various difficulties facing 
petroleum-exporting countries have been identified through a comprehensive survey 
of the relevant literature, and the existing challenges have been classified into three 
categories: economic, political and socio-economic. 
The economic transmission challenges are based on theories of Dutch disease, 
revenue volatility and dependency. The most important symptoms of Dutch disease 
are exchange rate overvaluation, lower investment in tradable sectors, thereby 
obstructing industrialisation, rapid expansion of the service sector, high average 
wages, and unemployment (Oomes and Alcheva, 2007; Ismail, 2010; Benjamin et 
al., 1987; Van Wijnbergen, 1984). 
Unstable oil markets, and thus variability of oil revenues, adversely affect economic 
growth in oil-exporting countries. Market instability poses a threat to investment in 
countries with governments that poorly formulate fiscal policy responses to volatility 
associated with the price of oil (Combes and Guillaumont, 2002; Aizenmand and 
Marion, 1999). Furthermore, fluctuating petroleum revenues may put economic 
development at risk, as government expenditure tends to move pro-cyclically with 
total oil revenues: an oil boom increases the cost of investment, while an oil bust 
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leads to under-spending on capital expenditure (Auty, 2001; Richmond et al., 2013). 
For example, significant revenue shortfalls driven by the sharp decline in global oil 
prices since mid-2014 have impacted the economy in the major exporters of crude 
oil. The low oil prices have led to a budget deficit, which have financed by drawing 
on the saving fund. The major ill effect of this collapse in oil prices has been on the 
capital expenditures since the rainy day fund can protect economies in many 
exporting countries for a short-term. The public and private sectors have cut back on 
investment and thereby delaying the projects (Donnan, 2016; Kerr, 2016; Arezki, 
2015). 
Economic over-dependence on volatile oil revenues is another determinant factor 
that compromises sustainable economic development in petroleum-exporting 
countries. The limited diversification of petroleum-rich economies results in 
dependency, which poses a major threat to long-term economic development in 
petroleum-rich countries. Diversification policies aim to move away from the oil and 
gas sector to other non-petroleum sectors, such as import-substitution industries that 
convert volatile and exhaustible petroleum incomes into other sources of income 
generation (Gill et al., 2014). 
Beyond these economic concerns, the political mechanisms of poor economic 
performance refer to institutional contexts associated with the oil and gas sector. The 
large rents yielded by the major petroleum exporing countries give rise to corruption, 
which results in poor governance, which in turn enables more rent seeking activities. 
Government and political elites may give more opportunities and advantages to their 
preferred allies or networks in an environment that lacks transparency and 
accountability in the processes of awarding contracts, collecting revenues and 
royalties, distributing petroleum revenues and managing public investment. Poor 
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institutional quality converts petroleum-abundant countries into rentier states whose 
major source of income is petroleum revenues. Such governments are less 
transparent and accountable regarding management of the petroleum sector (Karl, 
2004; Busse and Gröning, 2013). 
In addition to the economic and political channels of the resource curse, socio-
economic challenges, such as a low level of human capacity building, may 
exacerbate the adverse effect of petroleum resources on long-term economic growth. 
Petroleum states under-invest in education and workforce skills because their 
economies are based on their endowments of petroleum resources. Such major oil-
exporting countries are classic examples of a ‘rentier state’. Petroleum-led economic 
development may have adverse effects on human capital accumulation by neglecting 
the creation of conditions for improving educational quality. Human capital 
investment may contribute to improving educational quality, which plays a key role 
in diversifying income sources through skilled labour-intensive sectors, such as 
manufacturing and other productive activities (Shao and Yang, 2014; Humphreys et 
al., 2007). 
7.4 Summary of the quantitative data analysis of the resource curse 
This section summarises the findings drawn from the quantitative data. Chapter 3 re-
appraised the importance of the major channels through which natural resources 
influence economic growth, identified in the resource curse literature and discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2. Its main objective was not to establish causality but to infer 
the relative significance of the transmission channels to the resource curse. It 
empirically examined the existence of an adverse relationship between economies 
over-dependent on petroleum and economic growth, and also reappraised the 
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positive effect of human resources and institutional capacity building on economic 
performance. A conditional hypothesis was developed that the impact of natural 
resources, such as petroleum wealth, is conditional on the quality of institutions and 
human capital development. 
Two different models were used for cross-sectional and dynamic panel data analysis. 
Both methods covered a sample of 160 countries over the period 1970 to 2010 to 
determine factors required for long-run economic growth. The first section used 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to answer the research questions. 
The research focused on the direct impact of different types of natural resource that 
are major sources of income generation, and their indirect effect through institutional 
and human resources on average rates of economic growth in countries highly 
dependent on resource exports. Therefore, institutional and human resource quality 
variables and a set of further control variables were added to the regression model. 
These control variables were investment share of GDP to measure growth in capital 
stock, in other words the spending effect with respect to Dutch disease, and terms of 
trade to capture the effect of the volatility of petroleum revenues in countries where 
the petroleum sector is the major source of income generation. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the econometric analysis has shown that countries 
dependent on fuel, identified through the creation of dummy variables, tend to 
underperform in economic growth compared with less fuel-dependent peers. The 
evidence from the OLS estimation suggests the existence of the fuel curse in 
economies relying heavily on petroleum revenues. Moreover, evidence has been 
provided in line with the hypothesis postulating that a good institutional setting will 
help abate the resource curse. Over the period 1970-2010, petroleum-exporting 
countries with higher levels of hydrocarbon dependence tended to be more exposed 
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to the curse because of low institutional capacity. These findings corroborate the 
results of studies conducted on the quality of institutions as important determinants 
of lower growth or, in other words, the curse (Isham et al., 2005; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006; Boschini et al., 2007). 
However, the results should be treated with caution since the cross-sectional analysis 
did not control for unobserved fixed-country effects. Furthermore, the study 
estimated OLS at one point in time, and therefore did not capture the effects of 
dynamic behaviour of the data (Levin, 2006), for example the change over time of 
primary commodity prices such as crude oil, which have fluctuated greatly since 
1970 and have a crucial effect on the economic growth of all oil-based economies. 
In order to overcome the limitations of the cross-country OLS approach, the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) approach was used to add greater precision 
to the estimates. This is a dynamic framework that relates the rate of economic 
growth over time to changes in variables of interest. A five-year lag was used to 
mitigate short-run business cycle effects. In order to account for omitted invariant 
country characteristics such as geographical factors, country fixed effects were 
included; and to overcome omitted shocks occurring in all countries, such as the 
world business cycle effect, a period effect was added to the regression model. 
The systematic GMM estimation method included a regression equation in the levels 
and lagged differences of the endogenous variables as an instrument to overcome the 
weak instruments related to variables showing little variation over time, such as 
institutional quality and human resource development. Furthermore, using this 
technique and focusing on changes in GDP over various five-year periods, it was 
expected that more informative results would be obtained regarding the partial 
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effects on growth of changes in fuel, mineral and agricultural resource dependence, 
institutions and human resources. 
The evidence of the panel data model revealed several main findings. It showed that, 
even controlling for fixed-effect omitted variables, higher fuel exports are related to 
lower long-run economic growth. The main finding associated with the effect of fuel 
exports on economic growth is that quality of institutions is a key factor determining 
the economic performance of petroleum-exporting countries. This finding is 
consistent with studies by Karl (2005), Auty (1993) and Ding and Field (2005). It 
also shows that countries abundant in point resources are more prone to the resource 
curse than diffuse resource-abundant countries, which is consistent with a study by 
Auty (2001). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, these results should be treated with caution, since limited 
data are available and the various dimensions of institutional quality are subject to 
measurement error. As Ross (2014) argues, definitions of institutional quality indices 
are ambiguous, and institutions may also be affected by natural resources. This 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the possible existence of a causal 
relationship between fuel exports and institutional quality. Moreover, how natural 
resources are measured may affect the results, including the distinction between 
natural resource dependence and natural resource abundance, and how they are 
gauged. 
7.5 Summary of the findings of the qualitative data analysis 
This section summarises comparative studies of resource-rich countries that shed 
light on causal explanations for poor economic growth through the transmission 
channels and highlight causal explanations for economic, political and social 
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channels in which natural resource dependence may affect economic growth. These 
help draw policy lessons from the experience of other resource-based industries to 
tackle the diverse curse effects of petroleum revenues on long-run economic 
development. Three research questions were posed to investigate the best policy 
tools, addressing economic, political and socio-economic issues across the selected 
petroleum-producing countries: 
1) How effective are institutional design and structure measures in addressing 
the political and economic issues associated with accountability, transparency 
and checks and balances? 
2) How effective are policies and measures aimed at human resource capacity 
building? 
3) How effective are economic policies in dealing with macroeconomic and 
petroleum revenue management issues? 
A comparative assessment of policy frameworks for institutional design, human 
resource capital development and revenue management was conducted with regard 
to Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
7.5.1 Institutional design 
A comparative assessment of the four major exporting countries has shown that 
institutional frameworks play a major role in maximising the outcomes of the 
petroleum sector. This finding is consistent with the literature suggesting that the 
quality of the existing institutional context determines the enhancement of value 
creation from petroleum wealth, which is not renewable (Barma et al., 2012). For 
instance, Norway has opted for an oil institutional model based on a separation of 
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powers between the NOC, which is engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations, 
the regulatory body, which provides oversight and technical expertise, and the 
government ministry, which helps set policy. These well-designed institutions are 
underlying factors that prevent conflicts of interest and have contributed to 
successful policy implementation in Norway’s petroleum industry. Norway’s oil 
institutional structure, with a strong emphasis on transparency and accountability, 
differs from those of Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
The findings have shown that institutional design is a fundamental factor in effective 
management of the petroleum sector in hydrocarbon-abundant countries. This 
finding is consistent with studies by Heller and Marcel (2012), Lahn et al. (2007, 
2009), Thurber et al. (2010, 2011) and Luong and Weinthak (2006). Furthermore, 
the effective design of institutions is based on setting clear and separate goals, roles 
and responsibilities for the main stakeholders involved in the oil and gas sector. In 
this context, conflicts of interest may be reduced among the key actors: the ministry, 
including an independent, highly capable regulatory agency, foreign and national oil 
firms, and parliament. Assessment of the administrative structure of petroleum 
governance has indicated that best practice in petroleum sector governance is based 
on the separation of functions, which builds the foundation for good governance of 
the oil and gas sectors. 
7.5.2 Developing human resource capital 
This sub-section summarises the findings regarding the human resource capacity-
building policies adopted by the selected countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
human resource development in the oil and gas industry is lacking, and is therefore a 
real cause of concern and a major challenge to national oil companies (NOCs). 
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Shortages of highly qualified and experienced workers have limited the ability of 
NOCs in Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria to plan and execute large-scale, complex 
development projects. In this context, these petroleum-exporting countries are 
dependent on international oil companies (IOCs) and international oilfield service 
companies for technical assistance. Furthermore, analysis of policies associated with 
developing indigenous technological capacity shows that countries relying heavily 
on the petroleum sector have been unable to support local skills development, 
capacity building and utilisation. These results confirm the findings of studies such 
as Glyfason (2001), Bridsall et al. (2001) and Wood and Mayer (1998) that suggest 
that poor human capacity building contributes to the poor performance of petroleum-
based economies. Some authors argue that the level of economic development at the 
time when the countries became an oil exporter and as well as the contribution of oil 
revenues to the development of human capital play a key role in the success of a few 
oil exporting countries, such as Norway (Lederman and Maloney, 2007; Fosu, 2012). 
Furthermore, the abundance of human capital is a major determinant in diversifying 
the export portfolio and thereby increasing manufacturing’s share of GDP in 
hydrocarbon-based economies. 
7.5.3 Revenue management 
This sub-section summarises the main findings with respect to effective mechanisms 
adopted by the selected countries to tackle the volatile and uncertain nature of 
petroleum revenues. It discusses effective policies that address uncertainty in 
petroleum revenue forecasts and possible fluctuations of oil prices. Norway, Kuwait, 
Azerbaijan and Nigeria have each established a petroleum revenues fund to address 
the negative effect of natural resources on growth through the volatility of oil prices. 
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However, the quality of such institutional mechanisms has varied between these 
selected petroleum-exporting countries. 
The establishment of a petroleum fund is insufficient in itself to prevent waste of 
revenues when the fiscal rules and procedures of the fund are ineffective. A well-
designed petroleum revenue fund may impede corruption and rent seeking. The 
findings have shown that the key features of the successful Norwegian petroleum 
fund are a consolidated budget framework, liquidity constraint on the general budget, 
limits on domestic investments by the fund, increased foreign investments, and 
transparency and accountability. These findings are consistent with studies such as 
those by Sturm et al. (2009), Ossowski et al. (2008) and Davis et al. (2003). 
Most of the findings from the comparative cross-country study support and explain 
the results obtained from the statistical analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, an oil-
based economy may be vulnerable to external shocks generated by fluctuations in oil 
prices, but the scale of impact depends largely on the degree of concentration of 
petroleum exporting countries’ export portfolios. Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria 
lack effective diversification policies to prioritise financing facilities for export-
oriented industries, given that inadequate trade finance is a major constraint for 
petroleum exporting countries, especially small and medium-sized firms that have no 
access to finance. 
7.6 Summary of the findings of interview research 
This section summarises the findings of Chapter 5 and the stakeholders’ perceptions 
of the challenges facing the oil and gas sector presented in Chapter 6. It also 
provides a comparative analysis of the four selected petroleum-exporting countries 
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and the Kurdistan region in terms of policy responses to the economic, political and 
socio-economic transmission channels of the resource curse. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to answer three questions relating to the 
economic, political and socioeconomic transmission channels of the resource curse: 
1) How effective, accountable and transparent are institutions in the Kurdistan 
region? What are the challenges and opportunities? 
2) How effective and capable are domestic human resources within the Kurdistan 
region? What are the existing obstacles and opportunities? 
3) What are the challenges currently facing economic development as a whole 
within the Kurdistan region? 
The findings reveal institutional, social, economic and geopolitical challenges facing 
the effective governance of the oil and gas sector and its role in the wider economy 
of the Kurdistan region. 
7.6.1 Institutional challenges 
The feedback obtained from the interviewees has highlighted three main challenges 
facing the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan region: poor institutional design, low 
institutional quality, and poor safeguards and quality controls. The main finding is 
that its current governance suffers from a poorly-designed institutional framework. A 
weak policy-making body (the Regional Council) and the absence of a NOC has 
created a ministry-dominant model of petroleum governance. The weak regulatory 
function exercised by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) has led to poor 
management of all areas in terms of timeliness, predictability and cost-effectiveness. 
The weakness of the regulatory system has resulted in duplication of effort, a lack of 
 217 
!
innovation and a high level of bureaucracy, which is a major obstacle facing oil 
companies in the Kurdistan region. The cumbersome bureaucracy is due to a lack of 
coordination and collaboration between the various departments in the ministry, 
thereby creating opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking behaviours in all 
petroleum activities from exploration to the refinery sector. 
As participants highlighted, the lack of a well-designed governance model for 
petroleum wealth has resulted in increasing public concern about the accountability 
and transparency of the management of oil and gas wealth by the government 
ministry. All interviewees agreed that this is due to a lack of participation by 
international organisations such as EITI and the World Bank, and more importantly 
the ineffective role of the Kurdistan Parliament in overseeing and controlling the oil 
and gas sector. 
The case study on petroleum governance of the Kurdistan region has shed light on 
the fact that institutional weakness in the petroleum sector manifests itself in 
institutional ineffectiveness: institutions are in place to carry out and ensure the 
maximisation of benefits from petroleum resources, but these are not efficiently used 
or enforced. Another manifestation of a weak administrative structure is the lack of 
necessary institutions or companies to carry out the various functions of petroleum 
governance effectively in order to ensure the efficient management of petroleum 
wealth. 
Of the four countries considered in Chapter 4, in Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria 
institutional weakness plays a contributing role in influencing the value creation of 
the petroleum wealth, as in the Kurdistan region. In each case, lack of a clear 
administrative body leads to less transparency and accountability in governance of 
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the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, inefficient administrative design of the 
governance model for the petroleum sector may result in a shortage of experienced 
management, insufficient technical knowledge, political and personal interference, 
inadequate law and regulation, duplication of efforts, excessive bureaucracy, 
conflicts of interest, and poor oversight and control. However, Norway’s experience 
with its oil institutional structure is different from that of the other cases here, with a 
strong emphasis on transparency and accountability. Norway has opted for an oil 
institutional model based on a separation of powers between the NOC, which is 
engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations, the regulatory body, which provides 
oversight and technical expertise, and the government ministry, which helps set 
policy. 
7.6.2 Social challenges 
Most interviewees stated that governance of the oil and gas industry in the Kurdistan 
region has faced two key social challenges: unemployment, and ineffective 
management of public expectations. As explained in Chapter 6, inefficient allocation 
of windfalls has hampered economic development policies, such as domestic 
capacity building of appropriate quality and with capabilities comparable to 
international standards. This context makes it difficult to enhance indigenous 
participation in petroleum activities, use local technology, award more contracts to 
indigenous firms, or stimulate joint venture arrangements between indigenous and 
foreign companies. 
In common with Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria, inadequate investment in 
education and human capacity building is a major challenge facing the Kurdistan 
region. Moreover, a noticeable mismatch between the skills supplied by the 
 219 
!
educational system and labour market demands is a challenge prevalent in these 
three countries as well as the Kurdistan region. Shortage of skills remains a 
significant barrier to productivity improvements. In contrast, Norway benefits from a 
competent labour force, thanks to its efficient, transparent and accountable 
governance structure and institutions. The terms of IOC licences make it mandatory 
to transfer skills and competencies to Norwegian companies, and Norwegian oil 
companies, in particular Statoil, set personnel training as a key objective. In addition 
to training schemes, the transfer of technology and the development of research by 
promoting cooperation between IOCs and Norwegian research institutions are 
successful aspects of Norway’s hydrocarbon policy. 
7.6.3 Economic challenges 
This sub-section examines the major problems affecting the Kurdistan region’s 
economy. Non-transparent revenue collection and spending and continued heavy 
dependence on oil revenues for the prosperity of the region’s people are significant 
obstacles to the economic development of the Kurdistan region. 
The findings from Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that Kurdistan’s oil revenues have 
been collected and allocated by MNR to support various economic sectors. Evidence 
from the interview research has highlighted that petroleum revenues have not been 
collected and spent transparently and accountably owing to the absence of a 
petroleum fund. Thus, Kurdistan needs to transfer all revenues generated from the oil 
and gas sector into a petroleum fund in order to increase transparency and 
accountability in revenue management, and to save some petroleum revenues for 
times when oil prices are high and to smooth fiscal public expenditure when they 
collapse, as has been the case since mid-2014. 
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Unlike the Kurdistan region, Norway, Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria have adopted 
institutional vehicles in response to oil boom and bust. Norway has diversified its 
sources of income, partly by investing its petroleum revenues abroad in order to 
diversify risk and increase expected rates of return. This diversified investment 
portfolio insulates the domestic economy from Dutch disease and external shocks. 
The non-oil tradable sectors are gradually growing; however, the greater proportion 
of non-oil tradable sectors is still linked to hydrocarbon industries. 
However, establishment of a petroleum fund is insufficient to address the economic 
challenges of the petroleum curse, such as Dutch disease and volatile oil revenues. A 
well-designed petroleum fund may lead to the transparent and effective management 
of petroleum revenues but, unlike Norway, the governments of Kuwait, Azerbaijan 
and Nigeria have been unwilling to impose fiscal rules on their respective funds. A 
lack of firm fiscal rules regarding inflows and outflows, as well as inadequate 
independent oversight, has resulted in arbitrary withdrawals of funds. In addition, oil 
funds have not been integrated into the state budgetary process, and powerful 
political and elite groups control transactions from the fund. Given this context, in 
contrast to Norway, transparency and accountability remain a major challenge for 
Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. 
The findings show that the Kurdistan region’s economy is driven overwhelmingly by 
its oil and gas sector. In common with oil-dependent countries such as Kuwait, 
Azerbaijan and Nigeria, the region faces the adverse effects of oil boom and bust. 
The evidence from Chapter 5 indicates that the KRG offers few incentives to help 
develop other domestic economic sectors since its revenues from petroleum 
resources are plentiful; however, this sector is less labour intensive and has led to 
increases in unemployment. Furthermore, private investors are not motivated to 
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invest in economically productive sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, 
since the service and construction sectors provide the biggest profits. Inefficient and 
inadequate fiscal policies, specifically a weak banking system in terms of mobilising 
savings, has made Kurdistan’s economy more heavily dependent on petroleum 
revenues. Hence, the economy has become less diversified and thereby more 
vulnerable to external shocks. 
7.6.4 Geopolitical issues 
The interviewees discussed the further challenge of the geopolitical issues facing the 
Kurdistan region’s oil and gas sector, which are a major source of uncertainty. These 
include the high economic dependency of the KRG on the federal budget, the fact 
that it is a landlocked region, the risk of Islamic State attack, and fluctuations in oil 
prices. 
Given that the Kurdistan region is not an independent country, the major economic 
challenges facing the region are difficult to address. For example, the financial 
dispute between Erbil and Baghdad has had the effect of delaying payments to oil 
and gas companies operating in the Kurdistan region, which has posed a major threat 
to investment plans for the oil and gas industry and other economic sectors. 
However, the KRG has recently started to export its oil independently and faces the 
same challenges as Kuwait, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. The Kurdistan region’s 
economy is vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. The participants’ responses shed 
light on the fact that the Kurdistan region’s dependence on oil revenues is a major 
challenge to long-term economic development. This has occurred as a result of poor 
financial policy and ineffective petroleum revenue management. 
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Another key geopolitical issue outlined by interviewees is linked to petroleum 
exports. They explained that the Kurdistan region is landlocked, which raises issues 
of infrastructural dependency in exporting its oil and gas. The expansion of pipeline 
exports is the lifeblood of the Kurdistan economy, so the future of landlocked 
Kurdistan depends on political relations between Ankara and Erbil. 
Another geopolitical issue highlighted by participants is security, which plays a vital 
role in the ongoing development of the petroleum sector. Security is important for 
optimal and long-term investments and employment development, which have been 
hit particularly badly since companies have been limiting their commitments as a 
result of insurgent attacks. 
7.7 Policy prescription for petroleum governance in the Kurdistan 
region 
The importance of the oil and gas sector to the sustainable development of the 
Kurdistan region’s economy has been highlighted in previous chapters. The findings 
of this thesis have significant institutional consequences for the Kurdistan region in 
that they focus on measures that to enable the KRG to protect the institutional and 
human resource capacity-building base of the petroleum sector, and the region at 
large. The findings also indicate that, as a result of an ineffective governance model 
for the oil and gas industry, the Kurdistan region has failed to manage its petroleum 
revenues effectively. Therefore, as a result of this research, the following governance 
structure for the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan region is proposed: 
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Figure 46: Proposed governance model for Kurdistan region’s oil and gas sector 
As shown in Figure 47, the suggested governance model has three main pillars –
policy formulator, regulator and operator – to prevent conflicts of interest and 
manage petroleum revenues in a more transparent and accountable way. The policy 
pillar should hold overall responsibility for the management of petroleum resources, 
focusing on oil and gas policy issues such as opening new areas for exploration, 
allocating contracts and approving development plans for awarded blocks. The 
Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) should be responsible for policy setting. A clear 
understanding of the responsibilities and organisational structure of the SPC may 
lead to greater accountability and transparency in the vision, policies and plans of the 
KRG for its petroleum resources. 
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• Monitoring by the Oil and Gas Ministry 
The Oil and Gas Ministry should regulate, monitor and supervise all petroleum 
activities implemented by independent entities, including the Kurdistan Exploration 
and Production Company (KEPCO), the Kurdistan National Oil Company (KNOC), 
the Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation (KOMO) and the Kurdistan Organisation 
for Downstream Operations (KODO), as well as foreign oil companies. The 
government ministry should be the driving force in realising the region’s petroleum 
resource potential by emphasising long-term solutions, upside opportunities, local 
content development, cooperation with other authorities and comprehensive follow-
ups of petroleum activities. It should have national responsibility for ensuring that 
the state collects revenues, taxes and fees from the petroleum sector, collects and 
analyses petroleum data, conducts audits and publishes consistent data on petroleum 
activities. The Ministry of Oil and Gas should also act as the SPC’s technical arm 
and advisory body. 
•  Involvement of NOCs 
National Oil Companies need to be involved in petroleum sector activities in order to 
localise the oil and gas industry by transferring technical capability within the sector 
and thus building indigenous capacity. Foreign oil companies, as investors, need to 
deliver corporate social responsibility programmes that provide sufficient benefit to 
local populations through hiring and training nationals, creating a national supply 
and investing in infrastructure (such as capturing flared gas and developing a gas 
network) and ancillary industries such as refineries. 
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• Effective oversight by independent bodies 
The effective role of parliament, the independent general auditor’s office and related 
international organisations such as IETI and the Revenue Watch Institute is crucial 
in exercising oversight of the oil and gas sectors and thereby making petroleum 
activities transparent and accountable. Members of the natural resource committee 
need to be educated specifically on oil issues to fill the current communication gap. 
In addition, the general auditor’s office needs to improve its technical capacity in 
terms of auditing petroleum activities. 
•  Establishment of a Petroleum Fund 
Regarding petroleum revenue management, a well-designed Petroleum Fund and 
access to detailed payment information play important roles in increasing 
transparency in revenue collection and spending. Transparency is also vital to 
prevent rumours from spreading, thus encouraging political and social cohesion in 
the Kurdistan region. Real public understanding of oil and gas revenue collection 
and spending decisions may build trust between government and public, thereby 
enabling public expectations to be managed more effectively. 
• Reduction of fuel subsidies 
The KRG has made little effort to raise non-oil revenues. A huge proportion of 
government expenditure has been allocated to maintaining fuel subsidies, which 
benefit richer households disproportionately because the quantity of petroleum 
products consumed by poorer households is lower. This inequality could be 
mitigated by removing the subsidies, thereby directly supporting low-income 
households and financing better targeted projects to compensate the poorest 
households. 
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Total subsidies to the electricity sector by the KRG cost $3 billion a year, so major 
reforms are needed to reduce subsidies to the power sector. Replacing diesel-fired 
power stations with natural gas-fired electric power plants, reforming the level and 
structure of electricity prices, and increasing private-sector participation in the 
electricity sector are effective strategies to eliminate subsidies while enhancing the 
government’s capacity for capital expenditure. Therefore, in order to raise non-oil 
revenues over the medium term, the KRG should redirect expenditure away from 
such subsidies. This may help finance greater public investment in non-oil sectors of 
the economy and also finance poor households in order to reduce poverty and 
inequality. 
• Prudent investment in other sectors 
In order to convert depleting petroleum wealth into other assets, it is vitally 
important to invest oil and gas revenues prudently. Given the Kurdistan region’s 
insufficient technical education and infrastructure, it may be difficult for it to move 
directly to industrial production. Development of the agricultural sector is vital to the 
region’s medium-term future. In particular, investment of oil revenues in enhancing 
the productivity of the agricultural sector may reduce poverty and enable broader 
industrial economic development. Import substitution policies would build up the 
Kurdistan region’s non-petroleum exporting sector and eventually enable it to 
become self-sufficient in major food production. Furthermore, the private sector 
should be encouraged to engage in food production and agro-processing. 
• Development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
In order to address the crowding-out effects relating to Dutch disease, it is vital to 
build an effective fiscal fund to help promote small and medium-sized enterprises in 
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the Kurdistan region and thereby support economic growth and development. Since 
SMEs are labour intensive, they may play a major role in increasing employment, 
developing skills and alleviating poverty. 
• Strengthening the financial sector 
The weak domestic banking system is unable to mobilise savings and channel them 
effectively into private investment. Therefore, in the long term, building the capacity 
of the financial sector will be critical in mobilising resources for domestically 
generated growth in the Kurdistan region. 
• Reform of the tax system 
The existing tax system in the Kurdistan region is limited and is ineffective in 
meeting rising budget financing needs in the context of a period of low oil prices. 
• Investment in human capital 
Human capital investment must be increased in order to educate and train local 
experts and skilled labour adequately. Development of the education system (higher 
education and vocational institutions) may contribute positively to increasing 
participation in the industry, in particular in oil and gas. 
• Diversification of petroleum trade routes 
The Kurdistan Region is landlocked and far from international oil markets. Lack of 
territorial access to the coast makes the region dependent mainly on pipelines to 
transport its hydrocarbon to world markets and limits its petroleum trading activities 
with the rest of the world. Major crude oil export pipelines include the pipeline from 
the Kurdistan Region to Turkey’s Ceyhan port, which poses a threat of high 
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dependency on Turkish trade routes. The second export route for crude oil is through 
Iran, trucking Kurdish oil to Iran’s Bandar Imam Khomeini for shipping to Asia. 
For the Kurdistan Region, being landlocked poses distinct challenges, particularly 
with respect to trade. In addition to transportation costs, the quality and reliability of 
transportation is dependent on factors outside the sphere of influence of the 
Kurdistan Region. Given these challenges, it is crucial that the KRG seeks to 
develop its trade and transport routes and reduce its high dependency on petroleum 
exports through diversification of petroleum trade routes, such as the development of 
local power generation and electricity exports. 
7.8 Integration between quantitative and qualitative data and a 
general policy prescription for petroleum-exporting countries 
The previous sections have presented separate summaries of the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative data. As discussed in Chapter 1, this study has employed 
a mixed-methods approach, which is very useful for explaining the results when both 
quantitative and qualitative data are used (Creswell and Clark, 2011; Boyed et al., 
2012). The mixed method is uncommon in the resource curse literature. Having first 
obtained statistical findings with respect to the transmission of the resource curse, 
this study has used an explanatory sequential design (Creswell and Clark, 2011) to 
gain deeper insights from cross-country comparative analysis. 
The main findings of the cross-country comparative analysis support the results 
obtained from the statistical analysis. Best practice in petroleum wealth management 
indicates that the petroleum resource curse is not inevitable. Prudent and sound 
institutional, human resource capacity building and petroleum revenue management 
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policies help avoid transmission of the resource curse. Although most of the 
literature on the resource curse has paid little attention to the role of administrative 
design in the oil and gas sector as a key factor in increasing the value creation of 
petroleum wealth, this study suggests that a well-designed institutional governance 
model for the petroleum industry is vital to addressing common problems associated 
with effective economic and human resource development. 
The main findings suggest the following recommendations for policy makers in 
petroleum-exporting and newly-emerging petroleum-rich countries for the effective 
governance of their oil and gas sectors. 
• Governance of petroleum wealth: 
- Separation of policy-making, regulatory and commercial functions to avoid 
conflicts of interest and increase transparency and accountability. 
- Establishment of NOC as a tool to achieve wider socio-economic policy 
objectives, such as economic diversification and raised local educational 
levels. 
- An independent NOC board to reduce political interference in the decision-
making process and delays in the approval process, as well as enabling the 
NOC to maximise its limited technical capacity and become more transparent 
and accountable. 
- Enhancement of the technical capability of the regulatory body. 
- Improvement of parliamentary oversight and control. 
• Human resource capacity 
- Efficient local content measures to increase levels of productivity and 
competitiveness in oil- and gas-exporting countries. 
- Localisation of the workforce and the development of local servicing 
companies. 
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- Enhancement of the quality of educational and vocational systems. 
- Staff training and a constant upgrading of workers’ skills. 
- Effective use of petroleum revenues. 
• Petroleum revenue management 
- A well-functioning petroleum fund through: 
o  A consolidated budget framework. 
o Liquidity constraints on the general budget. 
o Limits on domestic investment by the fund. 
o Investing petroleum revenues abroad. 
- Diversification of export portfolios through: 
o Creating links within the petroleum sector, such as petrochemical 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
o Creating links with other economic sectors, such as agriculture and 
industrial manufacturing. 
7.9 Contributions of the research 
This research has critically engaged with the resource curse literature by adopting a 
triangulation approach through cross-country quantitative analysis (econometric 
analysis), cross-country case analysis (comparative analysis) and a single case study 
(documentary research and interview analysis). The research represents a critical 
reappraisal of the resource curse thesis. It extends current knowledge and takes an 
important step towards explaining why some petroleum-exporting countries 
successfully develop their economies whilst others fail, as well as identifying the 
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main challenges facing the governance of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas wealth. This 
research makes theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the 
literature on the resource curse in general, and on the Kurdistan region’s oil and gas 
sector in particular. 
7.9.1 Theoretical contributions 
From a theoretical point of view, this study has reappraised the resource curse 
theory, and has identified the main transmission channels of the resource curse in 
petroleum-exporting countries. It contributes theoretically by extending the 
application of political economy theory to examine empirically the role of 
institutional and human resource capacity building in sustainable economic 
development. It has focused particularly on the managerial model of the petroleum 
sector, in the context of which few previous studies have investigated the effect of 
administrative design as a causal factor affecting performance. An important 
theoretical contribution of this research, which has not been investigated by previous 
studies, is its empirical investigation of the governance model of the Kurdistan 
region, as a newly-emerging petroleum-exporting region. This study has assessed the 
effectiveness of its management of the oil and gas sector, and the role of the 
petroleum industry’s governance model in the capacity building and development of 
other economic sectors. 
7.9.2 Methodological contributions 
This research has provided valuable methodological insights that may be 
incorporated into future research in the same field. It has overcome the 
methodological limitations of previous studies, which have been confined mainly to 
the cross-country quantitative method and detailed qualitative case studies to 
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examine the resource curse theory. This research has addressed the issues from 
several directions by adopting a methodological triangulation approach. In addition 
to conducting econometric analysis to identify the main causal mechanisms through 
which petroleum rents have an impact on economic outcomes, a case study analysis 
has been carried out to provide a causal explanation of the potential implications of 
hydrocarbon rents for sustainable economic development in petroleum-exporting 
countries. 
A further methodological contribution relates to understanding the development of 
the newly-emerging oil and gas industry in the Kurdistan region by conducting 
interview research based on the results of the quantitative and qualitative cross-
country studies. This method has provided an in-depth explanation of the impact of 
the governance model on sustainable economic development in the Kurdistan region 
as a new player in global energy security. 
7.9.3 Empirical contributions 
There have been few previous studies in the field of petroleum sector governance 
models. The methods and findings of this research offer a basis for political 
economy scholars to expand studies of the political transmission channels of the 
resource curse. The research has revealed that the petroleum sector’s governance 
model is a significant factor in promoting or hindering the effective management of 
oil and gas resources by the KRG. The findings of this research may assist policy 
makers in redesigning the administrative structure of the oil and gas sector in the 
Kurdistan region. In addition, the approach adopted by this study might be used to 
study other regions and states with similar circumstances or characteristics. 
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7.10 Limitations of the research 
This research has aimed to investigate the main challenges facing petroleum-
exporting countries from a broader socio-economic perspective. As with all studies, 
however, confidence in the findings must be considered in light of the limitations. 
Limited data are available, and variables such as various dimensions of institutional 
quality and economic growth are subject to measurement error. 
7.11 Recommendations for future research 
This research has provided a better understanding of the issues facing petroleum-
exporting countries by addressing them from different directions. Since few studies 
have applied the triangulation approach, it is recommended that further such studies 
be conducted to investigate the best policies to achieve better performance over the 
long run, and to identify the main transmission channels of the resource curse. 
In addition, the results of this study show that an effective governance structure for 
the oil and gas sector will create the conditions for sustained economic growth and 
improve human resource capacity building and institutional quality, leading to a 
lower level of corruption and rent-seeking activities. It is recommended that future 
studies should examine the effect of administrative design of the oil and gas sector 
on the wider economy of petroleum-exporting countries, in particular newly 
emerging petroleum exporters.  
There are a number of additional areas for further research that have been 
highlighted by this thesis. These include the further investigation of the importance 
of different transmission channels of the resource curse by using different regression 
models such as switching regression models. Switching regression models allow one 
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to take into account country heterogeneity by looking at effects common for a group 
of countries. The approach could also provide a threshold value to classify natural 
resource dependency as a blessing or a curse. 
An alternative way of using institutional variables is to create a composite index for 
the institutional indicators, which are highly correlated with each other, but not 
correlated with other covariates. The creation of a composite index would reduce the 
problems of collinearity and confounded effects. The disadvantage is that the effects 
of the different indicators are distinguished in the index estimation using principal 
component analysis and factor analysis, but are not separated in the regression 
model.  
Moreover, the squares of the explanatory variables could be added to the regression 
to measure additional nonlinear effects. Using squared explanatory variables allows 
the computation of the optimal level of natural resources as a share of GDP. The 
optimal level will differ across countries and over time.  
Another alternative approach to estimate the effects of natural resources on 
economic growth is to use matching techniques. In this case, the resource rich 
countries are compared with counterfactuals, namely countries with identical 
characteristics but without natural resources. The explanatory variables are measured 
with errors so they are often approximation. Measurement errors in dependent 
variables are absorbed in the residual term. However, measurement errors in the 
explanatory variables can lead to biased parameter estimates. Secondary data suffer 
from both aggregation and approximation bias sources, and thus measurement errors 
normally create attenuation bias. This implies that the empirical results in chapter 3 
may underestimate the impact of natural resource on economic growth. A possible 
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solution to this problem is the use of an instrumental variable estimator, although it 
is normally hard to find an adequate instrument in typical economic datasets. Future 
research could use the estimation result in forecasts and policy simulation predicting 
policy outcomes for the emerging oil and gas sectors, and could also apply the 
methodology employed in this thesis to other interesting case studies, such as 
Scotland or Alberta. 
 
7.12 Concluding remarks 
This research has provided causal explanations of the resource curse confronting 
most petroleum-exporting countries by investigating the political, social and 
economic factors through which petroleum revenues are converted into a curse rather 
than a blessing. The findings of the research are significant, given that few previous 
studies in the resource curse literature have applied a mixed methods approach. This 
research has shown that empirical studies are insufficient to assist petroleum 
exporters in addressing the transmission channels of the resource curse, whereas case 
studies help to highlight policy options that will deal most successfully with 
channels contributing to the curse. The implications of this research may be useful in 
helping new petroleum exporters to avoid the resource curse. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Institutional indices definition 
 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA): Reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability (PS): Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GEF): Reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ): Reflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL): Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC): Reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
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Appendix B: All licensed fields in Kurdistan region as of 2014 (Source: MNR, 
2014) 
  Block Name Status City Company Name (Operator) 
1 Tawke Production Duhok DNO 
2 Sulevani Exploration Duhok PETROQUEST RESOURCES 
3 Central Duhok Exploration Duhok Murphy Oil 
4 SINDI Amedi Open Duhok Open 
5 Ber Bahr Exploration Duhok Genel Energy 
6 Sumail Exploration Duhok DNO ASA 
7 Shaikan Production Duhok Gulfkeystone  
8 Skeikh Adi Exploration Duhok Gulfkeystone  
9 Sarsang Production Duhok Hillwood Int Energy 
10 Atrush Production Duhok TAQA 
11 Alqush Exploration Duhok EXXON mobile 
12 Jebeel Kand Open Duhok Open 
13 AIN SIFNI Exploration Duhok Afreen 
14 Baeshiqa Exploration Duhok EXXON mobile 
15 Rovi Exploration Duhok Chevron 
16 Sarta Exploration Duhok Chevron 
17 Bardarash Production Erbil AFREN PLC 
18 Hawler Production Erbil ORYX Petroleum 
19 Khurmala Production Erbil Kurdistan Gov 
20 Erbil Open Erbil Open 
21 Qushtapa Open Erbil Open 
22 Mala Omar Open Erbil Open 
23 Shorish Open Erbil Open 
24 Pirmam Exploration Erbil EXXON mobile 
25 Bina Bawi Production Erbil OMV 
26 Taq Taq Production Erbil Genel Energy 
27 Safen Exploration Erbil Marathon Oil and Total 
28 Harir Exploration Erbil Marathon Oil 
29 Shakrok Exploration Erbil HESS Corporation 
30 Betwata Exploration Erbil EXXON mobile 
31 Hindreen Exploration Erbil Turkish Entity 
32 Choman Exploration Erbil Turkish Entity 
33 Dinarta Exploration Erbil HESS Corporation 
34 Akre Bijeel Production Erbil MOL 
35 Qandil Open Erbil Open 
36 Block A Open Erbil Open 
37 Qara Hanjeer Exploration Kirkuk EXXON mobile 
38 Chemchemal Production Sulaimanya Pearl Petroleum 
39 Kewa Chirmla Exploration Sulaimanya Genel Energy 
40 Khalakan Exploration Sulaimanya Gas Plus 
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41 Qaladze Exploration Sulaimanya Repsol 
42 Piramagrun Exploration Sulaimanya Repsol 
43 Miran Production Sulaimanya Genel Energy 
44 Bazian Exploration Sulaimanya KNOC 
45 Sangaw North Open Sulaimanya Open 
46 Top Khana Exploration Sulaimanya Talisman Energy 
47 Kurdamir Production Sulaimanya Talisman Energy 
48 Khor Mor Production Sulaimanya Pearl Petroleum 
49 Taza Exploration Sulaimanya Oil Search 
50 Pul Khana Exploration Sulaimanya Turkish Entity 
51 Garmian Production Sulaimanya Western Zagros 
52 Shakal Exploration Sulaimanya Prime Natural Resources 
53 Chia Surkh Exploration Sulaimanya Genel Energy 
54 Qaradagh Exploration Sulaimanya Chevron 
55 BARANAN Exploration Sulaimanya Talisman Energy 
56 Arbat Exploration Sulaimanya Turkish Entity 
57 Arbat East Exploration Sulaimanya EXXON mobile 
58 Penjwin Open Sulaimanya Open 
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Appendix C: Interview questions 
 
Introduction and Purpose of this Interview 
I am a doctoral candidate attending Warwick Business School at the University of Warwick. My 
primary academic focus is upon the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector and the future opportunities 
this will create on many levels. The emergence of the Kurdistan Region as a new oil and gas-
producing region has driven my research to examine the following questions: 
• What are the specific challenges associated with petroleum-led economic development? 
• What are the conditions under which oil and gas-rich countries can channel more of their 
revenues into their institutional and human resource capacity building? 
•  How can they promote sustainable economic development? 
In order to identify the major challenges facing resource-rich countries, as a first step, I have 
conducted a comprehensive literature review. On the basis of this, I have divided the existing 
challenges into three categories: economic, political, and socio-economic. In addition, these different 
transmission channels of the resource curse were re-tested through econometric analysis. Evidence 
shows that a high level of institutional and human resource quality is a major driver for transforming 
the resulting petroleum wealth into a blessing rather than curse.  
In the second step, I conducted cross-country case studies to identify effective economic, political and 
socio-economic policies that address the resource curse challenges. In the third step, I conducted an 
overview of Kurdistan’s petroleum development through publicly published documents. My research 
to date suggests that the economic, political, and socio-economic areas are of particularly important in 
understanding the successful ability of a petroleum resource rich region or country to deal with the 
potential resource curse. This has informed a number of generic questions related to these three areas 
in my interview research.  
Confidentiality 
All data provided is confidential and will be identified by a unique participant number while I am 
writing my thesis and it will not be possible to identify individuals that have provided information. 
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This interview research includes examining the details that surround the challenges 
and opportunities associated with development of the oil and gas sector within the 
Kurdistan Region. It is a semi-structured interview and the target groups who are 
involved in the oil and gas sector include:  
1. Ministry of Natural Resources: According to Kurdistan’s petroleum law, the 
Ministry shall oversee and regulate its Petroleum Operation. The responsibilities 
of the Ministry include the formulation, implementation, supervision, 
inspection, auditing and enforcement of all petroleum operations by all 
persons and all activities relating thereto. This includes the marketing of 
petroleum, and negotiating, agreeing and executing all authorisations, including 
petroleum contracts, entered into by the Regional Government as well as for 
amending the terms of any authorisation to ensure that the petroleum operations 
are carried out for the benefit of the people of the Region and Iraq. 
2. Kurdistan Parliament (Natural Resource Committee): The committee as the 
highest legal authority is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the Ministry 
of Natural Resource’s activities. 
3. The Foreign Oil and Gas Companies: The foreign investors involved in the 
Kurdistan’s petroleum industry. 
4. Domestic Suppliers: The indigenous investors involved in the Kurdistan’s 
petroleum industry. 
5. Media: The Kurdish journalists who work within Kurdistan’s media 
My research to date suggests that the economic, political, and socio-economic areas 
are of particularly importance in understanding the ability of a petroleum resource 
rich country or region to deal with a potential resources curse. Therefore the 
following are critical and generic questions related to the three areas contained in the 
interview research: 
• How effective, accountable, and transparent are the institutions in the Kurdistan 
Region? What are the challenges and opportunities?  
• How effective and capable are the domestic human resources within the 
Kurdistan Region? What are the existing obstacles and opportunities? 
• What are the challenges currently facing the economic development as a whole 
within the Kurdistan Region? 
Interview Questions 
1. Ministry of Natural of Resources 
1.1 How effective, accountable, and transparent are the institutions within the 
Kurdistan Region? What are the apparent challenges and opportunities?  
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1.2 How effective and transparent is the licensing process? (Announcement- 
application- negotiation; negotiation contract team) 
1.3 How effective is the monitoring and supervision system currently in place? 
(Exploration, production activities, auditing, environment and safety issues). Is 
there adequate skill and sufficient technical knowledge in place?  
1.4 How efficient is the data management solution and is an IT system in place?  
(This is based upon a consistent data model, a reference/administrative database 
for most important types of data, modern data storage media and well-maintained 
hardware, allowing efficient use of GIS and other petroleum management 
software systems). 
1.5 What are your thoughts about the establishment of the Kurdistan National Oil 
Company? Is it necessary? If yes, what role will this national oil company play in 
the petroleum sector? Which operational mechanisms should be considered?  
1.6 How effective is the Foreign Investment law within Kurdistan in terms of 
attracting the foreign investors? What are the current obstacles? 
1.7 How is the petroleum sector affected due to increasing instability on Kurdistan’s 
borders?  
1.8 To what extent has domestic employment been increasing within oil and gas 
sector? How effective is Kurdistan’s domestic training program? What are the 
prescient obstacles?  
2. The Natural Resource Committee of Parliament 
2.1 How capable and independent are the policymaking and regulatory authorities 
within Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector? (Political and elite group interest as 
opposed to the national interest).  
2.2 How effective and transparent is the licensing process? (Block announcement, 
application, and negotiation) 
2.3 How effective is the supervision of the committee on the policy-making process 
and the implement of the petroleum polices? (Setting petroleum policy, auditing 
and environment issues) 
2.4  What are the related obstacles? (Lack of cooperation, and committee’s technical 
capability) 
2.5  What are your thoughts about the establishment of the Kurdistan National 
Company? Is it necessary? If so, what role will the national oil company play in 
the emerging petroleum sector? Which operational mechanisms should be 
considered?  
2.6 How effective are the investment regulations law within Kurdistan to attract 
eager foreign investors to the petroleum and other industries? 
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2.7 To what extent has the domestic employment been increasing? How effective is 
Kurdish domestic training program? What are its present obstacles?  
3. International Oil Companies 
a. How effective are the regulatory institutions in Kurdistan? 
(Less bureaucratic, competent public institutions, the tax institution) 
b. How effective is the Foreign Investment Law within Kurdistan in 
attracting the interested foreign investors?  
c. What are the obstacles that exist and the present opportunities available to 
foreign investors who are tending to enter in Kurdistan with greater 
frequency? 
d. How has the petroleum sector been affected by the increasing instability 
on the Kurdistan’s borders? (A decline in investment or change of 
shareholders in PSCs contracts) 
e. To what extent has domestic employment been increasing? How effective 
is Kurdistan’s domestic training program? What obstacles exist in its 
implementation?  
4. Domestic Suppliers (local content) 
4.1 How transparent is the awarding of the subcontracts? 
4.2 How supportive is the government in encouraging its indigenous industries?  
(Financial support) 
4.3 How efficient is the related legislation? 
4.4 How competitive are Kurdish companies when compared to the foreign 
companies working within Kurdistan? 
4.5 What are the obstacles and opportunities? 
4.6 5. Media: Kurdish Journalists 
a. How easy is for the media to access the relevant data associated with 
the oil and gas sector?  
b. How greatly does the public trust that the petroleum wealth will bring 
increased welfare and blessing for them? 
c. To what extent has the government been successful in developing 
Kurdish talent within the hydrocarbon industry and also within its 
domestic companies? 
d. What are the obstacles that exist vis-a-vis domestic capacity building? 
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e. How has the petroleum sector been affected after a marked increase 
of instability along the borders of Kurdistan? 
